MICHIGAN
INDEPENDENT
CITIZENS
REDISTRICTING
COMMISSION

Report on 2021 Redistricting

FOREWORD

For most of Michigan's history, redistricting was conducted by the State Legislature—a process that all too often sparked political controversy and judicial intervention when the Legislature and Governor could not agree on a plan. That all changed when Michigan voters approved a constitutional amendment in 2018 that created a **Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (MICRC)** and vested it with exclusive authority to adopt new district boundaries based on census data for the Michigan Senate, Michigan House of Representatives, and U.S. House of Representatives every 10 years beginning in 2021.

The **Michigan Constitution** vests the State's redistricting process in the hands of the MICRC, led by 13 Commissioners who are selected using a process designed to provide for balanced, independent, and transparent governance. Commissioners were selected and appointed by August 2020 using the process outlined in the constitutional amendment. In order to ensure balance, under the Michigan Constitution, our 13 Commissioners are politically balanced: four members who affiliated with the Democratic party, four members who affiliated with the Republican party, and five members who were not affiliated with any political party.

Together, we completed the first open, independent and citizen-led redistricting process in Michigan history while far surpassing the MICRC's goals for public comment, public hearing attendance and news media coverage. The Michigan Constitution mandated at least 10 public hearings around the state during 2020-21. We held at least 139 public hearings, including 16 hearings prior to drafting maps, and received over 29,000 public comments.

Our mission since we began in 2020 was to lead Michigan's redistricting process to assure Michigan's Congressional, State Senate, and State House district lines were drawn fairly in a transparent manner, meeting Constitutional mandates. Our aim throughout the process was to raise public awareness of the commission, encourage citizens to participate in the map-making process, generate consistent news media coverage to inform the public and answer questions from the news media and public about the commission's work.

Without question, the MICRC's efforts to complete its responsibilities was challenged by the greatest public health crisis in more than a century caused by the devastating spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Michigan census data the commission anticipated using in early 2021 was not provided by the U.S. Census Bureau until late September due to COVID-related delays. While the lack of timely census data did not ultimately impede the commission from faithfully serving the people of Michigan, it did contribute to the MICRC's final maps not being approved until Dec. 28.

Despite these challenges, the MICRC fulfilled its constitutional mandate. We met or surpassed every metric of public observation and participation. From September 17, 2020, through May 6, 2021, before map drawing began we held 35 public meetings to address preliminary matters like hiring staff, procurement activities, and adoption of procedures. While the Michigan Constitution required the Commission to hold ten public hearings before drafting, we held sixteen. After the release of redistricting data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we created draft proposed maps. At this stage, we held 38 more public meetings throughout the state.

After winnowing the list of draft proposed U.S. House of Representatives, Michigan House of Representatives, and Michigan Senate plans to 15 plans, we published those proposed plans, accepted more feedback, and held an additional four meetings before adopting, at our December 28, 2021, meeting, new redistricting plans. As the Constitution requires, each plan was adopted by the vote of at

least two Commissioners affiliated with the two major parties and two Commissioners affiliated with no party.

Getting public input and promoting transparency in the MICRC process was of the utmost importance so that the public had confidence in our work as well as the work of future Michigan redistricting commissions. By holding dozens of meetings in every region of the state throughout 2020-21 was instrumental to the MICRC's ability to gain knowledge and insights from the public, then systematically go through and make the changes that we needed to comply with the seven ranked redistricting criteria, which include compliance with the Voting Rights Act and partisan fairness.

Planning and research was fundamental to the MICRC's work. The MICRC consulted with leaders of redistricting commissions from California and Arizona, the first and second states in the nation to approve similar commissions, respectively. We heard from experts with the University of Michigan and Michigan State University. We received feedback on our proposed maps from hundreds of organizations that helped shape our decisions.

"Redistricting is never easy," as the U.S. Supreme Court stated in *Abbott v. Perez*. This process has proved that although redistricting presents unique challenges, the MICRC has been successful in collaboratively overcoming those challenges. The adopted redistricting plan with new legislative boundaries will be used for the 2022 primary and general elections.

The MICRC is proud of what we achieved. We are not alone in that belief.

The Princeton Gerrymandering Project, a nonpartisan research group that analyzes redistricting with the aim of eliminating partisan gerrymandering across the country, graded the MICRC's congressional map with an overall score of "A" and a "B" for the state House and Senate maps, saying "compared to a lot of maps across the country, they did very well."

As one [New York newspaper editorial](#) observed after the MICRC's landmark maps were announced: "The state of Michigan has just done something almost miraculous in this time of political acrimony – and something every citizen in America should want their state to do: It has done away, as much as possible, with political gerrymandering and taken a giant leap toward guaranteeing fair state and federal representation."

Equally important, the MICRC commissioned the Glengariff Group, Inc. to conduct two pre- and post-campaign statewide surveys of Michigan voters. The benchmarking survey was conducted March 27-31, 2021. The post-survey was a 600 sample, live operator telephone survey conducted on Feb. 11-14, 2022 and has a margin of error of +/-4.0% with a 95% level of confidence.

Key results from the post-campaign public opinion survey show:
- Most impressively, at the conclusion of the survey, all voters were asked if Michigan should continue to allow the Michigan Independent Citizens' Redistricting Commission to redraw the state's maps or should Michigan go back to allowing elected representatives that have control in the State Legislature to redraw the maps. ***By an overwhelming margin of 65.5% to 10.1%, Michigan voters say the state should continue with the redistricting commission moving forward.***
- Voters were asked if Michigan citizens did or did not have a greater role in deciding how new districts would be drawn. By a margin of 45.0%-22.1%, voters aware of the MICRC's work believe Michigan citizens did have a great role.

- Voters were asked if the Commission succeeded or failed in giving Michigan citizens a greater role than politicians in designing new districts. By a margin of 49.6%-22.1%, voters aware of the MICRC's work said the MICRC succeeded in giving Michigan citizens a greater role.

Our democracy is stronger thanks to Michigan citizens' engagement, leadership and vision for a fair, inclusive and transparent process that puts voters above politics and ensures gerrymandering in Michigan is done once and for all.

PURPOSE STATEMENT

This report fulfills the MICRC's requirement enumerated as follows in the Michigan Constitution:

> *"(16) For each adopted plan, the commission shall issue a report that explains the basis on which the commission made its decisions in achieving compliance with plan requirements and shall include the map and legal description required in part (9) of this section. A commissioner who votes against a redistricting plan may submit a dissenting report which shall be issued with the commission's report."*

The seven ranked, constitutionally mandated criteria below were used to draw new district boundaries for the state's Congressional, State Senate and State House districts:

> *"(a) Districts shall be of equal population as mandated by the United States constitution, and shall comply with the voting rights act and other federal laws.*
>
> *(b) Districts shall be geographically contiguous. Island areas are considered to be contiguous by land to the county of which they are a part.*
>
> *(c) Districts shall reflect the state's diverse population and communities of interest. Communities of interest may include, but shall not be limited to, populations that share cultural or historical characteristics or economic interests. Communities of interest do not include relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates.*
>
> *(d) Districts shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any political party. A disproportionate advantage to a political party shall be determined using accepted measures of partisan fairness.*
>
> *(e) Districts shall not favor or disfavor an incumbent elected official or a candidate.*
>
> *(f) Districts shall reflect consideration of county, city, and township boundaries.*
>
> *(g) Districts shall be reasonably compact."*

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Dissenting Reports

Commissioner Lange: Dissent to All Adopted Maps
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Michigan Congressional Districts

Michigan was apportioned 13 congressional districts following the 2020 Decennial Census, a reduction of one district from the 2010 apportionment. The Michigan Independent Citizen's Redistricting Commission approved the following map and district boundaries.

Legal Description & Interactive Map

Metro Detroit

POPULATION

"(a) Districts shall be of equal population as mandated by the United States constitution, and shall comply with the voting rights act and other federal laws."

The Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission sought and relied on legal counsel and expert advice in order to draw plans that complied with the requirements of the United States constitution, the Voting Rights Act and other federal laws. Material reflecting that counsel and advice is accessible on the Commission's website.

Meeting Notices & Materials

Meeting Notices & Materials Archives

Mapping Data

DISTRICT	Total Population				Racial Demographics as Percent of Total Population					Voting Age Population		Racial Demographics as Percent of Voting Population				
	All Persons	Target	Dev.	Difference	NH White	NH Black	NH Asian	Hispanic	Minority	VAP	% of Total	NH White	NH Black	NH Asian	Hispanic	Minority
1	775,375	775,179	0.03%✓	196	89.45%	0.92%	0.55%	2.04%	10.55%	633,080	81.6%	90.86%	0.99%	0.55%	1.62%	9.14%
2	774,997	775,179	-0.02%✓	-182	87.82%	1.99%	0.55%	4.65%	12.18%	606,868	78.3%	89.17%	2.21%	0.56%	3.82%	10.83%
3	775,414	775,179	0.03%✓	235	70.15%	11.06%	2.99%	10.67%	29.85%	597,448	77.0%	74.00%	10.25%	2.95%	8.81%	26.00%
4	774,600	775,179	-0.07%✓	-579	75.09%	8.32%	2.46%	8.56%	24.91%	593,972	76.7%	78.42%	7.71%	2.46%	7.05%	21.58%
5	774,544	775,179	-0.08%✓	-635	84.50%	4.07%	0.86%	5.18%	15.50%	606,306	78.3%	86.61%	4.04%	0.88%	4.13%	13.39%
6	775,273	775,179	0.01%✓	94	69.15%	9.90%	10.38%	4.96%	30.85%	619,426	79.9%	71.51%	9.53%	10.12%	4.34%	28.49%
7	775,238	775,179	0.01%✓	59	79.90%	5.89%	3.20%	5.66%	20.10%	611,160	78.8%	82.03%	5.67%	3.23%	4.77%	17.97%
8	775,229	775,179	0.01%✓	50	73.40%	14.85%	1.11%	5.35%	26.60%	606,390	78.2%	76.23%	13.91%	1.14%	4.44%	23.77%
9	774,962	775,179	-0.03%✓	-217	87.94%	2.25%	1.31%	3.86%	12.06%	606,770	78.3%	89.59%	2.18%	1.28%	3.14%	10.41%
10	775,218	775,179	0.00%✓	39	72.75%	13.27%	6.08%	3.03%	27.25%	620,272	80.0%	75.73%	12.09%	5.78%	2.56%	24.27%
11	775,568	775,179	0.05%✓	389	68.30%	12.94%	8.67%	5.33%	31.70%	624,065	80.5%	70.86%	12.50%	8.39%	4.47%	29.14%
12	775,247	775,179	0.01%✓	68	45.95%	44.43%	1.81%	3.26%	54.05%	596,111	76.9%	47.46%	43.81%	1.97%	2.85%	52.54%
13	775,666	775,179	0.06%✓	487	36.80%	45.33%	2.89%	10.26%	63.20%	592,734	76.4%	39.55%	44.70%	2.89%	8.77%	60.45%
Assigned	10077331															
Total Pop	10077331															
Unassigned	0															

COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST

"(c) Districts shall reflect the state's diverse population and communities of interest."

The Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission sought to understand Michigan's diverse population and communities of interest via public engagement and feedback opportunities. In total, MICRC received more than 29,000 comments.

Comments on Final Congressional Map (Chestnut)

Comments on All Proposed Maps

Public Comment Portal Comments

Commission Meeting Comments

This chart outlines considerations for change to all maps following the second round of public input hearings in Oct. 2021.

Suggested Change	Commissioner	Hearing	Map
Bangla Town	Szetela	Detroit	
Palmer Park adjustments for LGBTQ COI	Szetela	Detroit	
Dexter Davis area a street was split	Clark	Detroit	
Boston/Edison neighborhood split	Rothhorn	Detroit	Cherry
Generally examining neighborhoods	Rothhorn	Detroit	
Southfield	Eid	Detroit	
Troy wanted to be in Oakland County	Eid	Detroit	
Arab community wanted Dearborn Heights to remain whole	Eid	Detroit	
Morningside	Kellom	Detroit	
Woodward 8-mile area	Kellom	Detroit	
API community in Novi	Szetela	Detroit	
Seikh Community, Troy, Rochester, Rochester Hills and Sterling Heights	Lange	Detroit	
African Immigrant Community	Rothhorn	Detroit	
Orthodox Jewish Oak Park	Rothhorn	Detroit	
Examine keeping Detroit more together	Clark	Detroit	
Oxford, Addison, Lake Orion, Clarkston area assessment	Clark	Flint	
Flint split or single district	Clark	Flint	
Oxford Township two precincts (3 and 5)	Orton	Flint	House
Caro split from county	Orton	Flint	
Saginaw and Gennessee County together	Lange	Flint	
Possibly remove Grand Blanc from Flint districts	Rothhorn	Flint	
Midland with Tri Cities	Witjes	Gaylord	
Midland and Midland Township together	Clark	Gaylord	
Watershed needs to be kept together	Szetela	Gaylord	

Suggested Change	Commissioner	Hearing	Map
Benzie County higher income vs lower income	Rothhorn	Gaylord	
Cheboygan Residents Identify wih the West	Clark	Gaylord	
Traverse City area	Lange	Gaylord	
Leelanau keeping together	Lange	Gaylord	
Unpack Lansing into 5 instead of 4	Eid	Lansing	
Battle Creek/Albion Community of Interest	Eid	West MI	
KZ and BattleCreek	Eid	West MI	
Delhi and Eaton	Clark	West MI	
Grand Rapids and Kalamazoo	Witjes	West MI	
Lakeshore District extend up to Saugatuck	Eid	West MI	
Native American Nation Van Buren and Allegan	Rothhorn	West MI	
Indigenous population community examination	Clark		
College student populations	Lange		
Jackson with west side of AA	Szetela	Ann Arbor	
Break-up AA	Szetela	Ann Arbor	

PARTISAN FAIRNESS

(d) Districts shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any political party. A disproportionate advantage to a political party shall be determined using accepted measures of partisan fairness.

The Michigan Independent Citizen's Redistricting Commission evaluated partisan fairness using four mathematical models. The adopted map did not provide 'disproportionate advantage' to any political party under any of the models used to measure partisan fairness.

Lopsided Margins[1]

The lopsided margins test calculates the difference between the average winning margin for candidates from each political party. If one party tends to win elections by larger margins, it indicates the party's votes are packed.

Average Winning Margin	Dem	61.2%
	Rep	57.2%

Finding	
Rep	Districts have a lopsided margin advantage of **4.0%**

DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Percent Votes		Party Wins	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
1	2,014,575	2,729,623	4,744,198	42.5%	57.5%		57.5%
2	1,606,164	2,458,415	4,064,579	39.5%	60.5%		60.5%
3	2,060,007	2,067,194	4,127,201	49.9%	50.1%		50.1%
4	1,919,525	2,268,384	4,187,909	45.8%	54.2%		54.2%
5	1,639,749	2,383,861	4,023,610	40.8%	59.2%		59.2%
6	2,807,351	1,786,702	4,594,053	61.1%	38.9%	61.1%	
7	2,294,626	2,256,640	4,551,266	50.4%	49.6%	50.4%	
8	2,465,441	2,033,607	4,499,048	54.8%	45.2%	54.8%	
9	1,750,528	2,812,643	4,563,171	38.4%	61.6%		61.6%
10	2,205,758	2,098,661	4,304,419	51.2%	48.8%	51.2%	
11	2,734,755	2,010,497	4,745,252	57.6%	42.4%	57.6%	
12	3,023,910	990,719	4,014,629	75.3%	24.7%	75.3%	
13	2,756,127	791,495	3,547,622	77.7%	22.3%	77.7%	

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[1] Sam Wang, "Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan Gerrymandering," Stanford Law Journal, 16, June 2016. Available at: https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/three-tests-for-practical-evaluation-ofpartisan-gerrymandering/)

Lopsided Margins

Comparison of Democratic and Republican vote shares across districts

Mean-Median Difference[2]

The mean-median district vote share difference compares a party's mean district vote share to its median district vote share:

- Mean = average party vote share across all districts
- Median = party vote share in the median district when districts are sorted on share of party vote

The difference between the mean and median vote shares provides a measure of whether the redistricting map produces skewed election results.

Mean-Median Difference = Party's Mean Vote – Party's Median Vote

Comparing a data set's mean and median is a common statistical analysis used to assess how skewed data set is – if the dataset is balanced, the mean will be very close in value to its median. As a dataset becomes more skewed and extreme values are added only on one side, the mean and median begin to diverge and looking at the difference between the two can be used determine the extent to which the data is skewed.

District Median Percentage	Dem	50.4%
	Rep	49.6%
Statewide mean percentage	Dem	52.7%
	Rep	47.3%
Mean-Median Difference	Dem	2.3%
	Rep	-2.3%

Findings	
Rep	Districts have a mean-median advantage of **2.3%**

	Party	
DISTRICT	Dem	Rep
1	42.5%	57.5%
2	39.5%	60.5%
3	49.9%	50.1%
4	45.8%	54.2%
5	40.8%	59.2%
6	61.1%	38.9%
7	50.4%	49.6%
8	54.8%	45.2%
9	38.4%	61.6%
10	51.2%	48.8%
11	57.6%	42.4%
12	75.3%	24.7%
13	77.7%	22.3%

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[2] Michael D. McDonald and Robin Best in "Unfair Partisan Gerrymanders in Politics and Law: A Diagnostic Applied to Six Cases," Election Law Journal 14(4), 2015 (available at: https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/abs/10.1089/elj.2015.0358)

Efficiency Gap[3]

The efficiency gap is calculated by taking one party's total wasted votes in an election, subtracting the other party's total wasted votes, and dividing this by the total number of votes cast. It captures in a single number the extent to which district lines waste the two parties votes unequally.

$$\text{Efficiency Gap} = \frac{[\text{Party A wasted votes}] - [\text{Party B wasted votes}]}{\text{total number of votes cast statewide}}$$

		Total Wasted Votes	% Wasted Votes of Total Votes
Statewide % Wasted Votes	Dem	14,150,372	25.28%
	Rep	13,833,107	24.72%

Finding	
Rep	Candidates have an efficiency gap advantage of **0.6%**

DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Lost Votes		Minimum to win	Surplus Votes		Total Wasted Votes	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
1	2,014,575	2,729,623	4,744,198	2,014,575	0	2,372,099	0	357,524	2,014,575	357,524
2	1,606,164	2,458,415	4,064,579	1,606,164	0	2,032,290	0	426,126	1,606,164	426,126
3	2,060,007	2,067,194	4,127,201	2,060,007	0	2,063,601	0	3,594	2,060,007	3,594
4	1,919,525	2,268,384	4,187,909	1,919,525	0	2,093,955	0	174,430	1,919,525	174,430
5	1,639,749	2,383,861	4,023,610	1,639,749	0	2,011,805	0	372,056	1,639,749	372,056
6	2,807,351	1,786,702	4,594,053	0	1,786,702	2,297,027	510,325	0	510,325	1,786,702
7	2,294,626	2,256,640	4,551,266	0	2,256,640	2,275,633	18,993	0	18,993	2,256,640
8	2,465,441	2,033,607	4,499,048	0	2,033,607	2,249,524	215,917	0	215,917	2,033,607
9	1,750,528	2,812,643	4,563,171	1,750,528	0	2,281,586	0	531,058	1,750,528	531,058
10	2,205,758	2,098,661	4,304,419	0	2,098,661	2,152,210	53,549	0	53,549	2,098,661
11	2,734,755	2,010,497	4,745,252	0	2,010,497	2,372,626	362,129	0	362,129	2,010,497
12	3,023,910	990,719	4,014,629	0	990,719	2,007,315	1,016,596	0	1,016,596	990,719
13	2,756,127	791,495	3,547,622	0	791,495	1,773,811	982,316	0	982,316	791,495

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[3] Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos and Eric M. McGhee, "Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap," University of Chicago Law Review: Vol. 82 (2), 2015. Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol82/iss2/4)

Seats to Votes Ratio

The seats to votes ratio measures the party's control of seats after the election in proportion to its share of the total state vote. For example, a major party held 80 percent of the 12 seats for the United States House of Representatives in Michigan while winning only 50 percent of the total vote. The seats/votes ratio is 80/50. This could suggest partisan gerrymandering.

	Vote Share	Count of Seats	Seat Share	Proportionality Bias
Dem	52.3%	7	53.8%	1.5%
Rep	47.7%	6	46.2%	-1.5%

DISTRICT	Composite Score			
	Dem	Dem %	Rep	Rep %
1	2,014,575	42.5%	2,729,623	57.5%
2	1,606,164	39.5%	2,458,415	60.5%
3	2,060,007	49.9%	2,067,194	50.1%
4	1,919,525	45.8%	2,268,384	54.2%
5	1,639,749	40.8%	2,383,861	59.2%
6	2,807,351	61.1%	1,786,702	38.9%
7	2,294,626	50.4%	2,256,640	49.6%
8	2,465,441	54.8%	2,033,607	45.2%
9	1,750,528	38.4%	2,812,643	61.6%
10	2,205,758	51.2%	2,098,661	48.8%
11	2,734,755	57.6%	2,010,497	42.4%
12	3,023,910	75.3%	990,719	24.7%
13	2,756,127	77.7%	791,495	22.3%

COMPACTNESS

The Michigan Independent Citizen's Redistricting Commission evaluated the requirement of *"(g) Districts shall be reasonably compact"* using five mathematical models. The adopted map was deemed 'reasonably compact' under each model.

POLSBY-POPPER

The Polsby-Popper (*PP*) measure (Polsby & Popper, 1991) is the ratio of the area of the district (A_D) to the area of a circle whose circumference is equal to the perimeter of the district (P_D). A district's Polsby-Popper score falls with the range of [0,1] and a score closer to 1 indicates a more compact district.

$$PP = 4\pi \times \frac{A_D}{P_D^2}$$

Compactness measure: Polsby–Popper				
District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	57,170	1,351	145,227	848	0.39
2	13,068	637	32,265	405	0.41
3	1,886	280	6,246	154	0.30
4	3,904	347	9,586	222	0.41
5	6,478	554	24,419	285	0.27
6	1,018	180	2,580	113	0.39
7	2,814	252	5,038	188	0.56
8	2,454	267	5,678	176	0.43
9	6,899	404	13,020	294	0.53
10	242	80	506	55	0.48
11	336	101	814	65	0.41
12	192	71	396	49	0.48
13	253	106	888	56	0.28

Most Compact: 0.56 For District: 7
Least Compact: 0.27 For District: 5

SCHWARTZBERG

The Schwartzberg score (S) compactness score is the ratio of the perimeter of the district (P_D) to the circumference of a circle whose area is equal to the area of the district. A district's Schwartzberg score as calculated below falls with the range of [0,1] and a score closer to 1 indicates a more compact district.

$$S = \frac{1}{P_D/C} = \frac{1}{P_D/(2\pi\sqrt{A_D/\pi})}$$

Compactness measure: Schwartzberg

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	57,170	1,351	145,227	848	0.63
2	13,068	637	32,265	405	0.64
3	1,886	280	6,246	154	0.55
4	3,904	347	9,586	222	0.64
5	6,478	554	24,419	285	0.52
6	1,018	180	2,580	113	0.63
7	2,814	252	5,038	188	0.75
8	2,454	267	5,678	176	0.66
9	6,899	404	13,020	294	0.73
10	242	80	506	55	0.69
11	336	101	814	65	0.64
12	192	71	396	49	0.70
13	253	106	888	56	0.53

Most Compact: 0.75 For District: 7

Least Compact: 0.52 For District: 5

REOCK SCORE

The Reock Score (R) is the ratio of the area of the district A_D to the area of a minimum bounding circle (A_{MBC}) that encloses the district's geometry. A district's Reock score falls within the range of [0,1] and a score closer to 1 indicates a more compact district.

$$R = \frac{A_D}{A_{MBC}}$$

Compactness measure: Reock Score

District	Distract Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	57,170	1,351	145,227	848	0.38
2	13,068	637	32,265	405	0.57
3	1,886	280	6,246	154	0.32
4	3,904	347	9,586	222	0.43
5	6,478	554	24,419	285	0.18
6	1,018	180	2,580	113	0.39
7	2,814	252	5,038	188	0.55
8	2,454	267	5,678	176	0.41
9	6,899	404	13,020	294	0.53
10	242	80	506	55	0.48
11	336	101	814	65	0.48
12	192	71	396	49	0.59
13	253	106	888	56	0.21

Most Compact: 0.59 For District: 12

Least Compact: 0.18 For District: 5

CONVEX HULL

The Convex Hull score is a ratio of the area of the district to the area of the minimum convex polygon that can encloses the district's geometry. A district's Convex Hull score falls within the range of [0,1] and a score closer to 1 indicates a more compact district.

$$CH = \frac{A_D}{A_{MCP}}$$

Compactness measure: Convex Hull

District	Distract Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	57,170	1,351	145,227	848	0.87
2	13,068	637	32,265	405	0.78
3	1,886	280	6,246	154	0.76
4	3,904	347	9,586	222	0.78
5	6,478	554	24,419	285	0.77
6	1,018	180	2,580	113	0.73
7	2,814	252	5,038	188	0.90
8	2,454	267	5,678	176	0.78
9	6,899	404	13,020	294	0.88
10	242	80	506	55	0.76
11	336	101	814	65	0.82
12	192	71	396	49	0.84
13	253	106	888	56	0.66

Most Compact: 0.9 For District: 7
Least Compact: 0.66 For District: 13

LENGTH-WIDTH

The Length-Width Ratio (LW) is calculated as the ratio of the length (L_{MBR}) to the width (W_{MBR}) of the minimum bounding rectangle surrounding the district. To orient the Length-Width score towards other compactness measures the maximum value of a district's width or length has been set to the denominator, making scores close to 1 more compact, and scores closer to zero less compact.

$$LW = \frac{W_{MBR}}{L_{MBR}}$$

Compactness measure: Length-Width

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	57,170	1,351	145,227	848	1.83
2	13,068	637	32,265	405	1.42
3	1,886	280	6,246	154	3.31
4	3,904	347	9,586	222	2.20
5	6,478	554	24,419	285	5.62
6	1,018	180	2,580	113	2.03
7	2,814	252	5,038	188	2.14
8	2,454	267	5,678	176	0.85
9	6,899	404	13,020	294	0.92
10	242	80	506	55	1.70
11	336	101	814	65	1.78
12	192	71	396	49	1.11
13	253	106	888	56	2.49

Most Compact: 5.62 For District: 5
Least Compact: 0.85 For District: 8

Congressional District Maps

Michigan State Senate Districts

The Michigan Independent Citizen's Redistricting Commission approved the following map and district boundaries for the 38 state senate districts.

Legal Description & Interactive Map

METRO DETROIT

POPULATION

"(a) Districts shall be of equal population as mandated by the United States constitution, and shall comply with the voting rights act and other federal laws."

The Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission sought and relied on legal counsel and expert advice in order to draw plans that complied with the requirements of the United States constitution, the Voting Rights Act and other federal laws. Material reflecting that counsel and advice is accessible on the Commission's website.

Meeting Notices & Materials

Meeting Notices & Materials Archives

Mapping Data

State Senate District Map

DISTRICT	Total Population				Racial Demographics as Percent of Total Population					Voting Age Population		Racial Demographics as Percent of Voting Population				
	All Persons	Target	Dev.	Difference	NH White	NH Black	NH Asian	Hispanic	Minority	VAP	% of Total	NH White	NH Black	NH Asian	Hispanic	Minority
1	270,366	265,193	1.95%✓	5,173	38.73%	34.78%	0.85%	19.30%	61.27%	201,593	74.6%	42.88%	35.03%	0.93%	16.83%	57.12%
2	260,296	265,193	-1.85%✓	-4,897	61.33%	24.66%	1.60%	8.81%	38.67%	188,578	72.4%	61.85%	24.47%	1.83%	7.88%	38.15%
3	268,291	265,193	1.17%✓	3,098	39.96%	42.25%	10.11%	2.40%	60.04%	212,874	79.3%	41.95%	42.09%	9.46%	2.19%	58.05%
4	259,877	265,193	-2.00%✓	-5,316	74.98%	14.56%	2.25%	6.09%	25.02%	214,717	82.6%	74.71%	13.32%	2.14%	4.98%	25.29%
5	260,723	265,193	-1.69%✓	-4,470	62.23%	19.28%	9.16%	3.96%	37.77%	205,113	78.7%	65.09%	18.25%	8.86%	3.42%	34.91%
6	269,435	265,193	1.60%✓	4,242	44.15%	39.61%	5.40%	2.93%	55.85%	205,711	76.3%	48.95%	39.15%	5.55%	2.60%	51.05%
7	258,715	265,193	-2.44%✓	-6,478	39.05%	45.54%	4.57%	7.55%	60.95%	208,010	80.4%	40.54%	44.78%	4.71%	6.20%	59.46%
8	267,500	265,193	0.87%✓	2,307	47.83%	40.57%	1.66%	2.48%	52.17%	206,961	77.4%	52.04%	40.25%	1.85%	2.28%	47.96%
9	260,091	265,193	-1.92%✓	-5,102	71.32%	4.34%	17.23%	3.75%	28.68%	206,406	79.4%	73.16%	4.24%	16.23%	3.18%	26.84%
10	260,891	265,193	-1.62%✓	-4,302	47.66%	44.75%	4.16%	2.22%	52.34%	207,211	79.4%	50.14%	40.43%	3.95%	1.90%	49.86%
11	267,881	265,193	1.01%✓	2,688	66.85%	20.46%	2.30%	2.76%	33.15%	204,523	76.3%	72.05%	19.19%	2.35%	2.38%	27.95%
12	270,210	265,193	1.89%✓	5,017	75.00%	12.13%	1.16%	2.78%	25.00%	207,870	76.9%	81.01%	11.52%	1.29%	2.34%	18.99%
13	258,822	265,193	-2.40%✓	-6,371	73.56%	8.54%	13.82%	3.34%	26.44%	213,186	82.4%	73.47%	8.19%	12.43%	2.77%	26.53%
14	262,085	265,193	-1.17%✓	-3,108	82.27%	6.31%	5.30%	4.33%	17.73%	218,191	83.3%	80.82%	5.96%	5.36%	3.37%	19.18%
15	260,766	265,193	-1.67%✓	-4,427	68.07%	14.59%	8.11%	6.21%	31.93%	221,289	84.9%	68.01%	13.28%	8.09%	5.32%	31.99%
16	262,182	265,193	-1.14%✓	-3,011	89.48%	2.47%	0.56%	5.66%	10.52%	213,755	81.5%	88.39%	2.36%	0.57%	4.46%	11.61%
17	266,557	265,193	0.51%✓	1,364	84.35%	4.39%	0.97%	6.06%	15.65%	209,069	78.4%	85.38%	4.32%	1.02%	4.72%	14.62%
18	268,135	265,193	1.11%✓	2,942	83.41%	4.92%	1.70%	4.49%	16.59%	205,401	76.6%	85.77%	4.66%	1.56%	3.62%	14.23%
19	262,619	265,193	-0.97%✓	-2,574	76.77%	11.36%	2.70%	5.88%	23.23%	211,508	80.5%	77.49%	10.03%	2.71%	4.80%	22.51%
20	262,284	265,193	-1.10%✓	-2,909	75.11%	9.05%	2.03%	8.53%	24.89%	200,292	76.4%	78.64%	8.34%	1.95%	6.73%	21.36%
21	271,390	265,193	2.34%✓	6,197	68.10%	11.61%	2.75%	8.46%	31.90%	205,416	75.7%	73.70%	11.23%	2.77%	7.38%	26.30%
22	264,573	265,193	-0.23%✓	-620	89.50%	0.65%	0.78%	2.86%	10.50%	204,483	77.3%	92.17%	0.65%	0.83%	2.37%	7.83%
23	263,780	265,193	-0.53%✓	-1,413	85.17%	3.66%	2.70%	5.03%	14.83%	211,880	80.3%	85.65%	3.52%	2.62%	4.05%	14.35%
24	271,211	265,193	2.27%✓	6,018	83.91%	1.69%	2.41%	3.77%	16.09%	203,066	74.9%	89.06%	1.70%	2.44%	3.24%	10.94%
25	264,345	265,193	-0.32%✓	-848	89.17%	2.24%	0.45%	3.64%	10.83%	209,073	79.1%	90.82%	2.19%	0.46%	2.94%	9.18%
26	266,938	265,193	0.66%✓	1,745	84.87%	3.15%	0.42%	4.46%	15.13%	206,886	77.5%	88.51%	3.13%	0.44%	3.71%	11.49%
27	269,043	265,193	1.45%✓	3,850	57.85%	27.73%	1.22%	4.07%	42.15%	200,250	74.4%	63.00%	27.27%	1.32%	3.66%	37.00%
28	265,180	265,193	0.00%✓	-13	78.73%	4.65%	5.09%	5.07%	21.27%	210,771	79.5%	81.43%	4.84%	5.29%	4.38%	18.57%
29	263,566	265,193	-0.61%✓	-1,627	55.33%	16.51%	4.61%	18.56%	44.67%	200,247	76.0%	60.57%	15.37%	4.63%	15.50%	39.43%
30	264,560	265,193	-0.24%✓	-633	81.65%	5.68%	2.38%	7.62%	18.35%	212,420	80.3%	82.52%	5.06%	2.30%	6.18%	17.48%
31	267,918	265,193	1.03%✓	2,725	79.46%	1.56%	2.85%	10.84%	20.54%	200,843	75.0%	83.32%	1.41%	2.92%	9.22%	16.68%
32	270,401	265,193	1.96%✓	5,208	75.58%	9.07%	0.52%	6.01%	24.42%	205,945	76.2%	80.98%	8.80%	0.55%	4.92%	19.02%
33	267,378	265,193	0.82%✓	2,185	87.59%	2.51%	0.43%	5.12%	12.41%	207,138	77.5%	88.65%	2.99%	0.43%	4.33%	11.35%
34	261,805	265,193	-1.28%✓	-3,388	90.54%	2.22%	0.72%	3.76%	9.46%	213,991	81.7%	89.33%	2.34%	0.72%	3.01%	10.67%
35	268,708	265,193	1.33%✓	3,515	74.07%	12.21%	1.54%	7.75%	25.93%	211,487	78.7%	76.93%	11.30%	1.55%	6.32%	23.07%
36	270,486	265,193	2.00%✓	5,293	92.65%	0.35%	0.36%	2.03%	7.35%	220,106	81.4%	93.79%	0.30%	0.37%	1.55%	6.21%
37	261,707	265,193	-1.31%✓	-3,486	87.54%	0.73%	0.59%	2.45%	12.46%	213,146	81.4%	89.30%	0.75%	0.57%	1.95%	10.70%
38	266,616	265,193	0.54%✓	1,423	88.14%	1.65%	0.69%	1.74%	11.86%	217,404	81.5%	89.52%	1.90%	0.72%	1.43%	10.48%

Assigned 10077331
Total Pop 10077331
Unassigned 0

COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST

The Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission sought to understand Michigan's diverse population and communities of interest via public engagement and feedback opportunities. In total, MICRC received more than 29,000 comments.

"(c) Districts shall reflect the state's diverse population and communities of interest."

Comments on Final Congressional Map (Linden)

Comments on All Proposed Maps

Public Comment Portal Comments

Commission Meeting Comments

PARTISAN FAIRNESS

(d) Districts shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any political party. A disproportionate advantage to a political party shall be determined using accepted measures of partisan fairness.

The Michigan Independent Citizen's Redistricting Commission evaluated partisan fairness using four mathematical models. The adopted map did not provide 'disproportionate advantage' to any political party under any of the models used to measure partisan fairness.

Lopsided Margins

Average Winning Margin	Dem	63.2%
	Rep	58.7%

Finding	
Rep	Districts have a lopsided margin advantage of **4.5%**

DISTRICT	Party Dem	Party Rep	Total Votes	Percent Votes Dem	Percent Votes Rep	Party Wins Dem	Party Wins Rep
1	851,070	292,452	1,143,522	74.4%	25.6%	74.4%	
2	755,866	262,569	1,018,435	74.2%	25.8%	74.2%	
3	946,197	224,423	1,170,620	80.8%	19.2%	80.8%	
4	828,426	653,023	1,481,449	55.9%	44.1%	55.9%	
5	851,926	556,975	1,408,901	60.5%	39.5%	60.5%	
6	1,016,114	469,106	1,485,220	68.4%	31.6%	68.4%	
7	1,132,528	418,860	1,551,388	73.0%	27.0%	73.0%	
8	1,251,274	394,020	1,645,294	76.1%	23.9%	76.1%	
9	705,117	777,377	1,482,494	47.6%	52.4%		52.4%
10	914,105	420,349	1,334,454	68.5%	31.5%	68.5%	
11	770,214	657,708	1,427,922	53.9%	46.1%	53.9%	
12	802,043	830,837	1,632,880	49.1%	50.9%		50.9%
13	938,950	814,031	1,752,981	53.6%	46.4%	53.6%	
14	860,212	701,929	1,562,141	55.1%	44.9%	55.1%	
15	1,087,019	448,037	1,535,056	70.8%	29.2%	70.8%	
16	605,886	839,809	1,445,695	41.9%	58.1%		58.1%
17	503,371	806,208	1,309,579	38.4%	61.6%		61.6%
18	577,925	855,830	1,433,755	40.3%	59.7%		59.7%
19	857,354	656,945	1,514,299	56.6%	43.4%	56.6%	
20	580,817	834,128	1,414,945	41.0%	59.0%		59.0%
21	873,298	623,609	1,496,907	58.3%	41.7%	58.3%	
22	632,830	1,012,216	1,645,046	38.5%	61.5%		61.5%
23	678,270	941,820	1,620,090	41.9%	58.1%		58.1%
24	591,273	1,021,738	1,613,011	36.7%	63.3%		63.3%
25	570,630	894,868	1,465,498	38.9%	61.1%		61.1%
26	694,054	861,687	1,555,741	44.6%	55.4%		55.4%
27	948,759	485,590	1,434,349	66.1%	33.9%	66.1%	
28	822,315	659,345	1,481,660	55.5%	44.5%	55.5%	
29	742,769	530,176	1,272,945	58.4%	41.6%	58.4%	
30	705,493	818,997	1,524,490	46.3%	53.7%		53.7%
31	532,144	1,009,913	1,542,057	34.5%	65.5%		65.5%
32	717,007	710,001	1,427,008	50.2%	49.8%	50.2%	
33	494,983	873,196	1,368,179	36.2%	63.8%		63.8%
34	569,367	802,097	1,371,464	41.5%	58.5%		58.5%
35	832,714	734,835	1,567,549	53.1%	46.9%	53.1%	
36	618,130	1,010,985	1,629,115	37.9%	62.1%		62.1%
37	736,347	969,123	1,705,470	43.2%	56.8%		56.8%
38	691,811	823,414	1,515,225	45.7%	54.3%		54.3%

Lopsided Margins

Comparison of Democratic and Republican vote shares across districts

Mean-Median Difference

District Median Percentage	Dem		51.7%
	Rep		48.3%
Statewide mean percentage	Dem		52.8%
	Rep		47.2%
Mean-Median Difference	Dem		1.2%
	Rep		-1.2%

Findings	
Rep	Districts have a mean-median advantage of
	1.2%

	Party	
DISTRICT	Dem	Rep
1	74.4%	25.6%
2	74.2%	25.8%
3	80.8%	19.2%
4	55.9%	44.1%
5	60.5%	39.5%
6	68.4%	31.6%
7	73.0%	27.0%
8	76.1%	23.9%
9	47.6%	52.4%
10	68.5%	31.5%
11	53.9%	46.1%
12	49.1%	50.9%
13	53.6%	46.4%
14	55.1%	44.9%
15	70.8%	29.2%
16	41.9%	58.1%
17	38.4%	61.6%
18	40.3%	59.7%
19	56.6%	43.4%
20	41.0%	59.0%
21	58.3%	41.7%
22	38.5%	61.5%
23	41.9%	58.1%
24	36.7%	63.3%
25	38.9%	61.1%
26	44.6%	55.4%
27	66.1%	33.9%
28	55.5%	44.5%
29	58.4%	41.6%
30	46.3%	53.7%
31	34.5%	65.5%
32	50.2%	49.8%
33	36.2%	63.8%
34	41.5%	58.5%
35	53.1%	46.9%
36	37.9%	62.1%
37	43.2%	56.8%
38	45.7%	54.3%

Efficiency Gap

Statewide % Wasted Votes		Total Wasted Votes	% Wasted Votes of Total Votes
	Dem	14,932,558	26.67%
	Rep	13,060,859	23.33%

Finding	
Rep	Candidates have an efficiency gap advantage of **3.3%**

DISTRICT	Dem	Rep	Total Votes	Dem	Rep	Minimum to win	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
1	851,070	292,452	1,143,522	0	292,452	571,761	279,309	0	279,309	292,452
2	755,866	262,569	1,018,435	0	262,569	509,218	246,649	0	246,649	262,569
3	946,197	224,423	1,170,620	0	224,423	585,310	360,887	0	360,887	224,423
4	828,426	653,023	1,481,449	0	653,023	740,725	87,702	0	87,702	653,023
5	851,926	556,975	1,408,901	0	556,975	704,451	147,476	0	147,476	556,975
6	1,016,114	469,106	1,485,220	0	469,106	742,610	273,504	0	273,504	469,106
7	1,132,528	418,860	1,551,388	0	418,860	775,694	356,834	0	356,834	418,860
8	1,251,274	394,020	1,645,294	0	394,020	822,647	428,627	0	428,627	394,020
9	705,117	777,377	1,482,494	705,117	0	741,247	0	36,130	705,117	36,130
10	914,105	420,349	1,334,454	0	420,349	667,227	246,878	0	246,878	420,349
11	770,214	657,708	1,427,922	0	657,708	713,961	56,253	0	56,253	657,708
12	802,043	830,837	1,632,880	802,043	0	816,440	0	14,397	802,043	14,397
13	938,950	814,031	1,752,981	0	814,031	876,491	62,460	0	62,460	814,031
14	860,212	701,929	1,562,141	0	701,929	781,071	79,142	0	79,142	701,929
15	1,087,019	448,037	1,535,056	0	448,037	767,528	319,491	0	319,491	448,037
16	605,886	839,809	1,445,695	605,886	0	722,848	0	116,962	605,886	116,962
17	503,371	806,208	1,309,579	503,371	0	654,790	0	151,419	503,371	151,419
18	577,925	855,830	1,433,755	577,925	0	716,878	0	138,953	577,925	138,953
19	857,354	656,945	1,514,299	0	656,945	757,150	100,205	0	100,205	656,945

Efficiency Gap

DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Lost Votes		Minimum to win	Surplus Votes		Total Wasted Votes	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
21	873,298	623,609	1,496,907	0	623,609	748,454	124,845	0	124,845	623,609
22	632,830	1,012,216	1,645,046	632,830	0	822,523	0	189,693	632,830	189,693
23	678,270	941,820	1,620,090	678,270	0	810,045	0	131,775	678,270	131,775
24	591,273	1,021,738	1,613,011	591,273	0	806,506	0	215,233	591,273	215,233
25	570,630	894,868	1,465,498	570,630	0	732,749	0	162,119	570,630	162,119
26	694,054	861,687	1,555,741	694,054	0	777,871	0	83,817	694,054	83,817
27	948,759	485,590	1,434,349	0	485,590	717,175	231,585	0	231,585	485,590
28	822,315	659,345	1,481,660	0	659,345	740,830	81,485	0	81,485	659,345
29	742,769	530,176	1,272,945	0	530,176	636,473	106,297	0	106,297	530,176
30	705,493	818,997	1,524,490	705,493	0	762,245	0	56,752	705,493	56,752
31	532,144	1,009,913	1,542,057	532,144	0	771,029	0	238,885	532,144	238,885
32	717,007	710,001	1,427,008	0	710,001	713,504	3,503	0	3,503	710,001
33	494,983	873,196	1,368,179	494,983	0	684,090	0	189,107	494,983	189,107
34	569,367	802,097	1,371,464	569,367	0	685,732	0	116,365	569,367	116,365
35	832,714	734,835	1,567,549	0	734,835	783,775	48,940	0	48,940	734,835
36	618,130	1,010,985	1,629,115	618,130	0	814,558	0	196,428	618,130	196,428
37	736,347	969,123	1,705,470	736,347	0	852,735	0	116,388	736,347	116,388
38	691,811	823,414	1,515,225	691,811	0	757,613	0	65,802	691,811	65,802

Seats to Votes Ratio

	Vote Share	Count of Seats	Seat Share	Proportionality Bias
Dem	52.3%	20	52.6%	0.3%
Rep	47.7%	18	47.4%	-0.3%

DISTRICT	Composite Score			
	Dem	Dem %	Rep	Rep %
1	851,070	74.4%	292,452	25.6%
2	755,866	74.2%	262,569	25.8%
3	946,197	80.8%	224,423	19.2%
4	828,426	55.9%	653,023	44.1%
5	851,926	60.5%	556,975	39.5%
6	1,016,114	68.4%	469,106	31.6%
7	1,132,528	73.0%	418,860	27.0%
8	1,251,274	76.1%	394,020	23.9%
9	705,117	47.6%	777,377	52.4%
10	914,105	68.5%	420,349	31.5%
11	770,214	53.9%	657,708	46.1%
12	802,043	49.1%	830,837	50.9%
13	938,950	53.6%	814,031	46.4%
14	860,212	55.1%	701,929	44.9%
15	1,087,019	70.8%	448,037	29.2%
16	605,886	41.9%	839,809	58.1%
17	503,371	38.4%	806,208	61.6%
18	577,925	40.3%	855,830	59.7%
19	857,354	56.6%	656,945	43.4%
20	580,817	41.0%	834,128	59.0%
21	873,298	58.3%	623,609	41.7%
22	632,830	38.5%	1,012,216	61.5%
23	678,270	41.9%	941,820	58.1%
24	591,273	36.7%	1,021,738	63.3%
25	570,630	38.9%	894,868	61.1%
26	694,054	44.6%	861,687	55.4%
27	948,759	66.1%	485,590	33.9%
28	822,315	55.5%	659,345	44.5%
29	742,769	58.4%	530,176	41.6%
30	705,493	46.3%	818,997	53.7%
31	532,144	34.5%	1,009,913	65.5%
32	717,007	50.2%	710,001	49.8%
33	494,983	36.2%	873,196	63.8%
34	569,367	41.5%	802,097	58.5%
35	832,714	53.1%	734,835	46.9%
36	618,130	37.9%	1,010,985	62.1%
37	736,347	43.2%	969,123	56.8%
38	691,811	45.7%	823,414	54.3%

COMPACTNESS

The Michigan Independent Citizen's Redistricting Commission evaluated the requirement of "*(g) Districts shall be reasonably compact*" using five mathematical models. The adopted map was deemed 'reasonably compact' under each model.

Polsby-Popper

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	71	63	315	30	0.23
2	54	38	114	26	0.48
3	70	66	345	30	0.20
4	251	88	616	56	0.41
5	79	50	198	32	0.40
6	74	47	179	31	0.41
7	113	66	345	38	0.33
8	49	49	192	25	0.26
9	105	57	255	36	0.41
10	61	55	241	28	0.25
11	63	54	234	28	0.27
12	306	89	629	62	0.49
13	132	65	333	41	0.39
14	966	165	2,158	110	0.45
15	406	122	1,186	71	0.34
16	1,797	223	3,954	150	0.45
17	3,507	419	13,972	210	0.25
18	1,589	244	4,740	141	0.34
19	543	108	924	83	0.59
20	1,890	318	8,068	154	0.23
21	887	134	1,426	106	0.62
22	874	133	1,416	105	0.62
23	309	92	677	62	0.46
24	547	133	1,403	83	0.39
25	5,020	353	9,894	251	0.51
26	1,701	269	5,763	146	0.30
27	288	84	555	60	0.52
28	1,119	169	2,266	119	0.49
29	77	41	133	31	0.58
30	360	112	994	67	0.36
31	2,499	227	4,100	177	0.61
32	5,788	347	9,573	270	0.60
33	2,924	333	8,827	192	0.33
34	4,334	354	9,974	233	0.43
35	767	137	1,502	98	0.51
36	14,061	615	30,128	420	0.47
37	9,836	613	29,891	352	0.33
38	33,196	943	70,771	646	0.47

Most Compact: 0.62 For District: 22
Least Compact: 0.2 For District: 3

Schwartzberg

Compactness measure: Schwartzberg				
District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	71	63	315	30	0.47
2	54	38	114	26	0.69
3	70	66	345	30	0.45
4	251	88	616	56	0.64
5	79	50	198	32	0.63
6	74	47	179	31	0.64
7	113	66	345	38	0.57
8	49	49	192	25	0.51
9	105	57	255	36	0.64
10	61	55	241	28	0.50
11	63	54	234	28	0.52
12	306	89	629	62	0.70
13	132	65	333	41	0.63
14	966	165	2,158	110	0.67
15	406	122	1,186	71	0.59
16	1,797	223	3,954	150	0.67
17	3,507	419	13,972	210	0.50
18	1,589	244	4,740	141	0.58
19	543	108	924	83	0.77
20	1,890	318	8,068	154	0.48
21	887	134	1,426	106	0.79
22	874	133	1,416	105	0.79
23	309	92	677	62	0.68
24	547	133	1,403	83	0.62
25	5,020	353	9,894	251	0.71
26	1,701	269	5,763	146	0.54
27	288	84	555	60	0.72
28	1,119	169	2,266	119	0.70
29	77	41	133	31	0.76
30	360	112	994	67	0.60
31	2,499	227	4,100	177	0.78
32	5,788	347	9,573	270	0.78
33	2,924	333	8,827	192	0.58
34	4,334	354	9,974	233	0.66
35	767	137	1,502	98	0.71
36	14,061	615	30,128	420	0.68
37	9,836	613	29,891	352	0.57
38	33,196	943	70,771	646	0.68

Most Compact: 0.79 For District: 22
Least Compact: 0.45 For District: 3

Reock Score

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	71	63	315	30	0.27
2	54	38	114	26	0.61
3	70	66	345	30	0.28
4	251	88	616	56	0.47
5	79	50	198	32	0.50
6	74	47	179	31	0.44
7	113	66	345	38	0.32
8	49	49	192	25	0.37
9	105	57	255	36	0.47
10	61	55	241	28	0.24
11	63	54	234	28	0.23
12	306	89	629	62	0.42
13	132	65	333	41	0.34
14	966	165	2,158	110	0.35
15	406	122	1,186	71	0.41
16	1,797	223	3,954	150	0.32
17	3,507	419	13,972	210	0.22
18	1,589	244	4,740	141	0.41
19	543	108	924	83	0.57
20	1,890	318	8,068	154	0.30
21	887	134	1,426	106	0.49
22	874	133	1,416	105	0.51
23	309	92	677	62	0.46
24	547	133	1,403	83	0.41
25	5,020	353	9,894	251	0.53
26	1,701	269	5,763	146	0.39
27	288	84	555	60	0.56
28	1,119	169	2,266	119	0.52
29	77	41	133	31	0.57
30	360	112	994	67	0.37
31	2,499	227	4,100	177	0.60
32	5,788	347	9,573	270	0.43
33	2,924	333	8,827	192	0.29
34	4,334	354	9,974	233	0.50
35	767	137	1,502	98	0.58
36	14,061	615	30,128	420	0.49
37	9,836	613	29,891	352	0.38
38	33,196	943	70,771	646	0.51

Most Compact: 0.61 For District: 2
Least Compact: 0.22 For District: 17

Convex Hull

Compactness measure: Convex Hull				
District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	71	63	315	30	0.59
2	54	38	114	26	0.84
3	70	66	345	30	0.59
4	251	88	616	56	0.78
5	79	50	198	32	0.77
6	74	47	179	31	0.79
7	113	66	345	38	0.79
8	49	49	192	25	0.72
9	105	57	255	36	0.79
10	61	55	241	28	0.63
11	63	54	234	28	0.73
12	306	89	629	62	0.86
13	132	65	333	41	0.75
14	966	165	2,158	110	0.91
15	406	122	1,186	71	0.77
16	1,797	223	3,954	150	0.94
17	3,507	419	13,972	210	0.64
18	1,589	244	4,740	141	0.71
19	543	108	924	83	0.86
20	1,890	318	8,068	154	0.62
21	887	134	1,426	106	0.96
22	874	133	1,416	105	0.89
23	309	92	677	62	0.86
24	547	133	1,403	83	0.81
25	5,020	353	9,894	251	0.87
26	1,701	269	5,763	146	0.70
27	288	84	555	60	0.95
28	1,119	169	2,266	119	0.83
29	77	41	133	31	0.93
30	360	112	994	67	0.74
31	2,499	227	4,100	177	0.90
32	5,788	347	9,573	270	0.91
33	2,924	333	8,827	192	0.70
34	4,334	354	9,974	233	0.78
35	767	137	1,502	98	0.80
36	14,061	615	30,128	420	0.79
37	9,836	613	29,891	352	0.76
38	33,196	943	70,771	646	0.87

Most Compact: 0.96 For District: 21
Least Compact: 0.59 For District: 1

Length-Width

Compactness measure: Length-Width				
District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	71	63	315	30	1.21
2	54	38	114	26	1.59
3	70	66	345	30	0.86
4	251	88	616	56	1.63
5	79	50	198	32	1.74
6	74	47	179	31	1.65
7	113	66	345	38	0.67
8	49	49	192	25	0.80
9	105	57	255	36	1.04
10	61	55	241	28	0.61
11	63	54	234	28	0.50
12	306	89	629	62	1.19
13	132	65	333	41	0.85
14	966	165	2,158	110	2.90
15	406	122	1,186	71	1.65
16	1,797	223	3,954	150	4.04
17	3,507	419	13,972	210	3.60
18	1,589	244	4,740	141	1.00
19	543	108	924	83	1.65
20	1,890	318	8,068	154	1.74
21	887	134	1,426	106	2.34
22	874	133	1,416	105	1.55
23	309	92	677	62	0.99
24	547	133	1,403	83	2.01
25	5,020	353	9,894	251	1.05
26	1,701	269	5,763	146	1.69
27	288	84	555	60	1.35
28	1,119	169	2,266	119	1.71
29	77	41	133	31	2.01
30	360	112	994	67	2.05
31	2,499	227	4,100	177	1.88
32	5,788	347	9,573	270	0.80
33	2,924	333	8,827	192	0.87
34	4,334	354	9,974	233	1.55
35	767	137	1,502	98	1.27
36	14,061	615	30,128	420	1.87
37	9,836	613	29,891	352	1.63
38	33,196	943	70,771	646	1.87

Most Compact: 4.04 For District: 16
Least Compact: 0.5 For District: 11

Michigan State House Districts

The Michigan Independent Citizen's Redistricting Commission approved the following map and district boundaries for the 110 state house districts.

Legal Description & Interactive Map

GREATER GRAND RAPIDS

POPULATION

"(a) Districts shall be of equal population as mandated by the United States constitution, and shall comply with the voting rights act and other federal laws."

The Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission sought and relied on legal counsel and expert advice in order to draw plans that complied with the requirements of the United States constitution, the Voting Rights Act and other federal laws. Material reflecting that counsel and advice is accessible on the Commission's website.

Meeting Notices & Materials

Meeting Notices & Materials Archives

Mapping Data

POPULATION

DISTRICT	Total Population				Racial Demographics as Percent of Total Population					Voting Age Population		Racial Demographics as Percent of Voting Population				
	All Persons	Target	Dev.	Difference	NH White	NH Black	NH Asian	Hispanic	Minority	VAP	% of Total	NH White	NH Black	NH Asian	Hispanic	Minority
1	91,856	91,612	0.27%✓	244	16.79%	35.26%	0.33%	43.92%	83.21%	65,520	71.3%	18.67%	38.03%	0.38%	39.49%	81.33%
2	89,622	91,612	-2.17%✓	-1,990	63.27%	11.54%	1.13%	18.58%	36.73%	69,719	77.8%	67.61%	11.04%	1.21%	15.61%	32.39%
3	93,531	91,612	2.09%✓	1,919	51.18%	33.31%	2.34%	8.21%	48.82%	66,030	70.6%	52.34%	32.82%	2.77%	7.64%	47.66%
4	90,903	91,612	-0.77%✓	-709	41.08%	52.65%	0.47%	1.72%	58.92%	64,833	71.3%	38.61%	55.60%	0.50%	1.61%	61.39%
5	92,744	91,612	1.24%✓	1,132	36.68%	55.87%	1.53%	1.96%	63.32%	71,629	77.2%	38.11%	55.31%	1.55%	1.70%	61.89%
6	93,629	91,612	2.20%✓	2,017	36.10%	56.66%	1.15%	2.03%	63.90%	73,324	78.3%	38.54%	54.93%	1.31%	1.79%	61.46%
7	92,948	91,612	1.46%✓	1,336	44.28%	46.93%	1.51%	2.80%	55.72%	75,856	81.6%	47.68%	44.29%	1.71%	2.52%	52.32%
8	92,670	91,612	1.15%✓	1,058	41.68%	45.73%	4.16%	2.96%	58.32%	76,299	82.3%	44.50%	43.70%	4.57%	2.61%	55.50%
9	90,818	91,612	-0.87%✓	-794	28.46%	50.05%	15.19%	1.57%	71.54%	66,200	72.9%	28.03%	51.65%	14.68%	1.48%	71.97%
10	90,534	91,612	-1.18%✓	-1,078	53.11%	38.14%	2.08%	2.77%	46.89%	74,475	82.3%	53.31%	38.79%	2.32%	2.35%	46.69%
11	91,145	91,612	-0.51%✓	-467	46.16%	46.82%	0.80%	2.19%	53.84%	70,700	77.6%	51.18%	42.82%	0.93%	1.82%	48.82%
12	90,630	91,612	-1.07%✓	-982	45.97%	44.46%	1.33%	2.45%	54.03%	68,955	76.1%	51.03%	40.99%	1.28%	2.08%	48.97%
13	90,393	91,612	-1.33%✓	-1,219	47.56%	41.39%	4.11%	2.17%	52.44%	69,812	77.2%	52.03%	38.36%	3.91%	1.89%	47.97%
14	90,555	91,612	-1.15%✓	-1,057	38.99%	43.39%	10.11%	2.45%	61.01%	69,140	76.4%	43.17%	41.11%	9.31%	2.14%	56.83%
15	92,301	91,612	0.75%✓	689	80.88%	7.49%	1.72%	5.23%	19.12%	69,652	75.5%	82.15%	7.18%	1.87%	4.70%	17.85%
16	93,035	91,612	1.55%✓	1,423	34.88%	56.88%	0.94%	2.87%	65.12%	72,066	77.5%	38.03%	54.92%	1.02%	2.44%	61.97%
17	90,737	91,612	-0.96%✓	-875	45.56%	44.57%	1.80%	3.10%	54.44%	71,354	78.6%	48.90%	42.43%	1.94%	2.64%	51.10%
18	92,169	91,612	0.61%✓	557	36.50%	52.03%	4.21%	2.71%	63.50%	75,714	82.1%	37.44%	52.16%	4.12%	2.40%	62.56%
19	90,931	91,612	-0.74%✓	-681	60.63%	24.62%	7.86%	2.80%	39.37%	72,930	80.2%	61.39%	25.11%	8.00%	2.34%	38.61%
20	93,017	91,612	1.53%✓	1,405	75.60%	10.28%	7.26%	2.68%	24.40%	74,684	80.3%	76.81%	10.20%	7.42%	2.25%	23.19%
21	93,876	91,612	2.47%✓	2,264	57.07%	7.60%	27.76%	3.48%	42.93%	71,599	76.3%	59.96%	7.89%	26.00%	3.07%	40.04%
22	91,654	91,612	0.05%✓	42	85.05%	2.23%	5.67%	3.19%	14.95%	75,487	82.4%	86.64%	2.24%	5.33%	2.74%	13.36%
23	90,719	91,612	-0.97%✓	-893	70.61%	4.68%	14.87%	4.41%	29.39%	76,266	84.1%	71.65%	4.78%	14.75%	4.14%	28.35%
24	91,480	91,612	-0.14%✓	-132	61.18%	10.03%	20.19%	3.69%	38.82%	69,996	76.5%	63.53%	9.84%	19.60%	3.29%	36.47%
25	90,562	91,612	-1.15%✓	-1,050	64.13%	20.53%	4.87%	4.47%	35.87%	73,216	80.8%	66.72%	19.62%	4.96%	3.82%	33.28%
26	91,723	91,612	0.12%✓	111	50.52%	37.86%	1.05%	4.20%	49.48%	70,678	77.1%	54.11%	35.82%	1.14%	3.61%	45.89%
27	90,457	91,612	-1.26%✓	-1,155	84.33%	3.05%	1.18%	6.36%	15.67%	73,737	81.5%	86.29%	2.93%	1.21%	5.34%	13.71%
28	91,598	91,612	-0.02%✓	-14	74.98%	9.75%	3.36%	6.24%	25.02%	71,385	77.9%	77.44%	9.14%	3.23%	5.36%	22.56%
29	92,583	91,612	1.06%✓	971	72.48%	13.37%	1.38%	6.68%	27.52%	72,381	78.2%	76.05%	11.83%	1.40%	5.62%	23.95%
30	93,460	91,612	2.02%✓	1,848	87.42%	2.57%	0.64%	4.06%	12.58%	73,606	78.8%	89.60%	2.30%	0.67%	3.21%	10.40%
31	92,978	91,612	1.49%✓	1,366	72.74%	16.00%	1.27%	4.03%	27.26%	73,558	79.1%	74.55%	15.72%	1.28%	3.54%	25.45%
32	92,092	91,612	0.52%✓	480	53.20%	28.29%	3.69%	7.17%	46.80%	73,449	79.8%	57.13%	26.46%	3.89%	6.21%	42.87%
33	92,730	91,612	1.22%✓	1,118	68.50%	7.94%	11.52%	5.90%	31.50%	74,822	80.7%	70.65%	7.76%	11.65%	5.23%	29.35%
34	92,371	91,612	0.83%✓	759	83.11%	2.61%	0.48%	8.88%	16.89%	73,142	79.2%	85.26%	2.88%	0.49%	7.27%	14.74%
35	93,023	91,612	1.54%✓	1,411	89.55%	1.44%	0.48%	4.20%	10.45%	71,335	76.7%	90.73%	1.66%	0.49%	3.29%	9.27%
36	89,634	91,612	-2.16%✓	-1,978	84.12%	2.73%	0.69%	7.00%	15.88%	68,621	76.6%	86.65%	2.74%	0.72%	5.44%	13.35%
37	91,456	91,612	-0.17%✓	-156	78.38%	6.26%	1.89%	6.54%	21.62%	71,787	78.5%	81.10%	6.19%	2.00%	5.18%	18.90%
38	93,422	91,612	1.98%✓	1,810	67.57%	19.03%	1.75%	6.63%	32.43%	73,770	79.0%	72.12%	16.97%	1.68%	5.18%	27.88%
39	90,270	91,612	-1.46%✓	-1,342	81.17%	1.69%	0.44%	10.74%	18.83%	69,482	77.0%	84.59%	1.69%	0.45%	8.20%	15.41%
40	90,211	91,612	-1.53%✓	-1,401	77.97%	7.16%	4.56%	4.57%	22.03%	69,763	77.3%	80.75%	6.74%	4.45%	3.86%	19.25%

State House District Map

POPULATION

DISTRICT	Total Population				Racial Demographics as Percent of Total Population					Voting Age Population		Racial Demographics as Percent of Voting Population				
	All Persons	Target	Dev.	Difference	NH White	NH Black	NH Asian	Hispanic	Minority	VAP	% of Total	NH White	NH Black	NH Asian	Hispanic	Minority
41	91,872	91,612	0.28%✓	260	59.50%	21.99%	2.17%	8.66%	40.50%	72,876	79.3%	64.54%	19.61%	2.54%	7.40%	35.46%
42	91,192	91,612	-0.46%✓	-420	86.29%	3.44%	1.09%	3.41%	13.71%	70,454	77.3%	88.31%	3.13%	1.11%	2.69%	11.69%
43	92,518	91,612	0.99%✓	906	88.43%	0.80%	0.52%	5.52%	11.57%	70,016	75.7%	90.34%	0.65%	0.51%	4.58%	9.66%
44	89,974	91,612	-1.79%✓	-1,638	67.40%	15.11%	3.76%	6.67%	32.60%	68,782	76.4%	71.48%	14.34%	3.39%	5.53%	28.52%
45	90,612	91,612	-1.09%✓	-1,000	90.40%	1.29%	0.55%	3.08%	9.60%	71,054	78.4%	92.00%	1.14%	0.54%	2.48%	8.00%
46	91,041	91,612	-0.62%✓	-571	75.41%	12.23%	1.26%	4.62%	24.59%	71,551	78.6%	78.41%	12.17%	1.26%	3.54%	21.59%
47	91,302	91,612	-0.34%✓	-310	82.97%	3.10%	3.93%	4.17%	17.03%	73,378	80.4%	84.80%	3.07%	4.17%	3.43%	15.20%
48	92,373	91,612	0.83%✓	761	83.36%	1.79%	6.90%	3.00%	16.64%	74,656	80.8%	84.30%	1.79%	7.25%	2.56%	15.70%
49	93,247	91,612	1.78%✓	1,635	81.32%	5.78%	4.20%	4.03%	18.68%	74,267	79.6%	82.78%	5.82%	4.14%	3.38%	17.22%
50	93,139	91,612	1.67%✓	1,527	91.14%	0.44%	0.72%	3.01%	8.86%	72,160	77.5%	92.28%	0.44%	0.77%	2.54%	7.72%
51	91,507	91,612	-0.11%✓	-105	89.00%	1.30%	1.29%	3.41%	11.00%	72,488	79.2%	90.44%	1.25%	1.35%	2.70%	9.56%
52	91,098	91,612	-0.56%✓	-514	84.95%	2.75%	1.63%	5.77%	15.05%	72,818	79.9%	86.85%	2.66%	1.63%	4.81%	13.15%
53	93,056	91,612	1.58%✓	1,444	40.81%	33.94%	2.28%	17.60%	59.19%	71,476	76.8%	46.05%	32.59%	2.35%	14.72%	53.95%
54	92,949	91,612	1.46%✓	1,337	73.66%	6.77%	9.52%	5.16%	26.34%	73,853	79.5%	75.32%	6.95%	9.54%	4.33%	24.68%
55	91,805	91,612	0.21%✓	193	73.68%	3.41%	13.74%	4.69%	26.32%	71,848	78.3%	75.98%	3.51%	13.12%	3.98%	24.02%
56	90,410	91,612	-1.31%✓	-1,202	67.73%	3.39%	21.41%	3.38%	32.27%	71,737	79.3%	70.93%	3.44%	19.61%	2.94%	29.07%
57	89,693	91,612	-2.09%✓	-1,919	74.61%	5.19%	13.76%	2.60%	25.39%	71,864	80.1%	76.21%	4.89%	13.48%	2.27%	23.79%
58	90,454	91,612	-1.26%✓	-1,158	78.17%	8.23%	6.25%	2.72%	21.83%	73,423	81.2%	79.90%	7.86%	6.07%	2.41%	20.10%
59	89,336	91,612	-2.48%✓	-2,276	86.97%	2.68%	3.69%	2.91%	13.03%	70,271	78.7%	88.36%	2.58%	3.58%	2.50%	11.64%
60	92,742	91,612	1.23%✓	1,130	81.65%	7.23%	3.47%	3.23%	18.35%	72,453	78.1%	83.34%	7.08%	3.47%	2.69%	16.66%
61	93,156	91,612	1.69%✓	1,544	73.83%	15.25%	2.72%	3.08%	26.17%	75,006	80.5%	77.01%	13.83%	2.69%	2.52%	22.99%
62	90,539	91,612	-1.17%✓	-1,073	77.07%	13.35%	1.44%	2.83%	22.93%	74,114	81.9%	79.79%	12.07%	1.47%	2.35%	20.21%
63	90,638	91,612	-1.06%✓	-974	88.69%	3.12%	0.74%	2.65%	11.31%	72,589	80.1%	90.27%	2.86%	0.79%	2.13%	9.73%
64	91,060	91,612	-0.60%✓	-552	85.90%	3.78%	0.61%	4.08%	14.10%	71,638	78.7%	88.31%	3.56%	0.65%	3.30%	11.69%
65	92,892	91,612	1.40%✓	1,280	87.96%	2.29%	0.36%	5.03%	12.04%	73,184	78.8%	89.40%	2.39%	0.36%	4.12%	10.60%
66	93,014	91,612	1.53%✓	1,402	88.17%	1.18%	1.61%	4.41%	11.83%	71,767	77.2%	89.95%	1.10%	1.61%	3.59%	10.05%
67	92,816	91,612	1.31%✓	1,204	87.35%	3.28%	0.42%	3.56%	12.65%	73,721	79.4%	88.89%	3.28%	0.41%	2.70%	11.11%
68	93,065	91,612	1.59%✓	1,453	82.34%	6.24%	1.74%	4.12%	17.66%	73,273	78.7%	84.24%	6.00%	1.78%	3.37%	15.76%
69	91,698	91,612	0.09%✓	86	68.76%	21.07%	0.85%	3.62%	31.24%	71,476	77.9%	71.44%	19.84%	0.88%	3.15%	28.56%
70	90,738	91,612	-0.95%✓	-874	36.26%	51.87%	0.51%	4.87%	63.74%	68,117	75.1%	39.89%	50.13%	0.59%	4.37%	60.11%
71	91,966	91,612	0.39%✓	354	91.17%	0.69%	0.43%	3.06%	8.83%	72,963	79.3%	92.41%	0.64%	0.42%	2.51%	7.59%
72	92,844	91,612	1.34%✓	1,232	85.21%	4.89%	1.27%	3.55%	14.79%	72,890	78.5%	86.72%	4.79%	1.31%	2.88%	13.28%
73	91,543	91,612	-0.08%✓	-69	77.71%	5.83%	7.53%	4.34%	22.29%	75,397	82.4%	78.57%	6.50%	7.50%	3.80%	21.43%
74	90,782	91,612	-0.91%✓	-830	58.79%	18.25%	4.34%	11.02%	41.21%	70,233	77.4%	63.43%	17.05%	4.27%	9.39%	36.57%
75	93,554	91,612	2.12%✓	1,942	79.32%	4.35%	5.90%	5.12%	20.68%	75,207	80.4%	81.08%	4.26%	6.12%	4.27%	18.92%
76	92,354	91,612	0.81%✓	742	78.11%	7.92%	2.58%	6.26%	21.89%	73,043	79.1%	80.63%	7.67%	2.44%	5.18%	19.37%
77	92,594	91,612	1.07%✓	982	69.49%	11.08%	2.11%	10.61%	30.51%	72,106	77.9%	73.16%	10.25%	2.18%	9.15%	26.84%
78	92,264	91,612	0.71%✓	652	87.59%	3.62%	0.42%	4.31%	12.41%	71,687	77.7%	88.34%	4.48%	0.43%	3.47%	11.66%
79	90,952	91,612	-0.72%✓	-660	82.38%	4.41%	3.55%	5.05%	17.62%	67,213	73.9%	84.66%	4.13%	3.49%	4.15%	15.34%
80	92,350	91,612	0.81%✓	738	67.22%	12.08%	8.14%	7.64%	32.78%	69,344	75.1%	70.96%	11.28%	7.94%	6.32%	29.04%

State House District Map

POPULATION

DISTRICT	Total Population				Racial Demographics as Percent of Total Population					Voting Age Population		Racial Demographics as Percent of Voting Population				
	All Persons	Target	Dev.	Difference	NH White	NH Black	NH Asian	Hispanic	Minority	VAP	% of Total	NH White	NH Black	NH Asian	Hispanic	Minority
81	91,516	91,612	-0.10%✓	-96	78.37%	7.75%	3.19%	5.49%	21.63%	71,975	78.6%	81.42%	7.03%	3.06%	4.63%	18.58%
82	91,219	91,612	-0.43%✓	-393	49.92%	26.76%	3.33%	14.62%	50.08%	70,814	77.6%	55.75%	24.58%	3.37%	12.03%	44.25%
83	91,341	91,612	-0.30%✓	-271	51.58%	9.19%	2.73%	31.56%	48.42%	67,461	73.9%	57.46%	8.69%	2.98%	26.96%	42.54%
84	91,890	91,612	0.30%✓	278	75.14%	6.21%	1.83%	11.25%	24.86%	73,379	79.9%	79.03%	5.36%	1.91%	9.31%	20.97%
85	90,127	91,612	-1.62%✓	-1,485	87.14%	1.21%	2.12%	5.70%	12.86%	66,158	73.4%	89.34%	1.11%	2.16%	4.64%	10.66%
86	90,575	91,612	-1.13%✓	-1,037	66.02%	2.62%	5.08%	22.19%	33.98%	70,221	77.5%	70.69%	2.33%	5.13%	18.69%	29.31%
87	91,376	91,612	-0.26%✓	-236	61.91%	24.21%	0.50%	6.83%	38.09%	70,829	77.5%	65.83%	22.94%	0.53%	5.55%	34.17%
88	90,900	91,612	-0.78%✓	-712	87.81%	1.47%	1.42%	4.62%	12.19%	71,051	78.2%	89.90%	1.37%	1.37%	3.68%	10.10%
89	93,134	91,612	1.66%✓	1,522	86.99%	1.96%	0.82%	5.55%	13.01%	71,969	77.3%	88.55%	2.04%	0.89%	4.58%	11.45%
90	91,549	91,612	-0.07%✓	-63	87.20%	1.60%	0.91%	5.69%	12.80%	68,467	74.8%	89.55%	1.47%	0.89%	4.50%	10.45%
91	91,350	91,612	-0.29%✓	-262	90.75%	0.53%	0.38%	3.79%	9.25%	70,036	76.7%	92.31%	0.44%	0.38%	3.02%	7.69%
92	92,520	91,612	0.99%✓	908	81.45%	4.58%	1.37%	5.84%	18.55%	73,959	79.9%	82.92%	5.11%	1.41%	4.77%	17.08%
93	89,410	91,612	-2.40%✓	-2,202	86.47%	3.80%	1.18%	5.25%	13.53%	72,182	80.7%	87.40%	4.20%	1.17%	4.50%	12.60%
94	90,438	91,612	-1.28%✓	-1,174	46.40%	33.75%	1.24%	13.25%	53.60%	69,020	76.3%	51.34%	31.92%	1.29%	11.32%	48.66%
95	91,439	91,612	-0.19%✓	-173	88.86%	1.05%	1.89%	3.11%	11.14%	71,873	78.6%	90.46%	1.01%	1.85%	2.48%	9.54%
96	90,544	91,612	-1.17%✓	-1,068	86.81%	1.69%	0.55%	6.14%	13.19%	72,724	80.3%	89.24%	1.54%	0.58%	4.84%	10.76%
97	93,159	91,612	1.69%✓	1,547	88.85%	2.28%	0.49%	4.03%	11.15%	73,355	78.7%	90.17%	2.33%	0.49%	3.30%	9.83%
98	92,049	91,612	0.48%✓	437	92.62%	0.32%	0.29%	3.35%	7.38%	72,801	79.1%	93.77%	0.31%	0.29%	2.76%	6.23%
99	89,375	91,612	-2.44%✓	-2,237	92.86%	0.38%	0.35%	2.09%	7.14%	72,792	81.4%	93.81%	0.34%	0.36%	1.64%	6.19%
100	91,751	91,612	0.15%✓	139	91.21%	1.17%	0.45%	2.19%	8.79%	72,641	79.2%	92.09%	1.15%	0.50%	1.89%	7.91%
101	92,604	91,612	1.08%✓	992	87.51%	1.49%	0.45%	5.48%	12.49%	72,534	78.3%	88.89%	1.50%	0.45%	4.81%	11.11%
102	91,886	91,612	0.30%✓	274	85.43%	1.22%	0.40%	7.30%	14.57%	72,924	79.4%	87.83%	1.25%	0.40%	5.68%	12.17%
103	93,426	91,612	1.98%✓	1,814	89.71%	0.53%	0.79%	3.36%	10.29%	76,458	81.8%	91.48%	0.46%	0.73%	2.69%	8.52%
104	89,466	91,612	-2.34%✓	-2,146	91.28%	0.35%	0.44%	2.58%	8.72%	71,871	80.3%	92.68%	0.30%	0.46%	1.96%	7.32%
105	89,541	91,612	-2.26%✓	-2,071	92.67%	0.32%	0.32%	2.12%	7.33%	72,736	81.2%	93.86%	0.28%	0.33%	1.56%	6.14%
106	90,875	91,612	-0.80%✓	-737	92.66%	0.27%	0.31%	1.34%	7.34%	75,466	83.0%	93.74%	0.22%	0.32%	1.05%	6.26%
107	92,701	91,612	1.19%✓	1,089	83.30%	1.24%	0.52%	1.77%	16.70%	75,875	81.8%	85.31%	1.39%	0.48%	1.42%	14.69%
108	89,366	91,612	-2.45%✓	-2,246	85.05%	2.21%	0.34%	1.69%	14.95%	72,443	81.1%	87.00%	2.62%	0.36%	1.25%	13.00%
109	89,410	91,612	-2.40%✓	-2,202	87.41%	2.21%	0.51%	1.84%	12.59%	73,187	81.9%	88.58%	2.58%	0.53%	1.63%	11.42%
110	90,788	91,612	-0.90%✓	-824	91.64%	0.48%	1.19%	1.70%	8.36%	74,036	81.5%	92.71%	0.46%	1.25%	1.41%	7.29%

Assigned	10077331
Total Pop	10077331
Unassigned	0

State House District Map

COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST

The Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission sought to understand Michigan's diverse population and communities of interest via public engagement and feedback opportunities. In total, MICRC received more than 29,000 comments.

"(c) Districts shall reflect the state's diverse population and communities of interest."

Comments on Final Congressional Map (Hickory)

Comments on All Proposed Maps

Public Comment Portal Comments

Commission Meeting Comments

PARTISAN FAIRNESS

(d) Districts shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any political party. A disproportionate advantage to a political party shall be determined using accepted measures of partisan fairness.

The Michigan Independent Citizen's Redistricting Commission evaluated partisan fairness using four mathematical models. The adopted map did not provide 'disproportionate advantage' to any political party under any of the models used to measure partisan fairness.

Lopsided Margins

Average Winning Margin	Dem	64.5%
	Rep	59.2%

Finding	
Rep	Districts have a lopsided margin advantage of **5.3%**

DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Percent Votes		Party Wins	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
1	258,502	20,654	279,156	92.6%	7.4%	92.6%	
2	261,320	174,928	436,248	59.9%	40.1%	59.9%	
3	265,267	72,758	338,025	78.5%	21.5%	78.5%	
4	328,745	19,885	348,630	94.3%	5.7%	94.3%	
5	438,662	126,246	564,908	77.7%	22.3%	77.7%	
6	470,863	102,192	573,055	82.2%	17.8%	82.2%	
7	463,517	102,015	565,532	82.0%	18.0%	82.0%	
8	341,385	88,387	429,772	79.4%	20.6%	79.4%	
9	311,310	17,291	328,601	94.7%	5.3%	94.7%	
10	366,472	198,627	565,099	64.9%	35.1%	64.9%	
11	353,187	168,158	521,345	67.7%	32.3%	67.7%	
12	313,082	125,555	438,637	71.4%	28.6%	71.4%	
13	303,076	144,266	447,342	67.8%	32.2%	67.8%	
14	306,099	104,625	410,724	74.5%	25.5%	74.5%	
15	270,884	173,183	444,067	61.0%	39.0%	61.0%	
16	405,317	123,360	528,677	76.7%	23.3%	76.7%	
17	334,631	153,279	487,910	68.6%	31.4%	68.6%	
18	491,476	126,756	618,232	79.5%	20.5%	79.5%	
19	412,797	235,189	647,986	63.7%	36.3%	63.7%	
20	349,902	284,833	634,735	55.1%	44.9%	55.1%	
21	259,240	241,843	501,083	51.7%	48.3%	51.7%	
22	309,321	339,589	648,910	47.7%	52.3%		52.3%
23	291,695	187,546	479,241	60.9%	39.1%	60.9%	
24	305,861	223,265	529,126	57.8%	42.2%	57.8%	
25	275,148	168,470	443,618	62.0%	38.0%	62.0%	

Lopsided Margins

DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Percent Votes		Party Wins	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
26	312,525	129,982	442,507	70.6%	29.4%	70.6%	
27	281,073	271,239	552,312	50.9%	49.1%	50.9%	
28	251,831	229,455	481,286	52.3%	47.7%	52.3%	
29	238,070	218,638	456,708	52.1%	47.9%	52.1%	
30	230,506	290,674	521,180	44.2%	55.8%		55.8%
31	275,393	235,646	511,039	53.9%	46.1%	53.9%	
32	360,998	108,735	469,733	76.9%	23.1%	76.9%	
33	420,621	167,901	588,522	71.5%	28.5%	71.5%	
34	214,429	277,077	491,506	43.6%	56.4%		56.4%
35	143,815	295,685	439,500	32.7%	67.3%		67.3%
36	153,719	264,662	418,381	36.7%	63.3%		63.3%
37	179,718	274,797	454,515	39.5%	60.5%		60.5%
38	285,580	266,034	551,614	51.8%	48.2%	51.8%	
39	189,211	264,591	453,802	41.7%	58.3%		58.3%
40	297,007	253,141	550,148	54.0%	46.0%	54.0%	
41	318,040	108,655	426,695	74.5%	25.5%	74.5%	
42	246,225	295,466	541,691	45.5%	54.5%		54.5%
43	160,976	348,109	509,085	31.6%	68.4%		68.4%
44	217,430	200,803	418,233	52.0%	48.0%	52.0%	
45	189,025	329,707	518,732	36.4%	63.6%		63.6%
46	215,370	200,283	415,653	51.8%	48.2%	51.8%	
47	382,546	238,809	621,355	61.6%	38.4%	61.6%	
48	312,504	306,850	619,354	50.5%	49.5%	50.5%	
49	239,660	309,345	549,005	43.7%	56.3%		56.3%
50	196,227	359,878	556,105	35.3%	64.7%		64.7%
51	229,955	363,093	593,048	38.8%	61.2%		61.2%
52	239,488	344,546	584,034	41.0%	59.0%		59.0%
53	287,443	121,241	408,684	70.3%	29.7%	70.3%	
54	267,126	309,291	576,417	46.3%	53.7%		53.7%
55	267,990	306,710	574,700	46.6%	53.4%		53.4%
56	291,476	264,875	556,351	52.4%	47.6%	52.4%	
57	215,912	228,973	444,885	48.5%	51.5%		51.5%
58	239,623	242,137	481,760	49.7%	50.3%		50.3%
59	201,755	333,786	535,541	37.7%	62.3%		62.3%
60	234,995	299,708	534,703	43.9%	56.1%		56.1%
61	271,563	250,509	522,072	52.0%	48.0%	52.0%	
62	273,649	273,005	546,654	50.1%	49.9%	50.1%	
63	214,269	325,099	539,368	39.7%	60.3%		60.3%
64	217,142	262,173	479,315	45.3%	54.7%		54.7%
65	183,403	351,999	535,402	34.3%	65.7%		65.7%

Lopsided Margins

DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Percent Votes		Party Wins	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
66	202,864	377,939	580,803	34.9%	65.1%		65.1%
67	250,917	293,559	544,476	46.1%	53.9%		53.9%
68	276,355	278,227	554,582	49.8%	50.2%		50.2%
69	323,172	203,120	526,292	61.4%	38.6%	61.4%	
70	374,227	66,491	440,718	84.9%	15.1%	84.9%	
71	251,023	301,954	552,977	45.4%	54.6%		54.6%
72	260,583	305,018	565,601	46.1%	53.9%		53.9%
73	262,680	214,960	477,640	55.0%	45.0%	55.0%	
74	326,911	154,066	480,977	68.0%	32.0%	68.0%	
75	327,413	227,885	555,298	59.0%	41.0%	59.0%	
76	292,290	273,022	565,312	51.7%	48.3%	51.7%	
77	322,455	201,503	523,958	61.5%	38.5%	61.5%	
78	177,054	291,695	468,749	37.8%	62.2%		62.2%
79	160,508	353,131	513,639	31.2%	68.8%		68.8%
80	275,659	259,938	535,597	51.5%	48.5%	51.5%	
81	285,844	281,219	567,063	50.4%	49.6%	50.4%	
82	312,114	123,420	435,534	71.7%	28.3%	71.7%	
83	187,012	182,812	369,824	50.6%	49.4%	50.6%	
84	243,716	249,048	492,764	49.5%	50.5%		50.5%
85	138,039	405,083	543,122	25.4%	74.6%		74.6%
86	203,770	270,959	474,729	42.9%	57.1%		57.1%
87	268,142	156,618	424,760	63.1%	36.9%	63.1%	
88	245,387	325,594	570,981	43.0%	57.0%		57.0%
89	154,660	302,784	457,444	33.8%	66.2%		66.2%
90	207,162	349,053	556,215	37.2%	62.8%		62.8%
91	171,026	291,337	462,363	37.0%	63.0%		63.0%
92	203,368	208,285	411,653	49.4%	50.6%		50.6%
93	206,155	316,588	522,743	39.4%	60.6%		60.6%
94	336,647	148,685	485,332	69.4%	30.6%	69.4%	
95	227,166	319,003	546,169	41.6%	58.4%		58.4%
96	274,622	271,760	546,382	50.3%	49.7%	50.3%	
97	217,116	326,656	543,772	39.9%	60.1%		60.1%
98	180,381	338,681	519,062	34.8%	65.2%		65.2%
99	209,769	314,549	524,318	40.0%	60.0%		60.0%
100	182,482	298,484	480,966	37.9%	62.1%		62.1%
101	177,978	310,629	488,607	36.4%	63.6%		63.6%
102	230,242	295,320	525,562	43.8%	56.2%		56.2%
103	314,152	337,962	652,114	48.2%	51.8%		51.8%
104	218,901	344,830	563,731	38.8%	61.2%		61.2%
105	194,704	345,949	540,653	36.0%	64.0%		64.0%

State House District Map

Lopsided Margins

DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Percent Votes		Party Wins	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
106	223,939	351,534	575,473	38.9%	61.1%		61.1%
107	246,137	337,553	583,690	42.2%	57.8%		57.8%
108	202,307	297,105	499,412	40.5%	59.5%		59.5%
109	275,060	244,621	519,681	52.9%	47.1%	52.9%	
110	220,366	293,600	513,966	42.9%	57.1%		57.1%

Comparison of Democratic and Republican vote shares across districts

Mean-Median Difference

District Median Percentage	Dem	50.3%
	Rep	49.7%
Statewide mean percentage	Dem	53.1%
	Rep	46.9%
Mean-Median Difference	Dem	2.7%
	Rep	-2.7%

Findings	
Rep	Districts have a mean-median advantage of **2.7%**

DISTRICT	Dem	Rep
1	92.6%	7.4%
2	59.9%	40.1%
3	78.5%	21.5%
4	94.3%	5.7%
5	77.7%	22.3%
6	82.2%	17.8%
7	82.0%	18.0%
8	79.4%	20.6%
9	94.7%	5.3%
10	64.9%	35.1%
11	67.7%	32.3%
12	71.4%	28.6%
13	67.8%	32.2%
14	74.5%	25.5%
15	61.0%	39.0%
16	76.7%	23.3%
17	68.6%	31.4%
18	79.5%	20.5%
19	63.7%	36.3%
20	55.1%	44.9%
21	51.7%	48.3%
22	47.7%	52.3%
23	60.9%	39.1%
24	57.8%	42.2%
25	62.0%	38.0%
26	70.6%	29.4%
27	50.9%	49.1%
28	52.3%	47.7%
29	52.1%	47.9%
30	44.2%	55.8%

DISTRICT	Dem	Rep
31	53.9%	46.1%
32	76.9%	23.1%
33	71.5%	28.5%
34	43.6%	56.4%
35	32.7%	67.3%
36	36.7%	63.3%
37	39.5%	60.5%
38	51.8%	48.2%
39	41.7%	58.3%
40	54.0%	46.0%
41	74.5%	25.5%
42	45.5%	54.5%
43	31.6%	68.4%
44	52.0%	48.0%
45	36.4%	63.6%
46	51.8%	48.2%
47	61.6%	38.4%
48	50.5%	49.5%
49	45.7%	54.3%
50	43.7%	56.3%
51	38.8%	61.2%
52	41.0%	59.0%
53	70.3%	29.7%
54	46.3%	53.7%
55	46.6%	53.4%
56	52.4%	47.6%
57	48.5%	51.5%
58	49.7%	50.3%
59	37.7%	62.3%
60	43.9%	56.1%

DISTRICT	Dem	Rep
61	52.0%	48.0%
62	50.1%	49.9%
63	39.7%	60.3%
64	45.3%	54.7%
65	34.3%	65.7%
66	34.9%	65.1%
67	46.1%	53.9%
68	49.8%	50.2%
69	61.4%	38.6%
70	84.9%	15.1%
71	45.4%	54.6%
72	46.1%	53.9%
73	55.0%	45.0%
74	68.0%	32.0%
75	59.0%	41.0%
76	51.7%	48.3%
77	61.5%	38.5%
78	37.8%	62.2%
79	31.2%	68.8%
80	51.5%	48.5%
81	50.4%	49.6%
82	71.7%	28.3%
83	50.6%	49.4%
84	49.5%	50.5%
85	25.4%	74.6%
86	42.9%	57.1%
87	63.1%	36.9%
88	43.0%	57.0%
89	33.8%	66.2%
90	37.2%	62.8%

DISTRICT	Dem	Rep
91	37.0%	63.0%
92	49.4%	50.6%
93	39.4%	60.6%
94	69.4%	30.6%
95	41.6%	58.4%
96	50.3%	49.7%
97	39.9%	60.1%
98	34.8%	65.2%
99	40.0%	60.0%
100	37.9%	62.1%
101	36.4%	63.6%
102	43.8%	56.2%
103	48.2%	51.8%
104	38.8%	61.2%
105	36.0%	64.0%
106	38.9%	61.1%
107	42.2%	57.8%
108	40.5%	59.5%
109	52.9%	47.1%
110	42.9%	57.1%

Efficiency Gap

		Total Wasted Votes	% Wasted Votes of Total Votes
Statewide % Wasted Votes	Dem	15,201,004	27.16%
	Rep	12,782,476	22.84%

Finding	
Rep	Candidates have an efficiency gap advantage of
	4.3%

DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Lost Votes		Minimum to win	Surplus Votes		Total Wasted Votes	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
1	258,502	20,654	279,156	0	20,654	139,578	118,924	0	118,924	20,654
2	261,320	174,928	436,248	0	174,928	218,124	43,196	0	43,196	174,928
3	265,267	72,758	338,025	0	72,758	169,013	96,255	0	96,255	72,758
4	328,745	19,885	348,630	0	19,885	174,315	154,430	0	154,430	19,885
5	438,662	126,246	564,908	0	126,246	282,454	156,208	0	156,208	126,246
6	470,863	102,192	573,055	0	102,192	286,528	184,336	0	184,336	102,192
7	463,517	102,015	565,532	0	102,015	282,766	180,751	0	180,751	102,015
8	341,385	88,387	429,772	0	88,387	214,886	126,499	0	126,499	88,387
9	311,310	17,291	328,601	0	17,291	164,301	147,010	0	147,010	17,291
10	366,472	198,627	565,099	0	198,627	282,550	83,923	0	83,923	198,627
11	353,187	168,158	521,345	0	168,158	260,673	92,515	0	92,515	168,158
12	313,082	125,555	438,637	0	125,555	219,319	93,764	0	93,764	125,555
13	303,076	144,266	447,342	0	144,266	223,671	79,405	0	79,405	144,266
14	306,099	104,625	410,724	0	104,625	205,362	100,737	0	100,737	104,625
15	270,884	173,183	444,067	0	173,183	222,034	48,851	0	48,851	173,183
16	405,317	123,360	528,677	0	123,360	264,339	140,979	0	140,979	123,360
17	334,631	153,279	487,910	0	153,279	243,955	90,676	0	90,676	153,279
18	491,476	126,756	618,232	0	126,756	309,116	182,360	0	182,360	126,756
19	412,797	235,189	647,986	0	235,189	323,993	88,804	0	88,804	235,189
20	349,902	284,833	634,735	0	284,833	317,368	32,535	0	32,535	284,833

Efficiency Gap

DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Lost Votes		Minimum to win	Surplus Votes		Total Wasted Votes	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
21	259,240	241,843	501,083	0	241,843	250,542	8,699	0	8,699	241,843
22	309,321	339,589	648,910	309,321	0	324,455	0	15,134	309,321	15,134
23	291,695	187,546	479,241	0	187,546	239,621	52,075	0	52,075	187,546
24	305,861	223,265	529,126	0	223,265	264,563	41,298	0	41,298	223,265
25	275,148	168,470	443,618	0	168,470	221,809	53,339	0	53,339	168,470
26	312,525	129,982	442,507	0	129,982	221,254	91,272	0	91,272	129,982
27	281,073	271,239	552,312	0	271,239	276,156	4,917	0	4,917	271,239
28	251,831	229,455	481,286	0	229,455	240,643	11,188	0	11,188	229,455
29	238,070	218,638	456,708	0	218,638	228,354	9,716	0	9,716	218,638
30	230,506	290,674	521,180	230,506	0	260,590	0	30,084	230,506	30,084
31	275,393	235,646	511,039	0	235,646	255,520	19,874	0	19,874	235,646
32	360,998	108,735	469,733	0	108,735	234,867	126,132	0	126,132	108,735
33	420,621	167,901	588,522	0	167,901	294,261	126,360	0	126,360	167,901
34	214,429	277,077	491,506	214,429	0	245,753	0	31,324	214,429	31,324
35	143,815	295,685	439,500	143,815	0	219,750	0	75,935	143,815	75,935
36	153,719	264,662	418,381	153,719	0	209,191	0	55,472	153,719	55,472
37	179,718	274,797	454,515	179,718	0	227,258	0	47,540	179,718	47,540
38	285,580	266,034	551,614	0	266,034	275,807	9,773	0	9,773	266,034
39	189,211	264,591	453,802	189,211	0	226,901	0	37,690	189,211	37,690
40	297,007	253,141	550,148	0	253,141	275,074	21,933	0	21,933	253,141
41	318,040	108,655	426,695	0	108,655	213,348	104,693	0	104,693	108,655
42	246,225	295,466	541,691	246,225	0	270,846	0	24,621	246,225	24,621
43	160,976	348,109	509,085	160,976	0	254,543	0	93,567	160,976	93,567
44	217,430	200,803	418,233	0	200,803	209,117	8,314	0	8,314	200,803
45	189,025	329,707	518,732	189,025	0	259,366	0	70,341	189,025	70,341
46	215,370	200,283	415,653	0	200,283	207,827	7,544	0	7,544	200,283
47	382,546	238,809	621,355	0	238,809	310,678	71,869	0	71,869	238,809
48	312,504	306,850	619,354	0	306,850	309,677	2,827	0	2,827	306,850
49	239,660	309,345	549,005	239,660	0	274,503	0	34,843	239,660	34,843
50	196,227	359,878	556,105	196,227	0	278,053	0	81,826	196,227	81,826

State House District Map

Efficiency Gap

DISTRICT	Party		Total Votes	Lost Votes		Minimum to win	Surplus Votes		Total Wasted Votes	
	Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep		Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
51	229,955	363,093	593,048	229,955	0	296,524	0	66,569	229,955	66,569
52	239,488	344,546	584,034	239,488	0	292,017	0	52,529	239,488	52,529
53	287,443	121,241	408,684	0	121,241	204,342	83,101	0	83,101	121,241
54	267,126	309,291	576,417	267,126	0	288,209	0	21,083	267,126	21,083
55	267,990	306,710	574,700	267,990	0	287,350	0	19,360	267,990	19,360
56	291,476	264,875	556,351	0	264,875	278,176	13,301	0	13,301	264,875
57	215,912	228,973	444,885	215,912	0	222,443	0	6,531	215,912	6,531
58	239,623	242,137	481,760	239,623	0	240,880	0	1,257	239,623	1,257
59	201,755	333,786	535,541	201,755	0	267,771	0	66,016	201,755	66,016
60	234,995	299,708	534,703	234,995	0	267,352	0	32,357	234,995	32,357
61	271,563	250,509	522,072	0	250,509	261,036	10,527	0	10,527	250,509
62	273,649	273,005	546,654	0	273,005	273,327	322	0	322	273,005
63	214,269	325,099	539,368	214,269	0	269,684	0	55,415	214,269	55,415
64	217,142	262,173	479,315	217,142	0	239,658	0	22,516	217,142	22,516
65	183,403	351,999	535,402	183,403	0	267,701	0	84,298	183,403	84,298
66	202,864	377,939	580,803	202,864	0	290,402	0	87,538	202,864	87,538
67	250,917	293,559	544,476	250,917	0	272,238	0	21,321	250,917	21,321
68	276,355	278,227	554,582	276,355	0	277,291	0	936	276,355	936
69	323,172	203,120	526,292	0	203,120	263,146	60,026	0	60,026	203,120
70	374,227	66,491	440,718	0	66,491	220,359	153,868	0	153,868	66,491
71	251,023	301,954	552,977	251,023	0	276,489	0	25,466	251,023	25,466
72	260,583	305,018	565,601	260,583	0	282,801	0	22,218	260,583	22,218
73	262,680	214,960	477,640	0	214,960	238,820	23,860	0	23,860	214,960
74	326,911	154,066	480,977	0	154,066	240,489	86,423	0	86,423	154,066
75	327,413	227,885	555,298	0	227,885	277,649	49,764	0	49,764	227,885
76	292,290	273,022	565,312	0	273,022	282,656	9,634	0	9,634	273,022
77	322,455	201,503	523,958	0	201,503	261,979	60,476	0	60,476	201,503
78	177,054	291,695	468,749	177,054	0	234,375	0	57,321	177,054	57,321
79	160,508	353,131	513,639	160,508	0	256,820	0	96,312	160,508	96,312
80	275,659	259,938	535,597	0	259,938	267,799	7,861	0	7,861	259,938

State House District Map

Efficiency Gap

DISTRICT	Party Dem	Party Rep	Total Votes	Lost Votes Dem	Lost Votes Rep	Minimum to win	Surplus Votes Dem	Surplus Votes Rep	Total Wasted Votes Dem	Total Wasted Votes Rep
81	285,844	281,219	567,063	0	281,219	283,532	2,313	0	2,313	281,219
82	312,114	123,420	435,534	0	123,420	217,767	94,347	0	94,347	123,420
83	187,012	182,812	369,824	0	182,812	184,912	2,100	0	2,100	182,812
84	243,716	249,048	492,764	243,716	0	246,382	0	2,666	243,716	2,666
85	138,039	405,083	543,122	138,039	0	271,561	0	133,522	138,039	133,522
86	203,770	270,959	474,729	203,770	0	237,365	0	33,595	203,770	33,595
87	268,142	156,618	424,760	0	156,618	212,380	55,762	0	55,762	156,618
88	245,387	325,594	570,981	245,387	0	285,491	0	40,104	245,387	40,104
89	154,660	302,784	457,444	154,660	0	228,722	0	74,062	154,660	74,062
90	207,162	349,053	556,215	207,162	0	278,108	0	70,946	207,162	70,946
91	171,026	291,337	462,363	171,026	0	231,182	0	60,156	171,026	60,156
92	203,368	208,285	411,653	203,368	0	205,827	0	2,459	203,368	2,459
93	206,155	316,588	522,743	206,155	0	261,372	0	55,217	206,155	55,217
94	336,647	148,685	485,332	0	148,685	242,666	93,981	0	93,981	148,685
95	227,166	319,003	546,169	227,166	0	273,085	0	45,919	227,166	45,919
96	274,622	271,760	546,382	0	271,760	273,191	1,431	0	1,431	271,760
97	217,116	326,656	543,772	217,116	0	271,886	0	54,770	217,116	54,770
98	180,381	338,681	519,062	180,381	0	259,531	0	79,150	180,381	79,150
99	209,769	314,549	524,318	209,769	0	262,159	0	52,390	209,769	52,390
100	182,482	298,484	480,966	182,482	0	240,483	0	58,001	182,482	58,001
101	177,978	310,629	488,607	177,978	0	244,304	0	66,326	177,978	66,326
102	230,242	295,320	525,562	230,242	0	262,781	0	32,539	230,242	32,539
103	314,152	337,962	652,114	314,152	0	326,057	0	11,905	314,152	11,905
104	218,901	344,830	563,731	218,901	0	281,866	0	62,965	218,901	62,965
105	194,704	345,949	540,653	194,704	0	270,327	0	75,623	194,704	75,623
106	223,939	351,534	575,473	223,939	0	287,737	0	63,798	223,939	63,798
107	246,137	337,553	583,690	246,137	0	291,845	0	45,708	246,137	45,708
108	202,307	297,105	499,412	202,307	0	249,706	0	47,399	202,307	47,399
109	275,060	244,621	519,681	0	244,621	259,841	15,220	0	15,220	244,621
110	220,366	293,600	513,966	220,366	0	256,983	0	36,617	220,366	36,617

State House District Map

Seats to Votes Ratio

	Vote Share	Count of Seats	Seat Share	Proportionality Bias
Dem	52.3%	57	51.8%	-0.5%
Rep	47.7%	53	48.2%	0.5%

DISTRICT	Composite Score			
	Dem	Dem %	Rep	Rep %
1	258,502	92.6%	20,654	7.4%
2	261,320	59.9%	174,928	40.1%
3	265,267	78.5%	72,758	21.5%
4	328,745	94.3%	19,885	5.7%
5	438,662	77.7%	126,246	22.3%
6	470,863	82.2%	102,192	17.8%
7	463,517	82.0%	102,015	18.0%
8	341,385	79.4%	88,387	20.6%
9	311,310	94.7%	17,291	5.3%
10	366,472	64.9%	198,627	35.1%
11	353,187	67.7%	168,158	32.3%
12	313,082	71.4%	125,555	28.6%
13	303,076	67.8%	144,266	32.2%
14	306,099	74.5%	104,625	25.5%
15	270,884	61.0%	173,183	39.0%
16	405,317	76.7%	123,360	23.3%
17	334,631	68.6%	153,279	31.4%
18	491,476	79.5%	126,756	20.5%
19	412,797	63.7%	235,189	36.3%
20	349,902	55.1%	284,833	44.9%
21	259,240	51.7%	241,843	48.3%
22	309,321	47.7%	339,589	52.3%
23	291,695	60.9%	187,546	39.1%
24	305,861	57.8%	223,265	42.2%
25	275,148	62.0%	168,470	38.0%
26	312,525	70.6%	129,982	29.4%
27	281,073	50.9%	271,239	49.1%
28	251,831	52.3%	229,455	47.7%
29	238,070	52.1%	218,638	47.9%
30	230,506	44.2%	290,674	55.8%
31	275,393	53.9%	235,646	46.1%
32	360,998	76.9%	108,735	23.1%
33	420,621	71.5%	167,901	28.5%
34	214,429	43.6%	277,077	56.4%
35	143,815	32.7%	295,685	67.3%
36	153,719	36.7%	264,662	63.3%
37	179,718	39.5%	274,797	60.5%
38	285,580	51.8%	266,034	48.2%
39	189,211	41.7%	264,591	58.3%
40	297,007	54.0%	253,141	46.0%

State House District Map 54

Seats to Votes Ratio

DISTRICT	Composite Score				DISTRICT	Composite Score			
	Dem	Dem %	Rep	Rep %		Dem	Dem %	Rep	Rep %
41	318,040	74.5%	108,655	25.5%	81	285,844	50.4%	281,219	49.6%
42	246,225	45.5%	295,466	54.5%	82	312,114	71.7%	123,420	28.3%
43	160,976	31.6%	348,109	68.4%	83	187,012	50.6%	182,812	49.4%
44	217,430	52.0%	200,803	48.0%	84	243,716	49.5%	249,048	50.5%
45	189,025	36.4%	329,707	63.6%	85	138,039	25.4%	405,083	74.6%
46	215,370	51.8%	200,283	48.2%	86	203,770	42.9%	270,959	57.1%
47	382,546	61.6%	238,809	38.4%	87	268,142	63.1%	156,618	36.9%
48	312,504	50.5%	306,850	49.5%	88	245,387	43.0%	325,594	57.0%
49	239,660	43.7%	309,345	56.3%	89	154,660	33.8%	302,784	66.2%
50	196,227	35.3%	359,878	64.7%	90	207,162	37.2%	349,053	62.8%
51	229,955	38.8%	363,093	61.2%	91	171,026	37.0%	291,337	63.0%
52	239,488	41.0%	344,546	59.0%	92	203,368	49.4%	208,285	50.6%
53	287,443	70.3%	121,241	29.7%	93	206,155	39.4%	316,588	60.6%
54	267,126	46.3%	309,291	53.7%	94	336,647	69.4%	148,685	30.6%
55	267,990	46.6%	306,710	53.4%	95	227,166	41.6%	319,003	58.4%
56	291,476	52.4%	264,875	47.6%	96	274,622	50.3%	271,760	49.7%
57	215,912	48.5%	228,973	51.5%	97	217,116	39.9%	326,656	60.1%
58	239,623	49.7%	242,137	50.3%	98	180,381	34.8%	338,681	65.2%
59	201,755	37.7%	333,786	62.3%	99	209,769	40.0%	314,549	60.0%
60	234,995	43.9%	299,708	56.1%	100	182,482	37.9%	298,484	62.1%
61	271,563	52.0%	250,509	48.0%	101	177,978	36.4%	310,629	63.6%
62	273,649	50.1%	273,005	49.9%	102	230,242	43.8%	295,320	56.2%
63	214,269	39.7%	325,099	60.3%	103	314,152	48.2%	337,962	51.8%
64	217,142	45.3%	262,173	54.7%	104	218,901	38.8%	344,830	61.2%
65	183,403	34.3%	351,999	65.7%	105	194,704	36.0%	345,949	64.0%
66	202,864	34.9%	377,939	65.1%	106	223,939	38.9%	351,534	61.1%
67	250,917	46.1%	293,559	53.9%	107	246,137	42.2%	337,553	57.8%
68	276,355	49.8%	278,227	50.2%	108	202,307	40.5%	297,105	59.5%
69	323,172	61.4%	203,120	38.6%	109	275,060	52.9%	244,621	47.1%
70	374,227	84.9%	66,491	15.1%	110	220,366	42.9%	293,600	57.1%
71	251,023	45.4%	301,954	54.6%					
72	260,583	46.1%	305,018	53.9%					
73	262,680	55.0%	214,960	45.0%					
74	326,911	68.0%	154,066	32.0%					
75	327,413	59.0%	227,885	41.0%					
76	292,290	51.7%	273,022	48.3%					
77	322,455	61.5%	201,503	38.5%					
78	177,054	37.8%	291,695	62.2%					
79	160,508	31.2%	353,131	68.8%					
80	275,659	51.5%	259,938	48.5%					

COMPACTNESS

The Michigan Independent Citizen's Redistricting Commission evaluated the requirement of "*(g) Districts shall be reasonably compact*" using five mathematical models. The adopted map was deemed 'reasonably compact' under each model.

Polsby-Popper

Compactness measure: Polsby–Popper					
District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	26	28	62	18	0.42
2	19	24	48	16	0.41
3	24	36	101	17	0.23
4	15	29	68	14	0.23
5	16	37	108	14	0.15
6	16	33	87	14	0.19
7	19	32	83	15	0.23
8	22	36	102	16	0.21
9	22	29	65	16	0.33
10	56	46	172	27	0.33
11	18	26	53	15	0.34
12	16	21	35	14	0.46
13	19	27	58	16	0.33
14	22	21	37	17	0.59
15	16	28	63	14	0.26
16	24	27	59	18	0.42
17	23	27	58	17	0.40
18	34	33	85	21	0.39
19	38	41	137	22	0.28
20	51	40	125	25	0.41
21	52	39	122	25	0.42
22	41	41	132	23	0.31
23	97	60	285	35	0.34
24	30	25	51	19	0.58
25	28	40	127	19	0.22
26	34	36	103	21	0.33
27	46	33	88	24	0.53
28	171	77	477	46	0.36
29	112	78	478	38	0.23
30	364	115	1,043	68	0.35
31	393	112	1,007	70	0.39
32	44	31	75	24	0.59
33	151	66	346	44	0.44
34	664	117	1,082	91	0.61
35	1,129	152	1,843	119	0.61
36	864	129	1,315	104	0.66
37	523	116	1,068	81	0.49
38	2,765	245	4,761	186	0.58
39	769	129	1,334	98	0.58
40	101	58	264	36	0.38

Compactness measure: Polsby–Popper

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
41	33	38	113	20	0.29
42	388	147	1,709	70	0.23
43	815	190	2,877	101	0.28
44	255	100	795	57	0.32
45	969	213	3,620	110	0.27
46	163	88	615	45	0.26
47	338	132	1,393	65	0.24
48	285	119	1,122	60	0.25
49	106	71	397	36	0.27
50	405	106	901	71	0.45
51	138	69	378	42	0.36
52	83	50	202	32	0.41
53	38	44	152	22	0.25
54	70	62	307	30	0.23
55	42	30	72	23	0.58
56	32	29	68	20	0.48
57	28	30	70	19	0.39
58	25	48	184	18	0.14
59	40	38	113	23	0.36
60	33	34	91	20	0.36
61	27	38	115	18	0.23
62	114	61	295	38	0.39
63	229	96	739	54	0.31
64	296	86	590	61	0.50
65	808	141	1,581	101	0.51
66	209	79	499	51	0.42
67	452	119	1,118	75	0.40
68	149	71	396	43	0.38
69	158	70	390	45	0.41
70	40	43	150	23	0.27
71	683	131	1,375	93	0.50
72	175	77	472	47	0.37
73	443	111	982	75	0.45
74	49	32	81	25	0.60
75	291	88	611	60	0.48
76	425	102	824	73	0.52
77	202	82	531	50	0.38
78	832	160	2,026	102	0.41
79	250	92	667	56	0.38
80	63	50	201	28	0.31
81	77	48	186	31	0.42

Compactness measure: Polsby–Popper

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
82	17	32	81	15	0.21
83	27	36	105	19	0.26
84	46	39	118	24	0.39
85	92	56	247	34	0.37
86	80	51	204	32	0.39
87	99	55	242	35	0.41
88	2,200	206	3,362	166	0.65
89	429	113	1,018	73	0.42
90	303	106	899	62	0.34
91	833	145	1,666	102	0.50
92	761	139	1,533	98	0.50
93	1,179	210	3,505	122	0.34
94	59	52	214	27	0.28
95	624	107	916	89	0.68
96	481	102	822	78	0.59
97	885	220	3,867	105	0.23
98	4,118	305	7,422	227	0.55
99	3,825	344	9,395	219	0.41
100	1,719	191	2,917	147	0.59
101	1,941	251	4,996	156	0.39
102	3,417	291	6,755	207	0.51
103	2,883	250	4,975	190	0.58
104	2,436	362	10,413	175	0.23
105	2,921	300	7,146	192	0.41
106	7,780	397	12,550	313	0.62
107	4,923	444	15,720	249	0.31
108	9,287	645	33,135	342	0.28
109	10,075	541	23,305	356	0.43
110	14,139	680	36,767	422	0.38

Most Compact: 0.68 For District: 95
Least Compact: 0.14 For District: 58

Schwartzberg

Compactness measure: Schwartzberg					
District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	26	28	62	18	0.65
2	19	24	48	16	0.64
3	24	36	101	17	0.48
4	15	29	68	14	0.48
5	16	37	108	14	0.39
6	16	33	87	14	0.43
7	19	32	83	15	0.48
8	22	36	102	16	0.46
9	22	29	65	16	0.57
10	56	46	172	27	0.57
11	18	26	53	15	0.58
12	16	21	35	14	0.67
13	19	27	58	16	0.58
14	22	21	37	17	0.77
15	16	28	63	14	0.51
16	24	27	59	18	0.65
17	23	27	58	17	0.63
18	34	33	85	21	0.63
19	38	41	137	22	0.53
20	51	40	125	25	0.64
21	52	39	122	25	0.65
22	41	41	132	23	0.56
23	97	60	285	35	0.58
24	30	25	51	19	0.76
25	28	40	127	19	0.47
26	34	36	103	21	0.57
27	46	33	88	24	0.73
28	171	77	477	46	0.60
29	112	78	478	38	0.48
30	364	115	1,043	68	0.59
31	393	112	1,007	70	0.62
32	44	31	75	24	0.77
33	151	66	346	44	0.66
34	664	117	1,082	91	0.78
35	1,129	152	1,843	119	0.78
36	864	129	1,315	104	0.81
37	523	116	1,068	81	0.70
38	2,765	245	4,761	186	0.76
39	769	129	1,334	98	0.76
40	101	58	264	36	0.62
41	33	38	113	20	0.54
42	388	147	1,709	70	0.48
43	815	190	2,877	101	0.53
44	255	100	795	57	0.57
45	969	213	3,620	110	0.52

Compactness measure: Schwartzberg

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
46	163	88	615	45	0.51
47	338	132	1,393	65	0.49
48	285	119	1,122	60	0.50
49	106	71	397	36	0.52
50	405	106	901	71	0.67
51	138	69	378	42	0.60
52	83	50	202	32	0.64
53	38	44	152	22	0.50
54	70	62	307	30	0.48
55	42	30	72	23	0.76
56	32	29	68	20	0.69
57	28	30	70	19	0.63
58	25	48	184	18	0.37
59	40	38	113	23	0.60
60	33	34	91	20	0.60
61	27	38	115	18	0.48
62	114	61	295	38	0.62
63	229	96	739	54	0.56
64	296	86	590	61	0.71
65	808	141	1,581	101	0.71
66	209	79	499	51	0.65
67	452	119	1,118	75	0.64
68	149	71	396	43	0.61
69	158	70	390	45	0.64
70	40	43	150	23	0.52
71	683	131	1,375	93	0.70
72	175	77	472	47	0.61
73	443	111	982	75	0.67
74	49	32	81	25	0.78
75	291	88	611	60	0.69
76	425	102	824	73	0.72
77	202	82	531	50	0.62
78	832	160	2,026	102	0.64
79	250	92	667	56	0.61
80	63	50	201	28	0.56
81	77	48	186	31	0.64
82	17	32	81	15	0.46
83	27	36	105	19	0.51
84	46	39	118	24	0.63
85	92	56	247	34	0.61
86	80	51	204	32	0.63
87	99	55	242	35	0.64
88	2,200	206	3,362	166	0.81
89	429	113	1,018	73	0.65
90	303	106	899	62	0.58

Compactness measure: Schwartzberg

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
91	833	145	1,666	102	0.71
92	761	139	1,533	98	0.70
93	1,179	210	3,505	122	0.58
94	59	52	214	27	0.53
95	624	107	916	89	0.82
96	481	102	822	78	0.76
97	885	220	3,867	105	0.48
98	4,118	305	7,422	227	0.74
99	3,825	344	9,395	219	0.64
100	1,719	191	2,917	147	0.77
101	1,941	251	4,996	156	0.62
102	3,417	291	6,755	207	0.71
103	2,883	250	4,975	190	0.76
104	2,436	362	10,413	175	0.48
105	2,921	300	7,146	192	0.64
106	7,780	397	12,550	313	0.79
107	4,923	444	15,720	249	0.56
108	9,287	645	33,135	342	0.53
109	10,075	541	23,305	356	0.66
110	14,139	680	36,767	422	0.62

Most Compact: 0.82 For District: 95
Least Compact: 0.37 For District: 58

Reock Score

Compactness measure: Reock Score

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	26	28	62	18	0.40
2	19	24	48	16	0.52
3	24	36	101	17	0.46
4	15	29	68	14	0.40
5	16	37	108	14	0.13
6	16	33	87	14	0.18
7	19	32	83	15	0.26
8	22	36	102	16	0.17
9	22	29	65	16	0.38
10	56	46	172	27	0.21

Compactness measure: Reock Score

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
11	18	26	53	15	0.30
12	16	21	35	14	0.29
13	19	27	58	16	0.27
14	22	21	37	17	0.48
15	16	28	63	14	0.42
16	24	27	59	18	0.38
17	23	27	58	17	0.28
18	34	33	85	21	0.37
19	38	41	137	22	0.38
20	51	40	125	25	0.44
21	52	39	122	25	0.37
22	41	41	132	23	0.39
23	97	60	285	35	0.45
24	30	25	51	19	0.52
25	28	40	127	19	0.24
26	34	36	103	21	0.37
27	46	33	88	24	0.42
28	171	77	477	46	0.36
29	112	78	478	38	0.21
30	364	115	1,043	68	0.40
31	393	112	1,007	70	0.45
32	44	31	75	24	0.49
33	151	66	346	44	0.40
34	664	117	1,082	91	0.55
35	1,129	152	1,843	119	0.49
36	864	129	1,315	104	0.49
37	523	116	1,068	81	0.40
38	2,765	245	4,761	186	0.47
39	769	129	1,334	98	0.50
40	101	58	264	36	0.52
41	33	38	113	20	0.50
42	388	147	1,709	70	0.43
43	815	190	2,877	101	0.25
44	255	100	795	57	0.32
45	969	213	3,620	110	0.30
46	163	88	615	45	0.31
47	338	132	1,393	65	0.28
48	285	119	1,122	60	0.37
49	106	71	397	36	0.39
50	405	106	901	71	0.57
51	138	69	378	42	0.45
52	83	50	202	32	0.55
53	38	44	152	22	0.34
54	70	62	307	30	0.30
55	42	30	72	23	0.50
56	32	29	68	20	0.49
57	28	30	70	19	0.40
58	25	48	184	18	0.29
59	40	38	113	23	0.48
60	33	34	91	20	0.41

State District Map

Compactness measure: Reock Score

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
61	27	38	115	18	0.40
62	114	61	295	38	0.46
63	229	96	739	54	0.31
64	296	86	590	61	0.40
65	808	141	1,581	101	0.54
66	209	79	499	51	0.37
67	452	119	1,118	75	0.52
68	149	71	396	43	0.42
69	158	70	390	45	0.57
70	40	43	150	23	0.48
71	683	131	1,375	93	0.58
72	175	77	472	47	0.51
73	443	111	982	75	0.51
74	49	32	81	25	0.61
75	291	88	611	60	0.44
76	425	102	824	73	0.59
77	202	82	531	50	0.50
78	832	160	2,026	102	0.50
79	250	92	667	56	0.35
80	63	50	201	28	0.49
81	77	48	186	31	0.39
82	17	32	81	15	0.48
83	27	36	105	19	0.43
84	46	39	118	24	0.40
85	92	56	247	34	0.37
86	80	51	204	32	0.48
87	99	55	242	35	0.57
88	2,200	206	3,362	166	0.56
89	429	113	1,018	73	0.50
90	303	106	899	62	0.36
91	833	145	1,666	102	0.52
92	761	139	1,533	98	0.44
93	1,179	210	3,505	122	0.39
94	59	52	214	27	0.43
95	624	107	916	89	0.60
96	481	102	822	78	0.54
97	885	220	3,867	105	0.51
98	4,118	305	7,422	227	0.72
99	3,825	344	9,395	219	0.29
100	1,719	191	2,917	147	0.54
101	1,941	251	4,996	156	0.34
102	3,417	291	6,755	207	0.49
103	2,883	250	4,975	190	0.55
104	2,436	362	10,413	175	0.31
105	2,921	300	7,146	192	0.50
106	7,780	397	12,550	313	0.46
107	4,923	444	15,720	249	0.43
108	9,287	645	33,135	342	0.34
109	10,075	541	23,305	356	0.58
110	14,139	680	36,767	422	0.57

State House District 72 Map

Most Compact: 0.72 For District: 98

Least Compact: 0.13 For District: 5

Convex Hull

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
			Compactness measure: Convex Hull		
1	26	28	62	18	0.79
2	19	24	48	16	0.75
3	24	36	101	17	0.70
4	15	29	68	14	0.54
5	16	37	108	14	0.60
6	16	33	87	14	0.60
7	19	32	83	15	0.62
8	22	36	102	16	0.70
9	22	29	65	16	0.67
10	56	46	172	27	0.76
11	18	26	53	15	0.67
12	16	21	35	14	0.80
13	19	27	58	16	0.78
14	22	21	37	17	0.92
15	16	28	63	14	0.67
16	24	27	59	18	0.79
17	23	27	58	17	0.90
18	34	33	85	21	0.86
19	38	41	137	22	0.67
20	51	40	125	25	0.80
21	52	39	122	25	0.83
22	41	41	132	23	0.76
23	97	60	285	35	0.68
24	30	25	51	19	0.91
25	28	40	127	19	0.60
26	34	36	103	21	0.74
27	46	33	88	24	0.85
28	171	77	477	46	0.74
29	112	78	478	38	0.64
30	364	115	1,043	68	0.75
31	393	112	1,007	70	0.77
32	44	31	75	24	0.91
33	151	66	346	44	0.83
34	664	117	1,082	91	0.93
35	1,129	152	1,843	119	0.93
36	864	129	1,315	104	0.98
37	523	116	1,068	81	0.85
38	2,765	245	4,761	186	0.91
39	769	129	1,334	98	0.89
40	101	58	264	36	0.84
41	33	38	113	20	0.79
42	388	147	1,709	70	0.62
43	815	190	2,877	101	0.70
44	255	100	795	57	0.68
45	969	213	3,620	110	0.76
46	163	88	615	45	0.73
47	338	132	1,393	65	0.70
48	285	119	1,122	60	0.59
49	106	71	397	36	0.65
50	405	106	901	71	0.83

MICHIGAN INDEPENDENT CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION

Compactness measure: Convex Hull

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
51	138	69	378	42	0.78
52	83	50	202	32	0.83
53	38	44	152	22	0.69
54	70	62	307	30	0.61
55	42	30	72	23	0.92
56	32	29	68	20	0.85
57	28	30	70	19	0.74
58	25	48	184	18	0.47
59	40	38	113	23	0.77
60	33	34	91	20	0.77
61	27	38	115	18	0.72
62	114	61	295	38	0.73
63	229	96	739	54	0.71
64	296	86	590	61	0.88
65	808	141	1,581	101	0.81
66	209	79	499	51	0.84
67	452	119	1,118	75	0.79
68	149	71	396	43	0.82
69	158	70	390	45	0.89
70	40	43	150	23	0.79
71	683	131	1,375	93	0.83
72	175	77	472	47	0.84
73	443	111	982	75	0.86
74	49	32	81	25	0.96
75	291	88	611	60	0.87
76	425	102	824	73	0.85
77	202	82	531	50	0.80
78	832	160	2,026	102	0.79
79	250	92	667	56	0.77
80	63	50	201	28	0.80
81	77	48	186	31	0.83
82	17	32	81	15	0.66
83	27	36	105	19	0.63
84	46	39	118	24	0.79
85	92	56	247	34	0.69
86	80	51	204	32	0.86
87	99	55	242	35	0.79
88	2,200	206	3,362	166	0.93
89	429	113	1,018	73	0.75
90	303	106	899	62	0.70
91	833	145	1,666	102	0.82
92	761	139	1,533	98	0.83
93	1,179	210	3,505	122	0.78
94	59	52	214	27	0.73
95	624	107	916	89	0.95
96	481	102	822	78	0.86
97	885	220	3,867	105	0.61
98	4,118	305	7,422	227	0.91
99		344	9,395	219	0.81

St 99   strict Map

Compactness measure: Convex Hull

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
100	1,719	191	2,917	147	0.86
101	1,941	251	4,996	156	0.73
102	3,417	291	6,755	207	0.87
103	2,883	250	4,975	190	0.87
104	2,436	362	10,413	175	0.56
105	2,921	300	7,146	192	0.74
106	7,780	397	12,550	313	0.93
107	4,923	444	15,720	249	0.68
108	9,287	645	33,135	342	0.67
109	10,075	541	23,305	356	0.79
110	14,139	680	36,767	422	0.78

Most Compact: 0.98 For District: 36
Least Compact: 0.47 For District: 58

Length-Width

Compactness measure: Length-Width

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
1	26	28	62	18	0.96
2	19	24	48	16	1.24
3	24	36	101	17	1.17
4	15	29	68	14	1.59
5	16	37	108	14	0.33
6	16	33	87	14	0.41
7	19	32	83	15	0.58
8	22	36	102	16	0.40
9	22	29	65	16	1.85
10	56	46	172	27	2.09
11	18	26	53	15	0.92
12	16	21	35	14	0.68
13	19	27	58	16	0.47
14	22	21	37	17	0.74
15	16	28	63	14	1.06
16	24	27	59	18	2.06
17	23	27	58	17	4.09
18	34	33	85	21	3.19
19	38	41	137	22	2.06
20	51	40	125	25	2.40

Compactness measure: Length-Width

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
21	52	39	122	25	2.72
22	41	41	132	23	2.21
23	97	60	285	35	1.18
24	30	25	51	19	1.33
25	28	40	127	19	2.20
26	34	36	103	21	1.03
27	46	33	88	24	0.68
28	171	77	477	46	0.76
29	112	78	478	38	0.67
30	364	115	1,043	68	2.28
31	393	112	1,007	70	1.53
32	44	31	75	24	1.53
33	151	66	346	44	1.79
34	664	117	1,082	91	1.61
35	1,129	152	1,843	119	2.57
36	864	129	1,315	104	2.61
37	523	116	1,068	81	2.16
38	2,765	245	4,761	186	1.07
39	769	129	1,334	98	1.46
40	101	58	264	36	1.36
41	33	38	113	20	1.13
42	388	147	1,709	70	1.06
43	815	190	2,877	101	2.71
44	255	100	795	57	3.04
45	969	213	3,620	110	3.29
46	163	88	615	45	3.13
47	338	132	1,393	65	2.71
48	285	119	1,122	60	1.87
49	106	71	397	36	1.99
50	405	106	901	71	1.34
51	138	69	378	42	0.90
52	83	50	202	32	1.49
53	38	44	152	22	1.93
54	70	62	307	30	0.69
55	42	30	72	23	0.96
56	32	29	68	20	1.03
57	28	30	70	19	0.89
58	25	48	184	18	0.80
59	40	38	113	23	2.19
60	33	34	91	20	0.97
61	27	38	115	18	1.67
62	114	61	295	38	1.15
63	229	96	739	54	0.98
64	296	86	590	61	0.71
65	808	141	1,581	101	1.09
66	209	79	499	51	2.60
67	452	119	1,118	75	1.07
68	149	71	396	43	0.80
69	158	70	390	45	1.01
70	49	43	150	23	1.14

State **District Map**

Compactness measure: Length-Width

District	District Area (SQM)	Perimeter (Miles)	Area of Circle with Same Perimeter	Perimeter of Circle with Same Area	Compactness Value
71	683	131	1,375	93	1.43
72	175	77	472	47	0.91
73	443	111	982	75	1.30
74	49	32	81	25	0.93
75	291	88	611	60	0.98
76	425	102	824	73	1.36
77	202	82	531	50	1.50
78	832	160	2,026	102	0.97
79	250	92	667	56	1.82
80	63	50	201	28	2.17
81	77	48	186	31	1.63
82	17	32	81	15	1.35
83	27	36	105	19	1.09
84	46	39	118	24	0.89
85	92	56	247	34	1.47
86	80	51	204	32	1.00
87	99	55	242	35	1.22
88	2,200	206	3,362	166	1.59
89	429	113	1,018	73	1.06
90	303	106	899	62	1.37
91	833	145	1,666	102	1.89
92	761	139	1,533	98	1.10
93	1,179	210	3,505	122	1.92
94	59	52	214	27	1.76
95	624	107	916	89	1.01
96	481	102	822	78	1.10
97	885	220	3,867	105	1.21
98	4,118	305	7,422	227	1.56
99	3,825	344	9,395	219	3.54
100	1,719	191	2,917	147	1.37
101	1,941	251	4,996	156	0.73
102	3,417	291	6,755	207	0.90
103	2,883	250	4,975	190	1.39
104	2,436	362	10,413	175	1.80
105	2,921	300	7,146	192	1.39
106	7,780	397	12,550	313	1.85
107	4,923	444	15,720	249	1.71
108	9,287	645	33,135	342	1.58
109	10,075	541	23,305	356	1.35
110	14,139	680	36,767	422	1.30

Most Compact: 4.09 For District: 17
Least Compact: 0.33 For District: 5

DISSENTING REPORTS

Three commissioners of the inaugural Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission elected to submit a dissenting report as allowed by the Michigan State Constitution.

"A commissioner who votes against a redistricting plan may submit a dissenting report which shall be issued with the commission's report."

<u>DISSENTING REPORT</u>
Submitted by Commissioner
Rhonda Lange

Dissenting Report for Adopted Congressional, Senate and State House Maps

Commissioner Rhonda Lange

Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission

Abstract

This report is an evaluation and assessment of why I objected to the recently adopted plans and details not only my personal opinions on the plans' creation but facts on input that the public gave that were ignored. I will not go into detail as to why I voted for other maps such as the Lange Congressional and Senate plans as the short and direct answer is I was told I HAD to vote for one. My personal choice would have been to not vote for any or abstain from voting due to not believing that we had reached truly fair maps that represented the voices of the public that we heard from. My stance was and still is that the Commission should have taken more time to work on maps and that none of the maps were truly fair.

Dissenting Report for Adopted Congressional, Senate and State House Maps

Congressional Plan Chestnut

The Congressional Chestnut Plan does a complete disservice to parts of Northern and Central Michigan. For example, District 2 takes the west coast of the state and runs it over and down to within two counties of the southern border of the state, which clearly is not compact and splits a total of six counties unnecessarily, which also goes against the criteria of considering county and township lines. District 8, while splitting three counties, needlessly splits off a township in Tuscola to add it to District 8 while splitting off a small township in Genesee County, that is in District 8 and putting it in District 7, again discounting county lines. District 3 needlessly splits three counties and ignores input about communities of interest. Such is the case with Districts 4 and 5. I will say that the SE part of the state, including Districts 6, 10, 11, 12 and 13, while not perfect from a split point of view due to population, I have no issues with; however, from a COI, it is my opinion that the Commission failed, especially as it relates to the African American population.

Michigan Senate Linden

The Michigan Senate Linden Plan does a disservice to "some" citizens of Michigan. While in the Senate plan Northern Michigan is a little more compact, once you get to Districts 33, 34 and 31 multiple counties are needlessly split to make up districts. Districts 33 and 34 both have five county splits and consist mostly of rural areas that do not have high populations, so those splits are both unwarranted and unnecessary. While public comment about COIs for those areas was minimal due to a lack of outreach in my opinion, the comments that were received should have been taken into account. District 17 needlessly splits four counties in mostly rural areas and discounts the COI testimony given for those areas in my opinion. District 22 needlessly splits

five counties. As for districts 1-13, my opinion is the same as it was for the Congressional maps in that area. It is my thought that VRA could have been accomplished in conjunction with COI and I will expound on this in my conclusion. Allegan County is split needlessly three times and Ottawa County is split needlessly two times after hundreds of comments from its residents about the county being a COI and from what I saw maybe one or two (I distinctly remember one) views that felt otherwise, yet they were split, and it was said that was a "compromise" when there was no need for it. The Commission split up three counties so that 3 cities could be considered a COI in District 35. It can also be argued that District 15 could have been accomplished in one county without taking a chunk out of Lenawee.

State House Hickory Plan

State House plan "Hickory" is the worst offender of them all not only in my opinion disenfranchising African American voters but as well as rural voters and voters in Northern Michigan. The U.P. commented that their counties are their COI and not to split them. District 107 needlessly splits three counties. District 104 is one of the most egregious splits in Northern Michigan, splitting 6 counties and not in the name of COI! District 110 splits two counties. While I drew this district, upon going back and editing and reviewing COI, I found it could have been redrawn in a way that kept counties whole and still maintained COI and county boundaries. District 97 splits four counties. Jackson County was split four times, which is completely unacceptable, and their voices were ignored when they expressed that their county WAS/IS THEIR COI. Even if they were over population for one house district, every attempt should have been made to do the least number of splits to maintain their COI. District 28 goes into Monroe County and the voices of those from Monroe County were ignored. In looking at this district it

could have been maintained in Wayne County. District 43 splits four counties and is not

compact. Lapeer County, which again is mostly rural, was split three times unnecessarily. Then

we move into SE Michigan: Macomb, Oakland, and Wayne counties. We as a Commission

failed this area horribly. It is my opinion that not only with the overwhelming amount of input

from the citizens, especially the African American community but also the overwhelming call

from the communities for us to keep drawing and have their voices better represented, we should

have made additional changes. It's my opinion that doing mediocre work is not OK when that

work will affect communities for 10 years.

Conclusion, Summary, Evaluation of Process including ranked criteria, public comment, etc.,

and my personal opinions on the work that got us to these maps.

It is my belief, based off just the minimal examples expressed in the body of this report, that the

Commission failed in its duty to draw fair maps. It is also my belief based off not only what I

saw but also heard, that there was a definite bias not only politically but also geographically and

racially in the drawing of these maps both in favor and against. It is my belief that the

Commission did not take into consideration all the ranked criteria when evaluating each criteria,

making sure each was met simultaneously. While some criteria such as political fairness had to

be evaluated once an entire map was completed, the others could have and should have been

looked at sincerely after each district was drawn. The excuse that time was a factor when you

have citizens from both sides of the aisle and all over the state saying that the maps needed more

work is unacceptable. The citizens spoke and said they did not want these maps for the next 10

years and "we" ignored that because of time. It is my opinion that when the maps were being

drawn based on COIs, the Commission was doing a fairly good job, but once it got to political fairness things went off the track, by our own expert's opinion and court case evaluation. ACCEPTABLE measures would be:

Lopsided Margin: Less than 8%

Mean Median: Less than 5

Efficiency Gap: Less than 7%

The Commission took these numbers to an extreme at the cost of breaking up COIs and, in my opinion, intentionally diluted the votes of rural populations by combining them with heavily populated urban areas that voted in a distinct way. It was also stated openly in a meeting by a commissioner that Northern Michigan was mostly white and really didn't have any diversity. That statement showed, in my opinion, there was bias and discrimination toward people in Northern Michigan, which consists mostly of rural areas.

When looking at criteria for SE Michigan, particularly those in the Detroit area, of course, the first is VRA, which we were given guidance from Mr. Adelson. While I personally did not agree with his and Dr Handley's evaluation, I am not an expert and did not object either. Where I think the Commission failed in this aspect with the maps is that we should have not only considered VRA (or possibly gotten a second opinion) but combined it with COI. The citizens of Detroit, especially African American citizens, came out in strong numbers about their COI, even listing exact streets in some cases. I think these maps failed because we listened to our experts and a set of proposed numbers over the voices of the citizens of the state who were told they would get to pick their representatives by having their communities of interest kept intact. In using the term "cracking and packing" as it relates to VRA, packing is the "INTENTIONAL" act

of concentrating a group to reduce their voting power. I believe we as a Commission could have listened to the African American community and given them the districts that they asked for based off of the COI standpoint, regardless of if those districts were at 51% or even higher as long as it was what the community asked for, but we didn't.

This brings me back to criteria 3, COI. We as a Commission received a lot of public comments on what citizens saw as their COIs. I feel that in drawing these maps the Commission showed a serious lack of consistency in what they saw as being acceptable for COI and, in my opinion, treated different areas of the state in different ways. Maybe this was unintentional, but it happened. Point of fact: the Tri-Cities (Midland, Saginaw, Bay City). The Commission decided that three cities in three different counties was a COI and drew it to be such in two maps based off of one set of public comments for the area; Ottawa County literally had hundreds of comments, including a petition saying that the entire county was their COI, and gave examples of why, and the Commission intentionally split the county unnecessarily and then had a commissioner say it was a "compromise" when there was no need for compromise to the best of my knowledge. I only recall one written comment against the whole county being a COI. I drew maps that made Northern Michigan more compact and considered the COIs that were given for what I will call Central Northern Michigan and the Commission ignored what people in those areas said. A lot of the rural areas stated that their county is/was their COI and the Commission balked at that idea while saying that three cities in three different counties was a COI; again, there was a lack of consistency. I must agree with a lot of the public comment when they said their COI is their county, especially in rural areas where the population is not as condensed. It is my opinion that it is no different than saying, for an example, a five-block radius in Detroit that might hypothetically have 20,000 people is a COI because they have the same issues as far as

economics, environmental, etc. It is no different for a county that has 20,000 people; the issues may be different, but the community still exists.

As for the criteria of favoring or disfavoring an incumbent, while I cannot speak for anyone but myself on this particular criteria, I can say that I did not look at any incumbent data as far as who represented what district in the old plans, were incumbents drawn out of new plans, etc. To make sure of this, I asked that Mr. Woods, the Communications and Outreach Director, not to send me any newspaper articles, at the advice of Legal Counsel Pastula, as it was said articles were being published that talked about incumbents and the districts they were in. I cannot speak to what other commissioners have or have not done regarding this criteria.

Criteria 6: Districts shall reflect consideration of county, city and township boundaries. As described in the subsections of this report in regards to each set of maps, I think I have more than shown in the few examples given that as far as Criteria 6 is concerned, the Commission did an extremely poor job of considering this criteria, especially in rural areas where being split multiple times for no constructive reason negatively affects their representation, and again most rural areas came to this Commission and specifically stated that their county was/is their COI and their voices were blatantly ignored.

Last Criteria: Districts will be reasonably compact. Again, just by looking at the examples I gave for each map, it is easy to see that this criteria was not met. I did a map that outperformed all other maps, including the current Legislative maps, when it came to this criteria that could have at least been considered for certain areas.

In closing, I would like to give my final perspective and opinion as it relates to the process, the work performed, and the concerns I have that I think could have influenced the maps as they were adopted.

First is the outreach. I was very vocal throughout this process on how I feel the outreach for the rural communities was not given as much commitment, time, or funds as the urban and more populous parts of the state. I repeatedly asked our Communications and Outreach Director to reach out to certain areas or groups, to which he said he would but never produced. I was told that there were lots of town halls done in rural communities, yet when the list circulated it was shown not to be the case. It is my opinion that there was extreme bias in the outreach. When it came to public hearings, I feel it was always quickly recommended to cut potential rural venues even though having only two for all of Northern Michigan, including the U.P., would make it harder for people to participate in person, especially in areas where internet could be considered spotty at best, which also limited access to participating online. The Commission approved funds requested by the Communications Director to hire an "influencer" to get more people to the Flint hearing because he felt turnout the first time around wasn't great but did not give the same considerationto any other areas. It is my opinion that areas picked for public hearings were very politically biased and a better job could have been done to make sure it was more of an equal mix.

Next is transparency. I have grave concerns on this issue. It is my belief by things I saw, things I personally heard, and things that I read that transparency was lacking! I also believe the public comment portal was a mess. I asked repeatedly if there was a way to make it easier to navigate as a commissioner and print out public comment, and the use of "hashtags" to help search … really? If you don't know what the public is going to use for a hashtag for a particular area, how do you know what to search? Also, I had issues with not getting attachments that were uploaded to the portal in a timely fashion (I'm still waiting on recently uploaded material from January).

This whole process has honestly saddened me and proved to me what my concern was all along for this amendment and what is "fair." I would dare ask is it "fair" that the African American population came out in strong numbers and told us what they wanted, and we didn't provide that? Is it fair that rural communities came out and told us what they wanted (some driving long distance) and we ignored it? Is it fair that the only two considerations that were given to the U.P. were trying to combine two cities (again in different counties) to make a district and the second being looking to try not to split the Native American population — which don't get me wrong, I am fine with that — but in turn didn't listen to the other voices we heard from? Is it fair that organized groups' voices were heard louder and dare I say drowned out the voices of lone citizens who took time off from work or drove long distances and sat for hours just to be heard? The list goes on and on. I realize we absolutely couldn't make everyone happy but more serious and unbiased consideration should have been given to all.

While I think these maps are truly not representative of the entire state and the input we received, if anything good comes out of this I hope that future commissions really listen to the public not about politics but about the people's needs, their communities, their beliefs, and that they don't judge or show bias toward them for that because in the end I think all anybody really wants is to live their lives to the fullest the way they see fit.

This will conclude my report. While I can go on and on about my experiences and things I observed, heard, etc., this is not the place to do it, although on a personal privilege note, I know that commissioners do not particularly care for me and that's OK. I volunteered for this Commission to do a job and if I feel something isn't right I'm going to say it, regardless of if it goes against the views of others or the narrative, because I am a member of this Commission like it or not and my job was not to make the Commission happy and portray a narrative to the

media just to advance the career of someone or so some organization could win a Pulitzer or any of the other B.S. that was floated my way, stuff that I repeatedly said I could not care less about. The only reason I applied for this position was I wanted to make sure of two things and that was that the maps were fair for EVERYONE in the state from the very northern tip of the U.P. to the very SE corner of the Lower Peninsula and to make sure that everyone's voice was heard and considered EQUALLY! I feel that as a Commission we failed and for that I truly apologize to all the citizens of the State of Michigan.

Commissioner Rhonda Lange

DISSENTING REPORT
Submitted by Commissioner
Erin Wagner

This serves as my dissenting report for the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission 2021 Final Proposed Maps.

From the start of my term on this commission, I have been interested in fair maps for ALL of Michigan's citizens, not just a few parties, or even the party that I affiliate with. I have read every public comment both on and off the portal and looked at every map submitted. At one point, I even asked General Counsel Pastula if the maps submitted by the citizens to the portal had been vetted by any of our "expert panel" of witnesses (specifically the Promote the Vote maps, in relation to VRA and the other criteria) so that I could use portions of those in relation to drawing my own and was told they had not been.

One of the main reasons I voted for EDS was because they offered to supply a QR code during the live mapping process where anyone could pull it up and see and comment upon exactly what we were doing at the time, yet when I brought that up, I was told that since MDOS had a contract with Professor Duchin, EDS would not be supplying a QR code.

I do not believe that these maps best serve the Citizens of Michigan and feel, as I stated a few times, that we should have spent more time than we allotted to come up with maps that were truly fair to everyone, while meeting all criteria. In my entire lifetime here in Michigan, we have been neither Red nor Blue, swinging between the two parties frequently in our voting decisions. To be fair is to slice up the "pie" so that everyone gets the same size piece. These maps do nothing of the kind. When we were mapping in relation to the importance of the criteria, I believe we were on the right path. When certain organizations started crying out about partisan fairness, I believe we then went off on a strictly partisan tangent and discounted most all the other work we had done, especially in relation to Communities of Interest (hereon referred to as COI's) as well as County boundaries.

When it came time to vote, we were forced to choose one of the subpar maps that were proposed. If we didn't agree that any of them be put forth to the public and the 45-day comment period, we should have been allowed to vote no confidence. I believe we should have taken more time, as numerous public commenters told us, to come up with maps that every Commissioner could confidently say were our best work.

Some examples as to why I voted against the proposed maps include, but are not limited to the following:

Chestnut:

Chestnut groups Grand Rapids with Grand Haven, Norton Shores and the like on the far west coast of Michigan, as well as extending into Muskegon. It divides three counties to make the 3rd Congressional

District and lumps different COI'S together. District 2 extends south beyond notable county boundaries to include 20 different counties, which are in NO way communities of interest. District 8 takes areas from five different counties to lump Midland with Bay City and Saginaw. District 7 includes six different counties encompassing rural areas such as Fowler, Charlotte, Olivet, Eaton Rapids, as well as Fowlerville, Howell and Brighton. Coming from this area, we have nothing in common with Howell, Brighton or the capitol of Lansing, aside from traveling there on occasion.

Linden:

The Linden map is laughable in that once again it groups rural areas with the capitol of Lansing in district 21 and places East Lansing, with rural Eagle, Westphalia and Williamston. Williamston and Webberville are a COI, yet it splits them to place Webberville in District 22 with Howell and Brighton. District 30 grabs from the west yet again. District 33 places northern areas, such as Baldwin and Sauble with areas such as Portland and Ionia which are in the middle of the State and much closer to Lansing, Grand Ledge and the like. Once again, Midland is grouped with Bay City and Saginaw, completely discounting a COI. Detroit areas seem to reach much farther north than Communities of Interest would warrant. Detroit's voice was by far the largest and loudest and yet we still seem to have allowed that voice to fall on deaf ears. District 36 extends from the Northeast tip of the lower peninsula down to the Huron Manistee National Forests on the Western side of the lower peninsula, dipping down to grab Pinconning in Bay County.

Hickory:

In the Hickory map, even though we heard numerous COI testimony to keep the Grosse Pointes in the same district as Harper Woods, Saint Clair Shores and nearby Detroit neighborhoods such as Morningside, East English Village, Jefferson-Chalmers, it slices Harper Woods from District 10 and includes it with District 11. Morningside is included in District 9, while District 10 extends beyond East Village to include everything southeast along the Detroit River and cuts off on the northeast side before St. Clair Shores.

Ann Arbor is split in to four districts, 47, 33, 23, and 49. Lansing's District 77 uses the Grand River along Moore's River Drive as most of its southern boundary, north to W. Cutler Road just north of Dewitt, then west and north again to include Westphalia and Eagle (areas which do not have the same interests as Lansing, and dips into Eaton County to grab Grand Ledge. District 76 includes the northeast tip of Eaton County, which is considered Lansing, grabs Vermontville (an area with a high concentration of Amish) yet leaves out Kalamo and Bellevue, with Bellevue being just west of Olivet about 5 minutes by car.

It splits Nashville, Hastings and Delton, all within Barry County into three separate districts and includes Bellevue in Eaton County with the Western portion of the State in District 43. Barry County is split three ways, and Eaton County is split in four ways.

As stated, these examples are not the ONLY problems I see in the proposed maps.

Another reason I dissented on these maps is because of the numerous times, as a Commissioner attending remotely, I watched the Commission take breaks and then come back to pass a motion regarding commission business, that was not part of the discussion that took place prior to said break and therefore remote Commissioners were not privy to any discussion. Unfortunately, this called into question the whole matter of "transparency " for me.

I understand that we could not make everyone happy, however I believe had we spent more time in revising maps according to public comment, we could have done a much better job than what we put forth.

Sincerely,

Commissioner Erin Wagner

DISSENTING REPORT
Submitted by Commissioner Rebecca Szetela

DISSENTING REPORT: 2021 CHESTNUT CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING MAP
Authored by: Commissioner Rebecca Szetela
Chair: September 2021-March 2022
Vice-Chair: March 2021-September 2021

Summary

The Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission adopted its final United States Congressional, Michigan State House, and Michigan State Senate maps on December 28, 2021. This approval was the culmination of over a year of challenging, and often intense, work, which was complicated both by the global COVID-19 pandemic and a four-month delay in release of data from the United States Census Bureau. For the first time in the State of Michigan, a group of randomly selected voters, in lieu of politicians, drew the U.S. Congressional, Michigan State House, and Michigan State Senate maps. These maps were drawn openly and with the ongoing participation, input, and observation of the public. Individual Commissioners, who were strangers to each other at the start of this process, bridged their partisan leanings and worked collaboratively, as a team, to compile maps. The Commission performed admirably under very challenging circumstances. There is much for the Commission to celebrate.

While celebrations are in order, all business processes, no matter how successful, should be subject to a frank evaluation process. There is always room for improvement. There are always insights to be gleaned and carried forward. Retrospective evaluations, where we look backward at what went right, what went wrong, and what can be improved, are (and should be) standard and expected. The redistricting process should be subject to no less scrutiny.

The intent of this Dissenting Report is to provide an honest and transparent account of areas where, due to a variety of intersecting factors, the Commission could have performed more faithfully to its Constitutional mandate in the creation, revision, and adoption of its U.S. Congressional, State House, and State Senate maps. This Report highlights deficiencies in adhering to several Constitutional criteria (Voting Rights Act Compliance, Respecting Communities of Interest, and Partisan Fairness) as well as an error in elevating a criterion that was not in the Constitution. This Report also notes that the Commission did not appropriately account for and consider the full body of public comment. As a

result, the Commission's process was not as data-driven, objective, or participatory as it should have been.

Because this Report is written with the intention toward improvements in the process, I have included many recommendations for future Commissions. For the reasons set forth below, I dissent to the adoption of Chestnut Congressional map by the Commission.

Rationale

OBJECTION 1 | CRITERIA #1 COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL LAW, INCLUDING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

> *"Unfortunately we do not have sufficient information to anticipate what might happen in future Democratic primaries in the proposed districts. The reason is that we have only one statewide Democratic primary for which we can recompile results and minority voters were not cohesive in this primary.* ***We simply do not know what would happen in a primary in which minority voters are cohesive****."*
> *Ex. 1, Dr. Lisa Handley, December 27, 2021[1]*

In my opinion, the Commission cannot say with any degree of confidence whether any of the Commission's approved maps (the US Congressional ("Chestnut"), State Senate ("Linden"), and State House ("Hickory")) will provide minorities, particularly Black voters in the metropolitan Detroit area, with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice in **both** primary and general elections. This is a serious flaw in the Chestnut map. Thus, I dissent to its adoption.

The Commission's Quantitative and Legal Analysis

In furtherance of its compliance with the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"), the Commission exclusively relied on quantitative analysis from Dr. Lisa Handley, legal analysis from its Voting Rights Expert (Bruce Adelson), and legal advice from its general counsel. The first step in this compliance process was a determination as to whether voting in Michigan was racially polarized. To determine this, Dr. Handley analyzed ten years' worth of general and primary election data from the State of Michigan. Ex. 2, Final Handley Report.[2] In conducting her analysis, Dr. Handley calculated that the majority of Michigan counties (95%, or 79 out of 83 counties) lacked sufficient Black voter populations to estimate voting behavior. Ex. 3, Sept. 2 Transcript, pp. 21-24. Thus, a racially polarized voting ("RPV") analysis could not

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[1] I would like to acknowledge the excellent analysis Dr. Lisa Handley performed for the Commission.
[2] For brevity, I have only attached portions of Exhibit 2 to this Dissent. The full report is available at: https://www.michigan.gov/micrc/meeting-notices-and-materials under the link titled "Racially Polarized Voting Analysis."

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be performed in those counties. *Id.* However, Dr. Handley determined that four Michigan counties (Wayne, Oakland, Saginaw, and Genesee) contained sufficient Black voting-age populations to allow an RPV analysis to be conducted. *Id.* In each of those four counties where the RPV analysis was conducted, voting was racially polarized. Ex. 2, pg. 7; Ex. 3, pp. 21-24. Because voting was racially polarized, the Commission was required to structure districts that complied with the VRA in those counties. *Id.* Mr. Adelson correspondingly advised that the VRA did not require minority-majority districts (e.g., districts with greater than 50% Black voting age population); however, the Commission did need to create "opportunity to elect" districts. The Commission was advised by Mr. Adelson that an "opportunity to elect" district is one where the district contains the requisite number of minority voters needed to enable those voters an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice. Dr. Handley's analysis was intended to determine the minimum percentage of Black voting-age population ("BVAP") necessary to create opportunity to elect districts in the four racially polarized counties (Wayne, Oakland, Saginaw, and Genesee).

To estimate these percentages, Dr. Handley evaluated the degree to which white voters supported Black-preferred candidates (the "White Crossover Vote") in the four counties. As noted by Dr. Handley, "if a relatively consistent percentage of white voters support Black-preferred candidates, candidates preferred by Black voters can be elected in districts that are less than majority Black." Ex. 2, p. 19. The White Crossover Vote can also compensate for depressed Black voter turnout. Ex. 2, p. 19. Alternately, "if voting is starkly polarized, with few or no whites crossing over to vote for the candidates supported by Black voters," a district "that is more than 50% Black VAP" may be needed to elect Black-preferred candidates. *Id.* Thus, Dr. Handley's analysis included the voting patterns of Black and white voters as well as data regarding variations in turnout rates.

After completing her analysis, Dr. Handley provided the Commission with a report stating that, for ***general elections***, Black voters could elect candidates of choice in Wayne County with a BVAP as low as 35%. Ex. 2; Ex. 4, pp 13-18. In Oakland County, once again for ***general elections***, Black voters could elect candidates of choice with a BVAP as low as 40%. Ex. 2; Ex. 4. Dr. Handley also stated that no county required districts with a BVAP of 50% or more in the general election. *Id.*

However, general election results were not the only relevant inquiry. As noted in Dr. Handley's writings on this topic, **both primary and general elections must be considered**. Ex. 5, *Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence,* B. Grofman, L. Handley, and D. Lublin, North Carolina Law Review, Volume 79, Number 5, Article 12 (6-1-2001) p. 1410-1411. Moreover, map drawers need to be ***most*** focused on the ***highest*** percentages required because that is

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the percentage needed to win both elections (primary and general). *Id.* Accordingly, if 52% is the

proper number to allow minority voters an opportunity to elect in a primary, but 43% is needed in a

general election, the map drawer's work should be governed by the higher primary percentage (52%).

Id.

Accordingly, Dr. Handley also analyzed primary data. Ex. 2, p. 24-26. There was a single

Statewide Michigan Democratic[3] primary with results that could be recompiled and applied to any

district reconfiguration that the Commission desired to test. *Id.* That election was the 2018

Gubernatorial primary, in which three candidates were running: Gretchen Whitmer, Abdul El-Sayed,

and Shri Thanedar. In analyzing this election, Dr. Handley determined that Black voters were not

"cohesive" – meaning they did not support a single, identifiable candidate. *Id.* This lack of cohesiveness

made it impossible to extrapolate the data from that election in a manner that could predict the

election results for future districts. *Id.* at 24. Disappointingly, the 2018 Gubernatorial primary could not

be used to determine the proper BVAP levels needed for Black voters to elect their candidates of

choice in the primary elections in the recompiled districts.

In the absence of Statewide primary data for analysis and recompilation, Dr. Handley analyzed

other primary election data. Dr. Handley produced two charts entitled "Threshold of Representation"

for both the State Senate and State House (the "Threshold Tables"). Ex. 2, p. 24-26. Dr. Handley

described these Threshold Tables as being a "useful check on the percent needed to win estimates"

found in the general election tables. Ex. 2, p. 24. The Threshold Tables were "designed to identify the

lowest minority percentage above which minority candidates are consistently elected." Ex. 2, p. 24. **For

the State Senate, that threshold was 48%**.[4] For the State House, **the threshold identified was 36%** (*as

described more fully in the footnote, it should have been between 47% and 52%*).[5] A Threshold Table

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[3] Because Michigan's BVAP population tends to vote overwhelmingly Democratic, Democratic primaries were Dr. Handley's area of focus.

[4] Dr. Handley's analysis showed there were no State Senate districts with BVAP levels between 36% and 44% (the very "target range" the Commission later confined itself to in drawing its maps). Ex. 2; Ex. 3, pp. 18-19. Of the single district with 45% BVAP (District 1), the Black candidate of choice (Alberta Tinsley Talabi) did not survive the primary, even though she received approximately 48% (and the majority) of the Black vote. Ex. 2, p. 26, 65. In comparison, Stephanie Chang, an Asian woman, won the primary with 49.8% of the vote, having received over 75% of the votes cast by white voters. *Id. Thus, in a district with 45% BVAP, Black voters did not have the opportunity for their candidate of choice (Alberta Tinsley Talabi) to advance to the general election*. As expected, as the Democratic candidate in the general election, Ms. Chang easily won the general election for Senate District 1, obtaining 72% of the vote and an estimated 95%+ of the BVAP vote. Ex. 2, p. 54.

[5] Using the same methodology Dr. Handley used in the Senate table, the Threshold for the House also should have been 47% BVAP or more. Similar to the State Senate, there were no State House districts with BVAP levels between 37% and 46%. Ex. 2, p. 25-26; Ex. 3, pp. 18-19. Dr. Handley's State House Threshold Table identifies 36% as the number needed to elect minority candidates of choice. Ex. 2. However, her analysis overlooked the fact that

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was not provided for Congressional elections.

To summarize Dr. Handley's analysis, for Wayne and Oakland Counties, the election analysis showed that Black voters had the opportunity to elect candidates of choice in the ***general election*** with BVAP numbers ranging between 35% and 40%. Ex. 4, pp. 13-16. However, the Threshold Tables, which reflected **primary results**, suggested higher amounts were likely necessary (48% in the State Senate and between 47% and 52% in the State House) for Black voters to have an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice in primaries.[6] Ex. 4, p. 18-19. Because VRA compliance requires the ability to elect candidates of choice ***in both elections***, the Commission should have taken a conservative approach by using higher BVAP numbers (approximately 48%) when constructing districts in all maps. Ex. 5, pp. 1410-1411. This approach would have been the most protective of the voting rights of Black voters.[7]

The Commission's Directions From Counsel

Armed with Dr. Handley's report and data, the Commission began drawing maps following this approach and drew districts in the Metropolitan Detroit area with BVAP percentages around 50%. After completing districts in most of the Metropolitan Detroit area, the Commission's counsel intervened and began aggressively pushing the Commission to reduce the BVAP numbers to as close to the general election percentages (35% to 40%) as possible. Ex. 6, Sept. 13 Email. This pressure was most evident at

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the minority candidate elected at the 36% threshold was not the candidate of choice for Black voters. Although all districts above 36% elected ***minority*** candidates, and in State House District 29 (BVAP 36.04%) a Black candidate was elected, this candidate ***was not*** the candidate of choice for Black voters. Ex. 2, p. 25, 67. The Black voters' candidate of choice (Kermit Williams) did not survive the primary, even though he received approximately 50% of the Black vote. *Id.* In comparison, Brenda Carter, a Black woman, won the primary with 30.7% of the vote, having received over 59% of the votes cast by white voters. *Id*. ***Thus, in a district with 36% BVAP, Black voters were*** <u>***not***</u> ***able to have their candidate of choice (Kermit Williams) survive the primary to be considered at the general election.*** Once again, as expected, the winner of the Democratic primary, Brenda Carter, easily won the general election for House District 29, obtaining 72.9% of the vote and an estimated 95%+ of the BVAP vote. Ex. 2, p. 58. By comparison, in the 6th House District (53% BVAP), the candidate of choice favored by Black voters (Tyrone Carter – with approximately 70% of BVAP vote) was able to prevail in the primary, even though white voters did not prefer that candidate. Ex. 2, p. 25, 68. Dr. Handley did not provide estimates for Black voters for District 4, where Abraham Aiyash was elected, because so many candidates ran for election in that primary that Dr. Handley could not ascertain the minority-preferred candidate. Thus, the Threshold of Representation for State House districts should have been somewhere between the BVAP of Mr. Aiyash's district (47% BVAP in the 4th district) and the 53% BVAP in Mr. Carter's district (the 6th district).

[6] The variation in the target BVAP percentages was attributable to primary and general election disparities in both the White Crossover Vote and voter turnout.

[7] If the Commission had exercised its discretion to use BVAP percentages higher than the general election values, and those numbers proved to be too high, Black voters' candidates of choice would still have a reasonable chance of election and a future Commission would have the ability, based on a decade of data, to adjust the numbers further downward. On the other hand, if the general election BVAP thresholds adhered to by the Commission are too low, Black voters may spend a decade being injured by not having an opportunity to elect candidates of choice. The Commission should have had a careful discussion balancing the risks and benefits of both approaches. In lieu of having that discussion, the Commission yielded that decision-making to its counsel.

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the September 30, 2021, Commission meeting in Rochester Hills, where the Commission was expressly directed to identify "anything that is higher than 40% for the black voting age population" and "those quote unquote fixes can be dealt with." Ex. 7, Sept. 30, 2021, AM Meeting Transcript, pg. 21; *See* Ex. 7, p. 22. Despite Dr. Handley's analysis showing that the required BVAP for primary elections was likely higher than the required BVAP for general elections, the Commission acquiesced to its counsel and redrew each of its existing maps in the Metropolitan Detroit area based on the general election BVAP "targets" of 35% to 40%.

The Public Response

Having witnessed the low percentages of BVAP that the Commission was being directed to achieve, Metropolitan Detroiters appeared in force to question whether the Commission's maps would provide Black voters in Metropolitan Detroit with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice in the primaries. *See* Ex. 8[8], Detroit Hearing Transcript, Oct. 20, 2021. The Commission received hundreds of comments objecting to the low BVAP percentages in its draft maps. Ex. 8. Additionally, Jerome Reide, a legislative liaison from the Michigan Department of Civil Rights, and John E. Johnson, Jr., the Executive Director of the Michigan Department of Civil Rights, also both presented letters to the Commission indicting their belief that the Commission was violating the Voting Rights Act.

As voters testified, the Metropolitan Detroit area is solidly Democratic, with elections in Wayne County generally favoring Democrats by 20 percentage points or more. Ex. 8. Reliably, whoever wins the Democratic primary in Wayne County will win the general election. *Id., see* Ex. 2. Thus, for Black voters to be able to elect their candidate of choice, that candidate of choice ***must be able to succeed in the Democratic primary***. Ex. 8. The public asserted that general election results were neither reliable nor valid indicators of whether Black voters would be able to elect candidates of choice. *Id.* By ignoring the outsized role of the Democratic primaries in the Metropolitan Detroit area and focusing on the 35% and 40% range derived from general election data, the public stated that the Commission was poised to disenfranchise Black voters by denying them the opportunity to elect their candidates of choice. *Id.*

The Commission Declines to Correct Its Course

Following several hearings and meetings, including the October 20 Detroit Public Hearing, some Commissioners began questioning the validity of its attorneys' directives to draw districts using the

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[8] Due to its length, I have attached only a portion of the transcript from the October 20, 2021, public hearing in Detroit. The full transcript is available at: https://www.michigan.gov/micrc/-/media/Project/Websites/MiCRC/Transcripts1/MICRC_Meeting_Transcript_10_20_2021.pdf?rev=a378536e31c446a494555afb9672b019&hash=0E0BEC4295A48C46AEB4689E2C0299D4

general election BVAP percentages supplied by Dr. Handley's report. The Commission's response to those concerns should have been to return to the expert who prepared the RPV analysis (Dr. Handley) to seek her opinion with respect to the concerns of the public. Instead, once again at the direction of counsel, the Commission held a closed session with its counsel (rather than Dr. Handley) to discuss the concerns of voters. Ex. 9, Oct. 20, 2021, Email. This meeting was merely a reiteration of the same legal advice that had resulted in the objections from Metropolitan Detroiters in the first instance. Closed Session Hearing, Oct. 27, 2021.[9] At this meeting, the concerns of Metropolitan Detroiters were cast as advocating "not to follow the law." *Id.* at 1:03:46. This messaging was repeated in email messages to Commissioners in advance of the meeting as well, where Commissioners were directed to disregard the comments as being "advanced by lobbyists and politicians driving emotion." Ex. 10, Oct. 18, 2021, Email. Commissioner comments during the closed-door meeting exemplify the adoption by some Commissioners of these recharacterizations of the concerns of voters. Closed Session Hearing, Oct. 27, 2021 (Commissioner at 1:01:50: "*I also reflected on the Detroit hearing…they were just wrong…their comments were not backed by anything other than their feelings*"; Commissioner at 39:13: "*I think…I hope we all recognize, at least I think, many of the many, many, many of the comments that we heard, while they were saying that it was a VRA issue, it's a partisan issue. They have an agenda. And we need to be able to spot that and weed that out and not fall for that.*"; Commissioner at 1:20:12: "*I just want to remind us all that…it was set up so that we hear from citizens, but, I think, at this point, we need to, kind of, shut out all the criticisms that are coming and all the pressure because these are all motivated.*"). In this echo chamber created by its counsel, Commissioners were dissuaded from making further adjustments to the maps. Acceding to these pressures, the Commission abandoned further inquiry into whether higher BVAP percentages were needed and, instead, deferred to the advice of counsel.

Although the Commission itself did not directly seek clarification from Dr. Handley, Dr. Handley attempted to alert the Commission of its impending error. Specifically, Dr. Handley warned Commission staff[10] on December 10, 2021, that the Commission's maps had BVAP levels too low to allow Black

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[9] The audio from this meeting is available at: https://www.michigan.gov/micrc/additional-pages/MSC-163823-Materials under the heading, "Closed Session Audio Recording, Oct. 27." A transcript of this hearing was not available at the time of the preparation of this Report.

[10] This information was not conveyed to the Commission by its general counsel and other staff members were directed by the general counsel not to share Dr. Handley's concerns with Commissioners. Uncomfortable with the general counsel's direction, staff members informed me of Dr. Handley's concerns and I relayed those concerns to several Commissioners on December 15, 2021. Ex. 11, December 15, 2021, Email. For clarification, I incorrectly stated in my December 15 email, based on my misunderstanding at the time, that Dr. Handley's analysis was flawed. The Commission's understanding of Dr. Handley's analysis was flawed, not the analysis itself.

voters the opportunity to elect their candidates of choice. Ex. 11, Email. Dr. Handley reaffirmed these concerns on December 27, 2021, noting that the Commission does not know if its maps will provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect candidates of choice in the Democratic primary:

> *Unfortunately we do not have sufficient information to anticipate what might happen in future Democratic primaries in the proposed districts. The reason is that we have only one statewide Democratic primary for which we can recompile results and minority voters were not cohesive in this primary.* ***We simply do not know what would happen in a primary in which minority voters are cohesive.***"
> *Ex. 1, Dr. Lisa Handley, December 27, 2021*

Despite vigorous public comment, evidence from its own expert indicating that higher BVAP percentages were needed, and plenty of time to act to change the maps, the Commission instead voted on December 28, 2021 to not allow adjustments to the maps.[11] Ex. 16, p. 85. The Commission had no data or evidence to suggest that Black voters will have an opportunity to elect candidates of choice in the Democratic primary with BVAP percentages of 35%, 40%, or even 45%. Ex. 2, Ex. 3. Undeterred, the Commission approved the Chestnut map, with BVAP populations of 43.81% (District 12) and 44.70% (District 13).

Conclusion

In conclusion, given the concerning data derived from primary elections and warnings from both the public and the Commission's RPV expert, the Commission's approach to compliance with the VRA was anything but data-driven, evidence-based, or participatory. The Commission's approach was to follow a will-o'-the-wisp and rely on the hope that general election thresholds will magically translate into Black voters' candidates of choice advancing past the Democratic primaries. Because the Commission did not have evidence or data to establish that these BVAP levels are sufficient to allow Black voters to have an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice in both the primary and general elections for either its Congressional, State Senate, or State House maps, I dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut Congressional Map.

Recommendation for Future Commissions:

1. In determining the requisite minority voting populations necessary for minority voters to have an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice, future Commissions should utilize the higher of the general election or primary election results to establish "target" BVAP ranges.

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[11] Commissioners Kellom, Curry, Lange, Wagner, and I voted against precluding changes to the maps (i.e., those Commissioners were in favor of changing the maps).

2. To ensure full and complete understanding of expert reports, all discussions of data and analysis regarding the requisite level of minority populations necessary to permit minority voters an opportunity to elect candidates of choice should require the attendance of the data scientist who conducted the analysis (in this case, Dr. Lisa Handley). Staff and other consultants should not be permitted to interpret the recommendations or conclusions of data scientists for the Commission.

3. Expert analysis of draft map compliance with the Voting Rights Act (and other metrics) should be received before maps may advance to the 45-day public comment period.

4. To the extent there is ambiguity or uncertainty regarding what BVAP levels are appropriate, Commissioners should openly and publicly discuss any concerns fully and vote on recommendations. The Commission should not rely on non-analyst determinations of the appropriate percentage levels.

5. The Commission, not staff or consultants, should evaluate the validity and import of public comments.

OBJECTION 2 | CRITERIA #3 COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST

I dissent to the Chestnut map to the extent it fails to take into consideration and accommodate the following seven communities of interest that were identified as significant by the Commission and incorporated into other Congressional, State Senate, and State House Maps.

Community of Interest 1: Bengali Community of Interest

The Bengali community identified Hamtramck and portions of Warren and Macomb County as being a community of interest that should be kept together. This community of interest was divided into two in the Chestnut Congressional map. The Chestnut map is the only final proposed Congressional map published by the Commission that divides this community of interest.

See comments p1511 (Mariam Akanan), p4107 (Nada Alhanooti, Hamtramck), f1514 (Tufayel Reza, Warren), f1516 (Iqbal Hossain, Hamtramck City), f1460 (Nurun Nesa, Warren), f1459 (Nazmin Begum, Warren); w1456 (Sumon Kobir, Warren Township), w1398 (Muzadded Abdullan, Warren City), p1037 (Rebeka Islam, Hamtramck), Map submitted via Portal Comment by Hayg Oshagan, 9/8/2021

Community of Interest 2: Jewish Community of Interest

Eighty percent of the Metropolitan Detroit-area Jewish community resides in the "core" Oakland County communities of Berkley, Commerce Township, West Bloomfield, Bloomfield Hills, Birmingham, Franklin, Farmington, Farmington Hills, Royal Oak, Oak Park, Huntington Woods, Walled Lake, and

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Southfield. Seven percent of Jewish households live in the Southfield area and 12% of the population of Southfield is Jewish. Franklin also contains a significant Jewish population. Despite requests to keep Southfield and Franklin with the remainder of the Jewish community in the "core" area, the Chestnut map isolates and separates Southfield and Franklin from the remainder of the Jewish community of interest. The Chestnut map is the only final proposed Congressional map published by the Commission that divides this community of interest.

See comments w746 (Todd Schafer, Beverly Hills); c1803 (Menachem Hojda, Oak Park); c5247 (Judah Karesh, West Bloomfield Township); w1000 (Charlotte Massey, Royal Oak)

Community of Interest 3: Indigenous Population Community of Interest

The Commission received many comments from members of Indigenous populations, who specifically identified their populations as communities of interest throughout the State. The Indigenous populations specifically identified the service areas for the Indian Health Services clinic run by the Nottawaseppi Huron Band of the Potawatomi and the American Indian Health & Family Services clinic in the Detroit area as communities of interest. In addition, Meredith Kennedy, the author of these comments and a representative for and member of the Indigenous populations, specifically identified the Birch map as being the map that best preserved these communities of interest. The Chestnut map does not preserve the community of interest of the Indigenous populations.

See comments p5531, p5527, and p5525

Community of Interest 4: LQBTQ+ Community of Interest

The Commission also received many comments from members and allies of the LQBTQ+ community, who identified their community of interest as encompassing the communities of Southfield, Oak Park, Pleasant Ridge, Huntington Woods, Ferndale, Hazel Park, and the Detroit neighborhood of Palmer Park. The Chestnut map divides this community of interest into three separate districts.

See comments w1924 (Oscar Renautt, Oak Park), w5790 (Ivy Nicole), w5669 (Sarah, Ishpeming Township), w5473 (Troy, Detroit), w5471 (Kathy Randolph), f3493 (Michael Rowady), c777 (LGBT Detroit, Detroit), c819 (LGBT Detroit, Detroit), w1287 (Midge Cone, Ann Arbor), and w1306 (Sue Hadden, Ann Arbor).

Community of Interest 5: Sikh Community of Interest

The Sikh community of Troy and Rochester Hills also identified their community as a community

of interest and requested that the Troy and Rochester Hills Sikh community of interest stay together. The Chestnut map divides this community.

Ex. 8, p. 16; Ex. 16, p. 19.

Community of Interest 6: Asian Pacific Islander and Chaldean Populations in Oakland/Macomb Counties Community of Interest

Members of the Asian Pacific Islander and Chaldean communities in eastern Oakland County and western Macomb counties also identified themselves as a community of interest. The Chestnut map divides these populations in two by following the township boundary between the 10th and 11th districts for Oakland and Macomb County. Thus, the Chestnut map divides the Asian Pacific Islander and Chaldean community of interest.

See comments w8699 (Daniel G, Troy) and p7262 (Yousif, Troy).

Community of Interest 7: Arab & Middle Eastern/North African Community of Interest

Members of the Arab or Middle Eastern/North African (MENA) community in Wayne County also identified themselves as a community of interest. The Chestnut map divides these populations in two. Thus, the Chestnut map divides the Arab or Middle Eastern/North African (MENA) community of interest.

See comment c1510 (Mariam Akanan, Dearborn), with supporting comments from Jamie Kim (Dearborn) and Mariam Bazzi (Dearborn).

Although the Commission had the discretion to determine which communities of interest it would incorporate into its maps, it is striking that these seven communities of interest were specifically identified for inclusion in all other "collaborative" Commission maps yet excluded, without explanation, from the Chestnut map. The Commission did not assess whether these communities of interest could have been accommodated within the Chestnut map and did not explain why these communities of interest were abandoned by the Commission in the Chestnut map. Due to the unexplained failure to accommodate the seven above-referenced communities of interest, I dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut Congressional map.

Recommendation for Future Commissions:

1. Future Commissions should maintain records of communities of interest incorporated into various draft maps along with specific details as to why communities of interest were included in some maps but not others.
2. To the extent maps exclude communities of interest included in other maps, a full

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accounting as to the rationale for that exclusion must be documented, along with a detailed explanation as to why the excluded community of interest could not be reasonably accommodated in the excluding map.

OBJECTION 3 | CRITERIA #4 PARTISAN FAIRNESS

I dissent because each of the Commission's Congressional, State Senate, and State House maps, including the Chestnut, could have achieved improved (i.e., closer to zero) partisan fairness metrics. Although the redistricting software licensed by the Commission, AutoBound Edge, contained a full complement of political and partisan data and tools, the Commission was directed by its general counsel that the Commission was precluded from considering election data and partisan fairness metrics when drawing its initial Statewide maps. Specifically, the Commission was advised by its general counsel that the Constitution "actually prohibits the Commission from considering the election results while they are mapping" and that the Commission was "legally prohibited from" considering election data in drawing maps. Ex. 7, Sept. 30, 2021, AM Transcript, pp. 66-67. As noted by members of the public, the Constitution contains no such restrictions. Ex. 12, Sept. 30, 2021, PM Transcript, p. 9.

To prevent Commissioners from viewing election data and partisan metrics during mapping, the Commission's general counsel further directed the Commission's mapping vendor, EDS, to disable and keep "hidden" the partisan fairness metrics, election data, and other political data and reporting features in AutoBound Edge. Ex. 13, Oct. 6 2021, Email. The Commission was unaware of this direction and did not consent to it. Handicapped by this lack of access, the Commission began drawing maps in August of 2021 without access to key functionality in the mapping software that it had paid for. These features were not re-enabled until after the completion of draft maps in October and required a software update. Ex. 14, October 3, 2021, Email from Kimball Brace ("*One of the things that staff and I need to discuss on Monday is how much of some of the additional reports do you want to unveil. Like this political fairness report there are a bunch of other data, tables and reports that are possible in EDGE, but we should talk about what do we want to release*.")

The Commission's lack of access to partisan fairness metrics until after maps were drawn resulted in rushed attempts to fix woefully non-compliant maps. Further, even after Commissioners were granted access to partisan fairness tools, Commissioners were repeatedly directed by the general counsel to "stop chasing zero" – meaning to cease trying to improve the partisan fairness metrics of the draft maps, even though improvements in such metrics were unquestionably achievable (and had been achieved by several Commissioners) without altering adherence to higher-ranked Constitutional

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criteria.

Moreover, maps with improved partisan fairness metrics were hampered from public release by the Commission's counsel. For example, around September 30, 2021, a Commissioner produced what had been described by the general counsel as a "perfect" Congressional map. The general counsel described the map as having a "0%" efficiency gap and a "0%" mean-median measurement. The general counsel and other consultants decided that this Commissioner's map could not have been produced without improper outside influence. Thus, the general counsel accused the Commissioner of violating the Constitution and pressured the Commissioner to withhold the map from the public and his fellow Commissioners ("*Bruce and I remain steadfast in our recommendation to [REDACTED] that he not advance his map we discussed with him last week…*"). Ex. 15, October 4, 2021, Email. Because of this interference, the Commissioner did not present the map to the Commission or the public and, further, altered the map to **increase** the partisan fairness metrics, tilting the "perfect" map in favor of Republicans.[12] Ex. 15. This map – which deliberately inflated the partisan fairness metrics in favor of Republicans – was the predecessor to the Chestnut map. As a result of these pressures, the Chestnut map is a less-partisan-fair version of another map.

As evidenced by a Commissioner's supposedly "perfect" map and other maps,[13] the Commission could have produced Congressional, State Senate, and State House maps with better (meaning closer to zero) partisan fairness metrics, without compromising other Constitutional criteria. Because maps with better partisan fairness metrics were actually achieved yet hindered from public production, I dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut map.

Recommendation for Future Commissions:

1. Future Commissions should have access to all partisan fairness and political data and reporting functionality while drafting maps.

2. Commissioners, not staff or consultants, should make decisions regarding access to data, tools, and maps.

OBJECTION 4 | INEQUITABLE ACCOUNTING AND TREATMENT OF PUBLIC COMMENTS AND INAPPROPRIATE ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC COMMENTS

I dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut Congressional map because it was not the map

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[12] Ironically, the general counsel's failure to be forthright with the full Commission with respect to her concerns about this Commissioner's map may have enabled the adoption of a revised version of the very map that she objected to.

[13] Similarly, the Szetela House map was a more-partisan-fair version of the Hickory, without deleterious impacts on higher-ranked Constitutional criteria.

preferred by the public. The Birch map, not the Chestnut map, was the Congressional map that the majority of the public supported. Due to the Commission's lack of an organized accounting system to track public comments and failure to equally weigh all comments, some Commissioners erroneously concluded that the Chestnut map had the greatest public support. Since the Birch map actually had the greatest public support, this was in error.

The Commission was tasked with soliciting "wide" and "meaningful public participation" as part of its Constitutional obligations. Const. 1963, Art. IV., §6(10). Accordingly, the Commission diligently solicited public feedback, resulting in the Commission receiving nearly thirty thousand public comments throughout the redistricting process.[14] After the approval and advancement of final proposed maps to the 45-day public comment period on November 1, the Commission received comments via public meetings ("In-Person Comments"), via the online public comment portal ("Portal Comments"), and via comments placed directly on the maps themselves on the Mapping Page ("Mapping Comments").[15] Unfortunately, the Commission lacked a systematic method of tallying, recording, and reporting public comments.

Recognizing this deficiency on the part of the Commission, members of the public attempted to fill the gap. For example, a woman named Nicole Bedi tallied Mapping and Portal Comments and reported the tallies. Ex. 16, December 28, 2021, Transcript, p. 19. Specifically, Ms. Bedi reported that the Birch map received the greatest number of positive comments (with 67% of comments positive). Ex. 16, p. 19. As further noted by Ms. Bedi, only 55% of the Chestnut map's comments were positive. *Id.* With 67% of its 819 comments positive, the Birch map received 548 positive comments. In contrast, the Chestnut map (with only 55% of its 828 comments being positive) received only 455 positive comments. Ex. 16, p. 19. Thus, the Birch map had over 20% more favorable comments than the Chestnut map. Other members of the public conducted similar examinations of the public record and provided their reports to the Commission. Each of those reports indicated that the Birch map was the most preferred.

Rather than relying on these or other mathematical tabulations, the Commission's evaluation of public comments was haphazard and inconsistent. Some Commissioners did not routinely read Portal or Mapping Comments. Other Commissioners did not read a single Portal or Mapping Comment. Some

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[14] The Commission's 2022 Communication and Outreach Report is available at: https://www.michigan.gov/micrc/-/media/Project/Websites/MiCRC/MISC5/MICRC-CO-031022.pdf?rev=e1e5911a7d264fa997475f9270d6380a&hash=D6FB5458F97A8339A47E7FAAFE75AEAE

[15] Portal Comments and Mapping Comments are available on the www.michigan.gov/micrc website.

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Commissioners weren't attentive to In-Person Comments. In contrast, at least one Commissioner seemed to value In-Person Comments more than Mapping or Portal Comments.[16] Ex. 16, p. 82-83, ¶5. Additionally, despite the fact that In-Person Comments in favor of the Birch were ubiquitous, some Commissioners appeared to inexplicably disregard those In-Person Comments. Ex. 16, p. 80-81, ¶1 and ¶3. Had the Commission created a recording and tracking system for public comments, many of these inconsistencies and discrepancies could have been avoided.

Lastly, at least one Commissioner attempted to sway public votes in favor of his preferred maps. Specifically, on December 20, 2021, prior to the Commission's final vote on the maps, a Commissioner individually met with two groups that had been particularly engaged during the redistricting process, ACCESS and APIAVote Michigan. It was the practice of the Commission that all public interactions be coordinated and publicly noticed through the Commission's staff and that Commissioners appear in groups. The rationale behind those practices was to prevent Commissioners from interactions with the public that could undermine the Commission's goals of transparency and openness. Disregarding those practices, the Commissioner individually arranged and attended this meeting. At the meeting, the Commissioner repeatedly suggested that the Chestnut map was the public's preferred map, informing both groups "you liked the Chestnut Congressional Map," and specifically advocating for both groups to submit "more comments like that."[17] To her credit, the representative from ACCESS corrected the Commissioner and stated that the Birch map was actually the map preferred by her group for the State of Michigan. Despite this Commissioner's efforts, the Chestnut map still received fewer favorable votes than the Birch map.

Using objective measures, in addition to receiving a greater number of favorable comments, the Birch, not the Chestnut, map had the greatest number of votes in favor of adopting the map between the dates the maps were published and the date the map was ultimately adopted. Between November 1, 2021, and December 28, 2021, **the Birch map received approximately *15% more* votes in its favor of its adoption than the Chestnut map.[18]** Additionally, when considering votes in favor of the Birch prior to

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[16] One Commissioner mistakenly believed there were comments in favor of the Chestnut map at the "next five" public hearings, which were held between October 20 and October 26. Ex. 16, p. 82-83, ¶5. The Chestnut map was not created or named until November 1. Therefore, the Commission could not have received In-Person Comments in favor of the Chestnut map at October hearings/meetings because the Chestnut map did not exist at that time. This confusion illustrates the precise problem with relying upon memory rather than objective measures.

[17] This meeting was recorded and posted on APIAVote Michigan's Facebook page on December 27, 2021, but I was unaware of the existence of the video or its contents until after the Commission voted on the maps on December 28, 2021. As of the date of this Report, the video is available at: https://www.facebook.com/apiavotemi/.

[18] Although the Birch map received a great many comments urging its adoption before November 1, 2021, and

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November 1, 2021, the Birch map was irrefutably the public's preferred map, with substantially greater public support than the Chestnut.

Source	Support Birch	Support Chestnut
Mapping Comments	294	204
Portal Comments	98	81
In-Person Comments[19]	50	101
Total [20]	**442**	386

The Chestnut map **was not** the public's preferred map by any measure.

The Commission was not obligated to adopt a particular map based solely on the weight of public opinion. However, because the Commission was required to solicit (and did solicit) public participation, the Commission should have accurately documented, analyzed, and given meaningful consideration the comments received from the public. It failed to do so. In part due to the failure to appropriately tally, measure, and account for public comments, the Commission failed to adopt the map preferred by the public and, instead, voted to approve a map the public did not prefer. For these reasons, I dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut map by the Commission.

Recommendation for Future Commissions:

1. Future Commissions should maintain a public, running tally of unique "votes" in favor of any maps published for the public's consideration. This tally should include all unique votes received for a particular map during the duration of its publication to the public.

2. Multiple votes by the same individual should be counted as a single vote. The Commission should establish processes to prevent the same individuals from casting multiple votes.

3. In-person, written, and online comments should be weighted equally.

4. Vote tallies should quantify the percentage of positive and negative comments with respect

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those votes in favor are still relevant and important, I focused solely on the time period where both maps had been published for consideration. Considering votes before November 1, 2021, would have resulted in an even greater number of votes in favor of the Birch.

[19] In the November 1 through December 28 time frame, the Chestnut map received more support than the Birch map via In-Person Comments; however, the Birch map received significantly more support in writing via Portal and Mapping Comments. Commissioners who never or rarely read Portal and Mapping Comments incorrectly believed the Chestnut map had greater support, when, in fact, the Birch map was the public's preferred Congressional Plan.

[20] I personally tallied the number of Portal, Mapping, and In-Person for the Birch and Chestnut maps to reach these results. In making these tallies, I only treated a comment as "in favor of adopting" of a map when the commentor specifically described one map as being superior to others using superlatives or other clear indicators of preference (e.g., "best map," "fairest map," "adopt this one," etc.). I disregarded comments generally describing a map as "fair" or "balanced" as well as comments ranking two maps as equal (e.g., "either the Chestnut or Birch"). I also disregarded unfavorable comments. In addition, I only considered votes after the date the Chestnut was created (November 1, 2021).

to a particular map.

5. Commissioners should not meet individually with groups or individuals to discuss redistricting matters.

6. Commissioners should not be permitted to "steer" or direct public opinion toward particular maps. In interactions with the public and press, Commissioners should remain neutral with respect to their preferred maps until the date of deliberations.

7. To enable the seamless incorporation of public mapping proposals, the Commission should verify that mapping tools used by the public to submit maps are compatible with mapping software used by the Commission.

8. To the extent a future Commission elects to adopt a map in spite of the weight of public comment with respect to that map, the Commission should provide, at a minimum, a rationale for its decision.

OBJECTION 5 | IMPROPER CONSIDERATION OF COMPETITIVENESS

In addition to receiving fewer positive public comments and fewer favorable public votes than other maps, a significant percentage of positive comments favoring the Chestnut map did so due to the supposed "competitiveness" of the map. Competitiveness is not among the Commission's seven ranked Constitutional criteria. Further, the Commission was repeatedly advised that it could not consider competitiveness as a factor ("*I have consistently stated that competitiveness is not a constitutional criteria in Michigan. Attempting to add this consideration as a criteria [sic] creates a significant legal problem and leaves the MICRC wide open to a court challenge. First, there is no legal basis for including competitiveness in the criteria that the MICRC is constitutionally mandated to follow. This would likely be viewed as arbitrary and capricious by a court, particularly after receiving legal advice against inserting competitiveness.*") Ex. 17, Sept. 20, 2021, Email.

Although the Constitution does not list competitiveness as a factor, the Constitution does not prevent the Commission from considering other factors *after* verifying compliance with the seven ranked Constitutional criteria. However, several Commissioners stated during deliberations that they primarily favored the Chestnut due to its "competitiveness," above consideration with respect to how the Congressional maps compared with respect to the seven ranked Constitutional criteria. Ex. 16, p. 77, p. 80 (¶1-2), and p. 81 (¶3).   In so doing, the Commission elevated a non-Constitutional criterion above the seven ranked Constitutional criteria. Thus, I dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut map to the extent the Commission improperly considered "competitiveness" as a primary factor in adopting

the map.

Recommendation for Future Commissions:

1. Future Commissions should not consider non-ranked criteria above Constitutionally ranked criteria.

2. Future Commissions should evaluate how to treat comments promoting criteria not specified by the Constitution.

3. If future Commissions desire to consider non-Constitutional criteria, such consideration should only occur after an evaluation and ranking of potential plans compliance with non-Constitutional criteria.

OBJECTION 6 | FAILURE TO ENGAGE IN OPEN AND TRANSPARENT DELIBERATIONS

Lastly, I dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut map because the Commission failed to deliberate on the maps comprehensively, openly, transparently, and objectively. The Commission deliberated for a mere 20 to 25 minutes before commencing voting on the Chestnut map. Deliberations on the Linden and Hickory maps were similarly brief. The Commission did not evaluate, compare, or contrast plans for their compliance with each of the Constitutional criteria in any systematic or comprehensive manner. Additionally, no attempts were made to rank plans based on objective measures. This lack of meaningful analysis and discussion of which maps best conformed to the Constitutional and other criteria did not fulfill the Commission's mission of an open, transparent, objective, and data-driven process. Thus, I dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut Congressional map.

Recommendation for Future Commissions:

1. Future Commissions should schedule several open meetings to deliberate over proposed plans.

2. Evaluations of compliance with each Constitutional criteria should be conducted well in advance of final deliberations and voting.

3. Proposed maps should be compared, contrasted, scored, and ranked in accordance with their compliance with the Constitutional criteria.

Conclusion

In summary, I dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut map with respect to its compliance with Constitutional Criteria 1 (Voting Rights Act Compliance), 3 (Communities of Interest), and 4 (Partisan Fairness). I also dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut map because the Commission improperly weighed considerations of competitiveness in adopting the map. Additionally, I dissent to the adoption of the Chestnut map because the Commission neglected to consider and equally weigh all public

comment received in a support of the various Congressional maps and, as a consequence, adopted a map not preferred by the public. Finally, I dissent due to the lack of open, transparent, and data-driven deliberations regarding the maps.

Respectfully submitted,

Rebecca Szetela

Rebecca Szetela

Dated: June 24, 2022

Exhibit 1

From:	lrhandley@aol.com
Sent:	Monday, December 27, 2021 9:25 PM
To:	Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC)
Cc:	Rothhorn, MC (MICRC); Pastula, Julianne (MICRC); badelson1@comcast.net
Subject:	Re: MICRC Questions
Follow Up Flag:	Follow up
Flag Status:	Completed

CAUTION: This is an External email. Please send suspicious emails to abuse@michigan.gov

Dear Rebecca,

Both the threshold tables on 26 and 27 and the recompiled election results for Dillard are important tools for estimating whether minority candidates of choice can win in the proposed districts. The two approaches, at least in this instance, do not contradict one another with regard to the general election -- the minority preferred candidate wins all of the general election above 35% in the state senate threshold table as well as the state house threshold table. It is the Democratic primary that is the stumbling block in the senate threshold table (I am referring to State Senate District 1 and the fact that the winner was not the candidate of choice of Black voters in the primary -- she was, however, the minority candidate of choice in the general).

Unfortunately we do not have sufficient information to anticipate what might happen in future Democratic primaries in the proposed districts. The reason is that we have only one statewide Democratic primary for which we can recompile results and minority voters were not cohesive in this primary. We simply do not know what would happen in a primary in which minority voters are cohesive.

(The reason that recompiled election results are especially important is that they take into account the voting patterns of the actual voters that will reside in the newly proposed district.)

Best wishes,
Lisa

Dr. Lisa Handley

-----Original Message-----
From: Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC) <SzetelaR@michigan.gov>
To: SA HANDLEY <lrhandley@aol.com>
Cc: Rothhorn, MC (MICRC) <RothhornM@michigan.gov>
Sent: Mon, Dec 27, 2021 2:24 pm
Subject: MICRC Questions

Good afternoon, Dr. Handley! I have some follow up question on your report to the MICRC. I understand you will be unavailable tomorrow, so Sue suggested I email a list of questions to you.

I am trying to reconcile the information contained on pages 26 and 27. My understanding is that the table on page 26 was intended to test the "breakpoint" between districts that are electing candidates of choice versus those that are not. Table 10 on page 26 indicates that for the Michigan State Senate, districts with BVAP of 47% or lower are not able to elect

candidates of choice. This is concerning since none of our currently proposed Senate maps (Palm, Cherry, Linden) exceed 45% BVAP. Based on this table alone, I read your report to suggest that our Senate maps need to be above 48% to create opportunity to elect districts and that revisions may be necessary.

However, when I read the text on the next page (re: bellweather elections, particularly the 2014 SOS race with Godfrey Dillard), I draw a different conclusion.

I wondered how our districts are performing looking at that election. To test the maps, I ran the Linden and Cherry election results for the Dillard election. I also edited the Linden to increase the BVAP to 45% and Linden/Cherry maps to increase the BVAP to 48% for comparison purposes. Comparing the election results for the 2014 SOS election, Dillard would have won handily in all five districts, regardless of whether the BVAP was as low as 35% or as high as 50%.

Senate Maps - BVAP Percentages

District No.	Linden Plan		Revised Linden 45%		Revised Linden/Cherry 48%	
	BVAP	Dillard Election	BVAP	Dillard Election	BVAP	Dillard Election
1	35.03%	71.74%	45.23%	79.97%	50.95%	84.53%
3	42.09%	76.23%	45.39%	78.54%	48.24%	80.45%
7	44.78%	63.19%	46.59%	64.89%	50.70%	66.74%
8	40.25%	65.15%	45.20%	68.40%	49.65%	70.81%
10	40.43%	62.57%	45.98%	66.49%	48.15%	68.25%

This reassures me that maybe our Senate maps are OK with their percentages as they stand? Or am I misunderstanding your analysis? If you could clarify I would appreciate it.

On a related note, I do think that part of the variation in results in current District 1 on Table 10 relates to the combination of communities. In the current district 1, you have very little of Detroit plus Harper Woods combined with Grosse Pointe Woods and Grosse Pointe Shores, which are both wealthy and white with high voter turnout. I suspect part of the variation in District 1 may relate to variations in voter turnout between the wealthier Grosse Pointes vs. the considerably less well-heeled Detroit and Harper Wood. I would expect the Grosse Pointes preferred candidate to be elected given the makeup of that district (which is part of the reason why we drew that district differently in our Senate maps).

Thank you so much for any clarification.

Rebecca Szetela

Commissioner

Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission

szetelar@michigan.gov

(517) 898-9366

Exhibit 2

Report to the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission

Dr. Lisa Handley

Preface

      This report outlines the analyses I conducted on behalf of the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (MICRC) and relays my findings. I also briefly explain the partisan fairness measures I advised the MICRC to adopt as a component of the redistricting software and why I made these recommendations. The legal implications of my findings and the assessment of any proposed plans have been left to the MICRC legal team.

I. The Voting Rights Act and Racially Polarized Voting

      The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibits any voting standard, practice or procedure – including redistricting plans – that result in the denial or dilution of minority voting strength. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was amended in 1982 to establish that intentional discrimination need not be proven (as the Supreme Court determined was required under the 15th Amendment to the Constitution). The U.S. Supreme Court first interpreted the amended Act in *Thornburg v. Gingles*,[1] a challenge to the 1982 North Carolina state legislative plans. In this case the U.S. Supreme Court held that plaintiffs must satisfy three preconditions to qualify for relief:

- The minority group must be sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority in a single-member district
- The minority group must be politically cohesive
- Whites must vote as a bloc to usually defeat the minority-preferred candidates

      What do we mean when we say minority voters must be politically cohesive? And how do we know if white voters usually vote as a bloc to defeat the candidates preferred by minority voters? According to the Court, racially polarized voting is the "evidentiary linchpin" of a vote dilution claim. Voting is racially polarized if minorities and whites consistently vote for different candidates. More specifically, if minorities consistently support the same candidates, they are said to be politically cohesive. If whites are consistently *not* supporting these candidates, they are said to be bloc voting against the minority-preferred candidates.

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[1] 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

Table 1: Number of Statewide Elections Analyzed that were Polarized

	General Elections with Minority Candidates	All Statewide General Election Contests	Statewide Democratic Primary
Statewide	6/6	12/13	1/1
Genesee	5/6	9/13	1/1
Saginaw	6/6	11/13	1/1
Oakland	6/6	13/13	0/1
Wayne	3/6	7/13	1/1

Every statewide general election contest analyzed was polarized in Oakland County – only in the Democratic primary for Governor in 2018 did Black and white voters support the same candidate (Gretchen Whitmer). Voting in Saginaw County was nearly as polarized: two U.S. Senate contests (2012 and 2014) were not polarized, but the gubernatorial primary was polarized. Black and white voters agreed on the same candidates slightly more often in Genesee County – in addition to supporting U.S. senate candidates Debbie Stabenow in 2012 and Gary Peters in 2014, they both supported Barack Obama in 2012 and Democrat Mark Schauer for Governor in 2014.

Voting in Wayne County was considerably less racially polarized than statewide or in the other three counties studied. However, slightly more than half of the general election contests and the one statewide Democratic primary analyzed were polarized, with Black and white voters supporting the same candidates in 2012, disagreeing on the three statewide offices, but supporting the same U.S. Senate candidate in 2014, supporting different candidates for U.S. President in 2016 and 2020, and voting for most of the same candidates in 2018.

C. Congressional and State Legislative Election Results

This section provides a summary of my racial bloc voting analysis of recent congressional and state legislative districts in the four-county area of Wayne, Oakland, Genesee and Saginaw. I analyzed 2018 and 2020 general elections, and the 2018 and 2020 Democratic primaries if at least one African American candidate competed in the election contest. However, for a number of state

only the first step in the process – it does not take into account the voting patterns of Black and white voters. If voting is racially polarized but a significant number of white voters typically "crossover" to vote for Black voters' preferred candidate, it may be the case that crossover voting can more than compensate for depressed Black turnout.

Incorporating Minority Cohesion and White Crossover Voting Even if Black citizens are turning out at lower rates than whites, and voting is racially polarized, if a relatively consistent percentage of white voters support Black-preferred candidates, the candidates preferred by Black voters can be elected in districts that are less than majority Black. On the other hand, if voting is starkly polarized, with few or no whites crossing over to vote for the candidates supported by Black voters, it may be the case that a district that is more than 50% Black VAP is needed to elect Black-preferred candidates. A district-specific, functional analysis should take into account not only differences in turnout rates, but also the voting patterns of Black and white voters.[21]

To illustrate this mathematically, consider a district that has 1000 persons of voting age, 50% of who are Black and 50% of who are white. Let us begin by assuming that Black turnout is lower than white turnout in a two-candidate general election. In our hypothetical election example, 42% of the Black VAP turn out to vote and 60% of the white VAP vote. This means that, for our illustrative election, there are 210 Black voters and 300 white voters. Further suppose that 96% of the Black voters supported their candidate of choice and 25% of the white voters cast their votes for this candidate (with the other 75% supporting her opponent in the election contest). Thus, in our example, Black voters cast 200 of their 210 votes for the Black-preferred candidate and their other 8 votes for her opponent; white voters cast 75 of their 300 votes for the Black-preferred candidate and 225 votes for their preferred candidate:

Thus, for example, if 39.3% of the Black population turned out and 48.3% of the white population turned out, B= .483 and A = .393, and M = .483/ (.393+.483) = .483/.876 = .5513, therefore a Black VAP of 55.1% would produce an equal number of Black and white voters. (For a more in-depth discussion of equalizing turnout see Kimball Brace, Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley and Richard Niemi, "Minority Voting Equality: The 65 Percent Rule in Theory and Practice," *Law and Policy*, 10 (1), January 1988.)

[21] For an in-depth discussion of this approach to creating effective minority districts, see Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley and David Lublin, "Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence," *North Carolina Law Review*, volume 79 (5), June 2001.

It is important to remember that winning office in the United States usually requires winning two elections: a primary and a general election. The tables above consider only general election contests. Producing a comparable set of tables for Democratic primaries is not possible. First, there was only one statewide Democratic primary – the 2018 primary contest for Governor. There were three candidates competing in this election and because 50% of the vote was not required to win the election, a mathematical equation setting the percentage needed to win 50% of the vote does not work. Second, Black voters were not cohesive in support of any one of these three candidates. In fact, the candidate preferred by even the plurality of Black voters was not the same in the four counties examined. Drawing a district that Black-preferred candidate could win this primary is not possible when there is no Black-preferred candidate.

In areas where most of the white voters are likely to vote in Republican primaries, the inability to calculate the percent needed to win in Democratic primaries is not particularly important. Black voters will dominate the Democratic primary unless they make up only a very small portion of the voters in the district. However, in the counties examined in Michigan, many white voters elect to participate in the Democratic primary, especially in Wayne County. As the percentage Black VAP of proposed districts decreases, it may become more challenging for Black-preferred candidates to win not only the general election but the Democratic primary – but only if voting in Democratic primaries is racially polarized. Unfortunately, it is not possible to ascertain exactly how much more difficult it would be – or even if it would be more difficult – given the lack of Democratic primary election data.

B. Threshold of Representation in the Current State House and Senate Districts

A useful check on the percent needed to win estimates found in Tables 5-8 that can be done prior to drawing any districts is to produce what have been referred to by some political scientists as "threshold of representation" tables. These tables are designed to identify the lowest minority percentage above which minority candidates are consistently elected. Tables 9 and 10, below, report the BVAP of the current Michigan state house and senate districts with over 20% BVAP, and indicate the race and party of the candidate elected to represent the district.[23] Sorted

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[23] There are no African American state senators or representatives elected from districts that are less than 20% Black in VAP. However, there are other minority candidates (Hispanic, Asian, and Middle Eastern) elected to state house districts with considerably less than 20% BVAP.

by the percent BVAP, the tables can sometimes provide evidence of a clear breakpoint between those districts that are probably electing candidates of choice and those that are not.[24]

An examination Table 9 indicates that every Michigan state house district with a BVAP of at least 35% elects a minority representative to the state house. In fact, every district with a BVAP of more than 26.53% elects a minority to office with the exception of District 49 in Genesee County. And the racial bloc voting analysis of House District 49 indicates that the white incumbent, John Cherry, is the candidate of choice of Black voters, even in the 2018 Democratic primary when he faced several African American candidates.

Table 9: Threshold of Representation for State House Districts, 2021

State House District	Total VAP	Black VAP	Percent Black VAP	Name	Party	Race	Percent of Vote 2020
7	60347	57256	94.27%	Helena Scott	D	Black	93.00%
8	62448	58042	92.42%	Stephanie A. Young	D	Black	96.70%
3	54130	49536	90.93%	Shri Thanedar	D	Asian	93.30%
9	62529	46806	74.22%	Karen Whitsett	D	Black	94.20%
10	69209	46977	67.41%	Mary Cavanagh	D	Hispanic	84.80%
1	59788	38993	64.76%	Tenisha R. Yancey	D	Black	75.80%
35	78306	49325	62.50%	Kyra Harris Bolden	D	Black	82.90%
34	49491	30419	60.96%	Cynthia R. Neeley	D	Black	86.70%
2	57031	33142	57.70%	Joe Tate	D	Black	74.10%
5	49290	27190	54.12%	Cynthia A. Johnson	D	Black	93.40%
6	67505	36182	52.86%	Tyrone Carter	D	Black	100.00%
4	68749	32761	47.27%	Abraham Aiyash	D	ME	89.80%
29	72319	26621	36.04%	Brenda Carter	D	Black	72.90%
95	58640	21320	35.50%	Amos O'Neal	D	Black	70.10%
49	64844	19308	29.47%	John D. Cherry	D	White	68.90%
54	72426	21212	28.79%	Ronnie Peterson	D	Black	77.70%
12	73883	20207	26.97%	Alex Garza	D	Hispanic	62.40%
11	73586	19760	26.53%	Jewell Jones	D	Black	65.20%
92	66135	16957	25.34%	Terry J. Sabo	D	White	65.30%
27	73337	18051	24.35%	Regina Weiss	D	White	74.40%
16	74617	17556	23.25%	Kevin Coleman	D	White	62.50%
75	76956	18127	22.56%	David LaGrand	D	White	74.60%
68	71672	16808	22.44%	Sarah Anthony	D	Black	75.90%
18	75251	16519	21.76%	Kevin Hertel	D	White	60.30%
22	68758	14588	21.00%	Richard Steenland	D	White	59.90%
60	74176	15887	20.97%	Julie M. Rogers	D	White	71.40%

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[24] Without the confirmation provided by a racial bloc voting analysis, it could conceivably be the case that the minority legislator is not the candidate of choice of minority voters.

Interpreting Table 10, for the Michigan state senate, is less straightforward. The four districts with BVAP percentages over 47% elect African Americans to office. However, Stephanie Chang, the state senator in District 1, which is 44.68% BVAP, was not the candidate of choice of Black voters in the 2018 Democratic primary, though she is the candidate of choice in the general election.

Table 10: Threshold of Representation for State Senate Districts, 2021

State Senate District	Total VAP	Black VAP	Percent Black VAP	Name	party	race	Percent of vote 2018
5	203828	111418	54.25%	Betty Alexander	D	Black	77.4%
2	169357	86961	50.82%	Adam Hollier	D	Black	75.7%
3	186758	90737	48.14%	Sylvia Santana	D	Black	81.8%
4	180199	85691	47.00%	Marshall Bullock	D	Black	78.3%
1	193087	87075	44.68%	Stephanie Chang	D	Asian	72.0%
11	229870	82336	35.48%	Jeremy Moss	D	White	76.7%
27	175918	54071	30.42%	Jim Ananich	D	White	71.2%
9	219325	50800	22.95%	Paul Wojno	D	White	65.9%
6	217734	46997	21.29%	Erika Geiss	D	Black	61.4%

C. Recompiled Election Results

As noted above, once draft districts have been drawn, there is a second approach available for ascertaining whether a proposed district is likely to provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice to legislative or congressional office. This approach relies on recompiling election results from previous elections to see if the candidates preferred by minority voters would win in the draft district. This process entails (1) identifying "bellwether" elections, (2) disaggregating the precinct level results for these elections down to the census block level and then (3) re-aggregating the results up to conform to proposed district boundaries to determine if the minority-preferred candidate would win. This recompilation can only be done

MICRC
09/02/21-1300 Meeting
Captioned by Q&A Reporting, Inc., www.qacaptions.com

Exhibit 3

>> VICE CHAIR SZETELA: We will bring the Michigan
Independent Citizens
Redistricting Commission to
order at 1:06 p.m.
Greetings to Ann Arbor. We are happy to be here today. There are several groups that are making this meeting possible. I would like to thank Tom Ivako, Bonnie Roberts and Logan Woods of the center for local, state and urban policy here at the University of Michigan. Ellen Werman and Nate Hall, campus election management project. Landon Meyers, campus vote project. It's gratifying that so many groups are here to assist the MICRC in engaging people in redistricting here in Michigan.

This Zoom webinar is being live streamed at YouTube at www.YouTube.com/MICHSO office/videos.

For anyone in the public watching who would prefer to watch via a different platform than they are currently using, please visit our social media at Redistricting MI to find the link for viewing on YouTube.

Our live stream today includes closed captioning. Closed captioning, ASL interpretation, and Spanish and Bengali and Arabic translation services will be provided for effective participation in this meeting. Please E-mail us at Redistricting@Michigan.Gov for additional viewing options or details on accessing language translation services for this meeting.

People with disabilities or needing other specific accommodations should also contact Redistricting at Michigan.gov.

This meeting is also being recorded and will be available at www.Michigan.gov/MICRC for viewing at a later date and this meeting is being transcribed and closed-captioned transcriptions will be made available and posted on Michigan.gov/MICRC along with the written public comment submissions.

There is also a public comment portal that may be accessed by visiting Michigan.gov/MICRC, this portal can be utilized to post maps and comments which can be viewed by both the Commission and the public.

Members of the media who may have questions before, during or after the meeting should direct those questions to Edward Woods III, our Communications and Outreach Director for the Commission at WoodsE3@Michigan.gov or 517-331-6309.

For the purposes of the public watching and for the public record I will now turn to the Department of State staff to take note of the Commissioners

The first and Foremost criteria are the U.S. Constitution and Federal law and the Voting Rights Act is Federal law.

And it applies everywhere in the country including Michigan.

It prohibits any voting standard practice or procedure including a redistricting plan that results in the denial or dilution of minority voting strength.

A redistricting plan that dilutes minority voting strength is one that either cracks or packs a geographically concentrated minority group.

A top example to the left is or to the right is an example of a District, a set of districts that cracks the minority community by dividing it among four districts, five districts so that they cannot elect a minority preferred candidate in any of those districts.

The lower example on the right is an example of a District or District center that packs minority voters so that they have an impact on only one District and no impact on any of the other districts despite the fact that you could probably have drawn two districts in which they had the ability to elect communities, to elect candidates of choice.

When the Voting Rights Act was amended in 1982 to make it clear that you did not have to show that the redirectors intended to discriminate only that the plan that they drew actually resulted in discrimination.

The Supreme Court first considered this case in 1986 in a case called Thornburg versus Jingles and had to prove three conditions in order to satisfy Section Two and get a District drawn in which they could have the ability to elect a candidate of choice.

First is that the group must be sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority in a single member District.

This is in essence so there was actually a remedy available.

There is a solution to the problem of how do we elect candidates of choice.

The second is that the minority group must be politically cohesive.

That is, they must vote for the same candidates.

And, third, whites must vote as a bloc to usually defeat the minority-preferred candidates.

If they were not voting as a bloc to defeat these candidates, these candidates would win, and you wouldn't need to draw a minority District.

So how do we know how the minority group is voting? How do we know how whites are voting? What you do is conduct a racial bloc voting analysis.

And my job in this particular situation is to actually carry out what's called a racial bloc voting analysis that is analyze voting patterns by race to determine if voting is polarized. If whites are voting against a cohesive minority community.

I mentioned that first of all we have, of course, a secret ballot.

We don't know the race of the voters when they cast the ballot.

So, we have to use estimation techniques.

And the two most standard estimation techniques are ecological regression analysis and ecological inference analysis. Ecological simply means you are using aggregate data.

What we are going to do is we are going to look at precincts rather than individuals. And we are going to look to see if there are patterns across the precincts in which the demographic composition of the precinct is related to the voting patterns of those precincts.

So, on the left we see ecological regression each precinct in the jurisdiction has been placed on the scatter plot on the basis of the percent Black turnout this is the jurisdiction in the south where we actually know turn out by race.

And the vertical axis is vote for Warnock this is an election that occurred in January of 2021 it's the race for U.S. Senate in Georgia.

This is real data in a specific County.

You can see a pattern here and the pattern is the higher the percent Black across the precincts the more votes you see for Warnock that is the estimation technique we used to determine how whites and Blacks are voting in this particular jurisdiction.

This practice, this particular technique had one disadvantage associated with it and that voting was very polarized, you would get estimates that were outside the logical pounds and would find something like 105 Blacks vote 105% of Black voters voted for Warnock. And negative 5 white voters voted for Warnock.

So, in the 1990s Professor King developed ecological inference, that you see on the right side. And this process, each precinct is actually represented by a line rather than a point using more information about the precinct to get this line. And that is all the possible combinations of Black and white votes that could have produced the result for that particular precinct as represented by a line as opposed to a point.

And then the computer generates a best guesstimate of what the actual composition of the votes for the Black candidate were, was.

So, this is the analysis that I performed in Michigan.

Now you need a few pieces of information in order to perform this.

And that is that you need to have an area that has a sufficient number of minority voters to actually estimate voting behavior by race.

I looked at eight counties.

There were several counties in the west of Michigan that had growing minority population around Grand Rapids, Muskegon County and Kent County and it turns out there was not a sufficient number of minority votes to estimate behavior voting behavior on the basis of race in those two counties.

The same is true of I looked at six counties in the east.

I was able to produce estimates for Wayne, Oakland, Genesee and Saginaw Counties, I was not able to do so for Washtenaw and Macomb Counties there was not a sufficient amount of Black turn out to estimate Black and white behavior in those two counties so

==what I'm going to give you is the results of analysis for statewide for the entire State of Michigan and for these four counties.==

Because actually what you want to do you want to do an area specific analysis because it turns out that voting patterns are different depending where you are in the state.

For example, it may be the case using the example I gave you before of the Georgia election.

Turns out that in the rule areas of Georgia the election was very polarized while in the urban area around Fulton it was much less polarized.

In fact, it wasn't polarized at all in certain areas.

So, it matters where you are in the state as to how much polarization there is and when you're drawing districts it matters what it looks like in that specific area.

The Court is quite adamant about doing a District-specific and am analysis and this is why I looked at these counties.

I looked at 13 elections there have been 13 statewide and Federal elections over the decade.

These include U.S. Senate, U.S. president, U.S. Senate, and three statewide contests, the gubernatorial contests the Attorney General and Secretary of State and the treasurer.

Four statewide contests.

Now the courts have indicated that the most probative contest to look at are contests include minority candidates.

So, you've had four contests statewide contests over the last decade that included minority candidates.

These are the most probative.

You have also listed them here.

You had the 2012 race for U.S. president.

You had a 2014 Secretary of State contest.

You had the 2018 and 2020 U.S. Senate contests.

Then you had two contests that included minority candidates as running mates.

This is the 2018 gubernatorial contest and the 2020 Presidential contest.

So, these I looked at all 13 statewide contests, but these are the most probative according to the courts.

Ordinarily I would look at statewide democratic primaries as well.

I could not look at republican primaries there is not enough minority participation in republican primaries to actually analyze voting patterns by race.

So, I look at democratic primaries.

And in this case, you've only had one statewide democratic primary.

This entire decade and that was in 2018 for Governor.

So, I looked at that contest as well.

This is what the results look like.

And I'm going to explain how to read this table.

Every election that I looked at for every area has a table that looks like this.

So, this is statewide.

This is the election listed here, 2018 Governor.

And here are the candidates.

Here are the parties of the candidates.

Here are the races of the candidates.

Here is the votes that they received statewide.

Now, there are actually four estimates for Black voters and there are four estimates for white voters.

I talked to you about ecological regression and mentioned the problem you have with ecological regression and there sit 104 of Black voters supporting Whitmer.

I didn't mention homogenous precinct.

This is actual these are the actual results of precincts across the state that are overwhelmingly one race.

So these are precincts across the state that are 90% or more voting age population Black in composition.

So that's how I derived the homogenous and this is actual data so looking at 90% plus precincts 90 per sent plus Black age population precincts 95.6% of those voters supported Whitmer.

There are actually two different forms of ecological inference analysis.

One is called two by two.

And that is the one that was developed in the 1990s.

It's since been refined so that I can account for differential turn out and that's what is in the last column 95.3%.

Now all of these are derived from different techniques.

You wouldn't expect them to be exactly the same, but they are all telling a very similar story and that is overwhelming Black support for Whitmer.

On the other side of this table, we will get our estimates.

I report the estimates for the white voters.

So let me see if I can get this to work.

But it's not doing this.

Okay, so we've got 41.1% in the overwhelmingly white precincts, 41.1% of the voters supported Whitmer.

The AR estimate is 38.9.

The two by two is 40.6.

And let me see and the C is 44.8% so these are estimates.

Now I forgot to mention down here the votes for office this is the percentage of voting age population that actually turned out and cast a ballot for that particular office.

So, you can see there is a difference in turn out rates.

And that is around 35% of Black voting age population turned out and cast a ballot for the Governor in 2018.

While the number was higher almost double for white voters.

This contest is racially polarized.

If Blacks voting alone had voted alone Whitmer would have been elected.

She was.

And then of course if whites voted alone, it would have been the republican candidate who was elected.

Below I have the primary for this election.

I have the gubernatorial primary of 2018.

We have the three candidates listed here.

We have they are all democrats.

We have their race.

We have the percentage of votes they received.

And you will see that this contest is also polarized.

This contest you have a plurality of the Black voters supporting Thanedar and majority of the white voters supported Whitmer.

So, this contest is also polarized.

Okay, now I did this, and you will see tables in the report that I eventually produce for every election but I'm going to show you summaries of this in a little bit.

So, over all statewide in the 13 elections that I looked at, 12 were polarized.

And those elections that are most probative to the courts, that is those that included minority candidates, 6 out of the 6 were polarized in the democratic primary which there was only one it was polarized.

And I money -- mentioned I looked at four counties and these are the results of the analysis in four counties in Genesee County we have nine of the 13 contests polarized with five of the six with minority candidates.

The democratic primary was polarized.

And Saginaw it's 11 out of 13 of the contests, six out of six of those contests with minority candidates.

And the democratic primary was polarized.

In Oakland all 13 of the general elections were polarized including the six with minority candidates but the democratic primary was not.

And finally in Wayne County where voting is less polarized you will see that 7 of the 13 contests were polarized, three of those were minority candidates and the democratic primary was polarized.

What this tells me is that voting is polarized in Michigan.

And what that means is the Voting Rights Act comes into may in districts that provide minority voters with the opportunity to elect their candidates must be drawn.

Okay, so voting is polarized.

Exhibit 4

Slide 1

DETERMINING IF A REDISTRICTING PLAN COMPLIES WITH THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

Dr. Lisa Handley

1

Slide 2

Redistricting Criteria Priority Pyramid: Voting Rights Act of 1965

- Section 2 prohibits any voting standard, practice or procedure, including a redistricting plan, that results in the denial or dilution of minority voting strength.

- All state and local jurisdictions are covered by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

- U.S. Constitution: equal population
- Voting Rights Act of 1965
- Contiguity
- Communities of interest
- No disproportionate advantage to any political party
- No favoring or disfavoring incumbents or candidates
- Consideration of county, city, township boundaries
- Reasonable compactness

2

Slide 3

Redistricting Plans that Violate the Voting Rights Act

Redistricting plans cannot:

- crack, or
- pack

a geographically concentrated minority community across districts or within a district in a manner that dilutes their voting strength.

35% 35% 35% 35% 35%

Plan that cracks minority community across 5 districts

20% 15% 100% 20% 20%

Plan that packs minority community into single district

3

Slide 4

Thornburg v. Gingles: Three-Pronged Test

U.S. Supreme Court held that plaintiffs must satisfy three preconditions to qualify for relief under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act:

- The minority group must be sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority in a single-member district
  - The minority group must be politically cohesive
  - Whites must vote as a bloc to usually defeat the minority-preferred candidates

A racial bloc voting analysis is used to ascertain whether minority voters are politically cohesive and if white voters bloc vote to usually defeat minority-preferred candidates.

4

Analyzing Voting Behavior by Race

Two standard statistical techniques for estimating voting patterns of minority and white voters:

- Ecological regression analysis (ER)
- Ecological inference analysis (EI)

Elections Analyzed to Date

- All federal and statewide general election contests, 2012-2020.
  - Four election contests included minority candidates:
    - 2012 U.S. President (Barack Obama)
    - 2014 Secretary of State (Godfrey Dillard)
    - 2018 U.S. Senate (John James)
    - 2020 U.S. Senate (John James)
  - Two contests included minority candidates as running mates
    - 2018 Governor (Gretchen Whitmer/Garlin Gilchrist)
    - 2020 U.S. President (Joseph Biden/Kamala Harris)
- Only Democratic primary for statewide office this past decade: 2018 race for governor

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
Area-Specific Analyses

- Wayne
- Oakland
- Genesee
- Saginaw

Example of RBV Results: 2018 General and Democratic Primary for Governor

Statewide

2018 General	Party	Race	Vote	Black HP	Black ER	Black EI 2x2	Black EI RxC	White HP	White ER	White EI 2x2	White EI RxC
Governor											
Whitmer/Gilchrist	D	W/AA	53.3%	95.6	104.3	98.6	95.3	41.1	39.9	40.6	44.8
Schuette/Lyons	R	W	43.8%	2.5	-6.4	0.6	1.8	56.0	57.9	56.2	52.8
Others				1.9	2.1	2.6	2.9	2.9	3.2	2.9	2.5
votes for office				36.6	31.6	35.2	35.2	61.9	61.7	63.3	63.3

2018 Democratic Primary for Governor	Party	Race	Vote	Black HP	Black ER	Black EI 2x2	Black EI RxC	White HP	White ER	White EI 2x2	White EI RxC
STATEWIDE											
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	30.2%	21.0	24.2	23.5	26.0	25.7	27.1	30.2	28.5
Shri Thanedar	D	A	17.7%	42.5	44.2	42.2	39.0	15.8	12.9	10.8	9.4
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	52.0%	36.5	31.6	33.5	35.0	58.6	60.0	59.4	62.0
votes for office				23.0	22.5	24.5	24.5	13.9	12.0	14.0	14.0

- *votes for office* = percentage of voting age population who turned out and cast a vote for the office
- HP = vote percentages from homogeneous precincts
- ER = estimates derived from ecological regression analysis
- EI 2x2 = estimates derived from standard EI (as developed by Prof. Gary King)
- EI RxC = estimates derived from EI technique that takes into account differences in participation by race

Drawing Minority Opportunity Districts

- Line drawers cannot simply set an arbitrary demographic target (e.g., 50% black voting age population) for all minority districts across the jurisdiction (*Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama*, 2015).

- A district-specific, functional analysis is required to determine if a proposed district will provide minority voters with the ability to elect minority-preferred candidates to office.

District-specific, Function Approaches

- Estimates of participation rates, minority cohesion and white crossover voting for minority-preferred candidates derived from the RBV analysis can be used to calculate the percent minority population needed in a specific area for minority-preferred candidates to win a district in that area.

- Election results from previous contests that included minority-preferred candidates ("bellwether elections" as identified by the RBV analysis) can be recompiled to reflect the boundaries of the proposed district to determine if minority-preferred candidates would consistently carry this proposed district.

Number of Racially Polarized Elections

	General Elections with Minority Candidates	All Statewide General Election Contests	Statewide Democratic Primary
Statewide	6/6	12/13	1/1
Genesee	5/6	9/13	1/1
Saginaw	6/6	11/13	1/1
Oakland	6/6	13/13	0/1
Wayne	3/6	7/13	1/1

Number of polarized contests / total number of contests

Complying with the Voting Rights Act

- If, based on the racial bloc voting (RBV) analysis, it is determined voting is racially polarized, and candidates preferred by a politically cohesive minority group are usually defeated by white voters not supporting these candidates, a district(s) that offers minority voters an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice must be drawn.

- If such districts already exist, and minority-preferred candidates are winning only because these districts exist, then these minority districts must be maintained in a manner that continues to provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their preferred candidates.

Michigan STATEWIDE

Percent Black VAP needed to win

race of B-P candidate	Black votes – votes cast for office	Black B-P	Black all others	White votes – votes cast for office	White B-P	White all others	% B-P cand would have received if district was 55% black VAP	50% black VAP	45% black VAP	40% black VAP	35% black VAP
GENERAL ELECTIONS											
2020 President	W	55.2	96.2	3.8	79.0	40.0	60.0	65.9	63.1	60.4	57.9
2020 US Senate	W	55.0	93.9	6.1	78.1	39.4	60.6	64.6	61.9	59.3	56.8
2018 Governor	W	35.2	95.3	4.7	63.3	44.8	55.2	65.2	62.8	60.6	58.5
2018 Secretary of State	W	35.1	95.6	4.4	62.2	43.9	56.1	65.0	62.6	60.2	58.0
2018 Attorney General	W	34.6	94.4	5.6	61.7	39.4	60.6	61.8	59.2	56.7	54.4
2018 US Senate	W	35.0	94.3	5.7	63.1	43.7	56.3	64.1	61.8	59.5	57.4
2016 President	W	54.1	97.3	2.7	67.2	34.3	65.7	65.5	62.4	59.3	56.3
2014 Governor	W	35.1	95.7	4.3	49.1	38.5	61.5	65.2	62.3	59.6	57.0
2014 Secretary of State	AA	34.8	95.8	4.2	47.8	33.5	66.5	62.8	59.7	56.8	54.0
2014 Attorney General	W	34.6	95.2	4.8	47.8	35.0	65.0	63.3	60.3	57.4	54.6
2014 US Senate	W	35.0	96.5	3.5	48.5	47.3	52.7	70.4	67.9	65.6	63.3
2012 President	AA	59.8	97.8	2.2	68.1	44.5	55.5	71.9	69.3	66.6	64.0
2012 US Senate	W	59.8	96.8	3.2	66.9	50.6	49.4	74.5	72.2	69.9	67.7

(35% black VAP column: 55.4, 54.4, 56.4, 55.9, 52.2, 55.3, 53.4, 54.4, 51.0, 51.9, 61.1, 61.5, 65.4)

Statewide

2018 General	Party	Race	Vote
Governor			
Whitmer/Gilchrist	D	W/AA	53.3%
Schuette/Lyons	R	W	43.8%
others			2.1
votes for office			

Estimates for Black Voters	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
	95.6	104.3	98.6	95.3
	2.5	-6.4	0.6	1.8
	1.9	2.1	2.6	2.9
	36.6	31.6	35.2	35.2

Estimates for White Voters	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
	41.1	38.9	40.6	44.8
	56.0	57.9	56.2	52.8
	3.2	3.2	2.9	2.5
	63.3	61.7	63.3	63.3

SAGINAW COUNTY

Percent Black VAP needed to win

race of B-P candidate	Black votes cast for office	Black B-P	Black all others	White votes cast for office	White B-P	White all others	55% black VAP	50% black VAP	45% black VAP	40% black VAP	35% black VAP
GENERAL ELECTIONS											
2020 President	W	48.6	95.3	4.7	79.6	36.3	63.7	61.5	58.7	56.0	53.4
2020 US Senate	W	48.4	93.8	6.2	78.7	37.5	62.5	61.7	58.9	56.3	53.9
2018 Governor	W	37.7	93.6	6.4	63.0	40.9	59.1	63.2	60.6	58.2	55.9
2018 Secretary of State	W	38.0	93.7	6.3	61.4	39.2	60.8	62.7	60.0	57.5	55.1
2018 Attorney General	W	37.6	93.4	6.6	61.0	33.3	66.7	59.1	56.2	53.4	50.8
2018 US Senate	W	37.8	93.5	6.5	62.8	39.3	60.7	62.3	59.7	57.2	54.8
2016 President	W	52.3	95.0	5.0	70.2	30.6	69.4	61.3	58.1	55.0	52.0
2014 Governor	W	32.7	94.1	5.9	50.8	42.2	57.8	65.1	62.5	60.1	57.8
2014 Secretary of State	AA	32.6	94.4	5.6	49.2	36.3	63.7	62.3	59.5	56.7	54.1
2014 Attorney General	W	32.4	94.1	5.9	50.1	32.6	67.4	59.8	56.8	53.9	51.1
2014 US Senate	W	32.7	94.1	5.9	50.6	46.7	53.3	66.9	65.7	63.8	61.9
2012 President	AA	56.2	95.7	4.3	70.3	42.9	57.1	69.0	66.4	63.8	61.3
2012 US Senate	W	55.7	95.4	4.6	68.7	52.3	47.7	73.8	71.6	69.5	67.4

(35% black VAP column: 50.9, 51.5, 53.7, 52.8, 48.3, 52.6, 49.0, 55.6, 51.6, 48.5, 59.7, 58.8, 65.4)

GENESEE COUNTY

Percent Black VAP needed to win

race of B-P candidate	Black votes cast for office	Black B-P	Black all others	White votes cast for office	White B-P	White all others	55% black VAP	50% black VAP	45% black VAP	40% black VAP	35% black VAP
GENERAL ELECTIONS											
2020 President	W	53.0	96.1	3.9	79.6	42.1	57.9	66.3	63.7	61.1	58.7
2020 US Senate	W	56.6	95.0	5.0	78.7	43.5	56.5	67.6	65.0	62.6	60.2
2018 Governor	W	45.1	95.3	4.7	59.2	46.2	53.8	69.8	67.2	64.9	62.6
2018 Secretary of State	W	44.9	95.2	4.8	58.6	48.0	52.0	70.8	68.5	66.2	64.0
2018 Attorney General	W	44.6	94.1	5.9	58.4	41.1	58.9	66.7	64.0	61.5	59.0
2018 US Senate	W	45.1	95.2	4.8	59.6	45.8	54.2	69.5	67.1	64.7	62.4
2016 President	W	59.0	96.4	3.6	67.3	37.4	62.6	67.9	65.0	62.0	59.2
2014 Governor	W	35.8	95.8	4.2	47.5	51.8	48.2	72.9	70.7	68.6	66.5
2014 Secretary of State	AA	35.9	95.6	4.4	46.1	46.2	53.8	70.3	68.6	65.4	63.1
2014 Attorney General	W	35.9	95.6	4.4	45.2	45.2	54.8	69.9	67.4	65.0	62.6
2014 US Senate	W	36.1	95.6	4.4	47.1	58.6	41.4	76.5	74.7	72.9	71.1
2012 President	AA	61.0	97.6	2.4	68.4	53.7	46.3	76.6	74.4	72.2	70.1
2012 US Senate	W	60.7	96.7	3.3	67.5	60.2	39.8	79.3	77.5	75.7	73.9

(35% black VAP column: 56.4, 57.9, 60.4, 61.8, 56.5, 60.1, 56.3, 64.5, 60.8, 60.2, 69.4, 67.9, 72.1)

OAKLAND COUNTY

Percent Black VAP needed to win

race of B-P candidate	Black votes cast for office	Black B-P	Black all others	White votes cast for office	White B-P	White all others	55% black VAP	50% black VAP	45% black VAP	40% black VAP	35% black VAP
GENERAL ELECTIONS											
2020 President	W	71.5	93.4	6.6	86.4	45.9	54.1	69.8	67.4	65.1	62.8
2020 US Senate	W	71.4	92.1	7.9	85.4	43.5	56.5	68.1	66.6	63.2	60.9
2018 Governor	W	53.2	94.1	5.9	68.8	47.4	52.6	70.1	67.6	65.5	63.3
2018 Secretary of State	W	53.1	94.2	5.8	67.2	47.5	52.5	70.4	68.0	65.8	63.5
2018 Attorney General	W	52.5	93.8	6.2	67.0	43.0	57.0	67.9	65.3	62.8	60.4
2018 US Senate	W	53.2	93.0	7.0	68.7	45.5	54.5	68.6	66.2	63.9	61.7
2016 President	W	65.6	95.1	4.9	73.5	39.1	60.9	68.3	65.5	62.7	60.0
2014 Governor	W	45.8	94.8	5.2	54.6	30.6	69.4	63.3	60.1	56.9	53.8
2014 Secretary of State	AA	45.9	94.6	5.4	53.1	26.4	73.6	61.4	58.0	54.7	51.3
2014 Attorney General	W	45.8	94.1	5.9	52.6	32.9	67.1	64.5	61.4	58.4	55.4
2014 US Senate	W	46.5	94.1	5.9	53.7	46.7	53.3	71.5	66.7	66.7	64.4
2012 President	AA	68.9	95.7	4.3	75.7	42.1	57.9	70.3	67.6	65.0	62.3
2012 US Senate	W	67.8	95.8	4.2	74.0	47.6	52.4	73.1	70.6	68.3	65.9

(35% black VAP column: 60.6, 58.6, 61.1, 61.4, 58.1, 59.5, 57.3, 50.7, 48.1, 52.4, 62.1, 59.7, 63.5)

Slide 19

Threshold of Representation: State House

- All districts over 36% Black elect minority candidates
- 89% of districts over 25% Black elect minority candidates
- No state house districts between 37 and 47% Black

19

Slide 20

Michigan – District Percentage of Voting-Age Non-Hispanic African Americans including combination with other races

20

Slide 17

17

Slide 18

Threshold of Representation: State Senate

- All districts over 48% Black elect minority candidates
- 67% of districts over 35% Black elect minority candidates
- No state senate districts between 36 and 45% Black

18

Exhibit **5**

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Drawing Effective Miority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence

Bernard Grofman

Lisa Handley

David Lublin

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DRAWING EFFECTIVE MINORITY DISTRICTS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

BERNARD GROFMAN, LISA HANDLEY, AND DAVID LUBLIN[*]

When applying the Voting Rights Act, courts and commentators alike have too often fixated on the distinction between "majority-minority" districts and "majority-white" districts, while paying relatively little attention to the likely electoral outcomes that any given districting plan will actually generate. In this Article, three political scientists provide a conceptual framework for predicting minority electoral success, taking into account the participation rates and voting patterns of minority and white voters, as well as incorporating the multi-stage election process (primaries plus general elections, and sometimes runoff elections). The Authors also analyze empirical election data to demonstrate how the model can be applied to address voting rights disputes.

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general election[74]—and sometimes the highest percentage is in the runoff, sometimes in the general election. Both Bishop and McKinney, for example, needed a higher percentage black to win the Democratic runoff than to win the general election in their districts in 1992.

Table 6: Percent Black Needed for Black Candidate to Win, Incorporating Cohesion & Crossover: Selected Southern Congressional Primary, Runoff & General Elections with Black Candidates

Congressional District	Year	% Black Participation	% White Participation	% Black Needed To Equalize Turnout	% Black Votes for Black Candidate* (Cohesion)	% White Votes For Black Candidate* (Crossover)	% Black Needed Given Both Cohesion & Crossover
DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY							
FL 3 (Brown)	1992 Primary	28.7	21.6	42.9	93.5	34.4	31.9
GA 2 (Bishop)	1992 Primary	39.8	44.4	52.7	84.4	31.2	43.7
GA 11 (McKinney)	1992 Primary	27.3	38.2	58.3	89.7	60.4	27.4
GA 4 (McKinney)	1996 Primary	30.5	12.8	29.6	93.3	24.6	27.0
DEMOCRATIC RUNOFF							
FL 3 (Brown)	1992 Runoff	24.0	14.5	37.7	92.0	15.8	36.7
GA 2 (Bishop)	1992 Runoff	35.3	30.3	46.2	79.0	25.5	45.7
GA 11 (McKinney)	1992 Runoff	20.9	34.6	62.3	90.8	26.5	49.3
GENERAL ELECTION							
FL 3 (Brown)	1992 General	57.8	68.6	54.3	97.1	25.6	41.7
GA 2 (Bishop)	1992 General	55.9	62.6	52.8	98.3	32.4	36.5
GA 11 (McKinney)	1992 General	60.3	57.8	48.9	96.7	36.0	33.0
GA 4 (McKinney)	1996 General	58.3	66.4	53.2	98.1	31.2	37.5

* The estimates of % white & black votes for black candidates is the % of whites & blacks voting for any of the black candidates, not simply the sinning black candidate.

The highest of the three percentages necessarily interests us most because it is the percentage needed for the black-preferred candidate to win all three elections—the Democratic primary, the Democratic runoff and the general election—and attain a seat in the legislature. The fact that the highest percentage black needed to win is not always found in the general election illustrates the importance of examining

74. The percent black needed to win the Democratic primary is somewhat misleading if more than one black candidate ran in the primary—the estimates for the percentage of whites crossing over and the percentage of blacks voting cohesively are a reflection of the percentage of whites and blacks voting for any of the black candidates, not simply the winning black candidate. For example, in the 1992 Democratic primary in the Georgia 11th, 60.4% of the whites voted for one of the four black candidates running, but not necessarily the black candidate (McKinney) who won.

all stages of the election process, and not simply relying on an analysis of the general election.

Before we conclude that black Democratic candidates can win in congressional districts that are not majority black, several cautionary notes must be added. First, black candidates may not have been persuaded to compete for congressional office in the South if majority black districts had not been created—and black candidates cannot win if they cannot be convinced to run. Second, black voters may not have turned out to vote in such high numbers if they did not think black-preferred candidates had a chance to win. Third, a district that was less than majority black may have attracted more experienced and well-funded white candidates, and that in turn could lower the level of white crossover voting and result in the defeat of black candidates. Fourth, white incumbents can play a major role in retarding the prospects for black electoral success. Only one of the congressional contests examined included a white incumbent; if white incumbents had run in more of these districts, the black electoral *success rate almost certainly would have been much lower.* For example, in the Georgia 10th, which is 38% black, a black Democratic candidate was easily defeated by the white Republican incumbent in the 1998 general election. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we must not over-generalize from the congressional data to other offices. As the data from state legislative districts in South Carolina demonstrate, sometimes legislative districts well in excess of 50% black are necessary to provide black voters with an equal opportunity to elect black candidates to office—a district-specific analysis is essential to make this determination.

C.   Factors that Affect the Opportunity to Elect Minority-Preferred Candidates: Data from South Carolina State Legislative Elections

Our examination of the outcome of elections in black majority districts for the South Carolina House of Representatives during the 1990s reinforces the importance of a jurisdiction-specific analysis of the factors that affect the opportunity to elect minority-preferred candidates to office. Table 7 lists the election results for all majority black state house districts in South Carolina for the 1992, 1994, 1996 and 1998 elections.[75]

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75. Table 7 does not include results from special elections, including the round of special elections held in 1997 due to court-ordered redistricting.

Exhibit 6

From:	Pastula, Julianne (MICRC)
Sent:	Monday, September 13, 2021 5:19 PM
To:	Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC); Rothhorn, MC (MICRC)
Cc:	Badelson1
Subject:	Privileged & Confidential: Significant Concerns from General Counsel and VRA Counsel

THIS EMAIL IS A PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION THAT CONSTITUTES ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT AND CONTAINS LEGAL ADVICE.

PLEASE DO NOT COPY, DISTRIBUTE, SHARE OR DISCLOSE THE PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION IN THIS EMAIL.

Dear Chair Szetela and Vice Chair Rothhorn,

Bruce and I are very concerned and alarmed about the drafting of packed districts that is occurring during today's mapping session. While the work is preliminary and future steps can be taken to remediate - this will become much more difficult the more packed districts that are drawn. In addition to not being able to justify the numbers coming out of today to a court, these drafts also create expectations on behalf of the public that will also be difficult to address moving forward.

The disaggregated election data was not available last Thursday when the Commission first moved into areas where the VRA is implicated. This was the data Lisa highlighted during her presentation on Sept 2nd which is critical for the Commission (and Bruce) to move forward. Today, the data appears to be loaded but there was no coordination of a presentation by Kim (which he offered over the weekend) to introduce the data and orient the Commission to it in advance of your mapping work. It has been 2 weeks and the Commission still does not have the critical updates it needs to the software even scheduled. This cannot be accepted by Commission any longer.

This complete breakdown of communication and the lack of information the Commission needs to perform its work is unacceptable and will continue to negatively impact its work unless it is addressed. The Commission desires to create best practices which will be measured by a successful defense of its maps after all legal challenges are done not by any other metric. The complete opposite is being done by the lack of information and coordination. The Commission is running out of time and have an enormous amount of work to do. The current course of action is against the advice of counsel and your RPV expert.

Everyone is making personal sacrifices but there needs to be uniform emergency among a majority of the Commission and unanimous understanding of the law. The current environment is not allowing either to take center stage.

The Commission should consider extending its meeting time for Mon-Wed, consolidating locations (instead of driving 6 hours round trip for a 6 hour meeting) and consider adding Friday meetings in order for the work to get done.

I recommend we have a call to discuss this email as soon as possible and would be happy to coordinate it to accommodate everyone's busy schedules.

Sincerely,

Julianne Pastula
General Counsel
State of Michigan

1

Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission
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>> VICE CHAIR ROTHHORN: As Vice Chair of the Commission, we will bring the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission to order at 10:02 a.m.

This Zoom webinar is being live streamed on YouTube at redistricting MI.

For anyone in the public watching who would prefer to watch via a different platform than they are currently using, please visit our social media at Redistricting MI to find the link for viewing on YouTube.

Our live stream today includes closed captioning. Closed captioning, ASL interpretation, and Spanish and Arabic and Bengali translation services will be provided for effective participation in this meeting. Please E-mail us at Redistricting@Michigan.Gov for additional viewing options or details on accessing language translation services for this meeting.

People with disabilities or needing other specific accommodations should also contact Redistricting at Michigan.gov.

For the public record, this meeting is also being recorded and will be available at www.Michigan.gov/MICRC for viewing at a later date and this meeting also is being transcribed and those closed captioned transcriptions will be made available and posted on Michigan.gov/MICRC along with the written public comment submissions.

There is also a public comment portal that may be accessed by visiting Michigan.gov/MICRC, this portal can be utilized to post maps and comments which can be viewed by both the Commission and the public.

Members of the media who may have questions before, during or after the meeting should direct those questions to Edward Woods III, our Communications and Outreach Director for the Commission at WoodsE3@Michigan.gov or 517-331-6309.

For the purposes of the public watching and for the public record I will now turn to the Department of State staff to take note of the Commissioners present.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Good morning, Commissioners. Please say present when I call your name. If you are attending the meeting remotely, please Announce during roll call you are attending remotely and disclose your physical location. I will call on Commissioners in alphabetical order starting with Doug Clark.

>> COMMISSIONER CLARK: Present.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Juanita Curry.

I understand that that may cause some level of uneasy and disappointment in people who are watching these hearings and are voters of Michigan.

But that's part of redistricting.

The Voting Rights Act and the U.S. Constitution say what they do.

And that has been my ongoing advice to the Commission.

Thank you.

>> VICE CHAIR ROTHHORN: Commissioner Witjes? Then Commissioner Orton.

>> COMMISSIONER WITJES: Based on advice of General Counsel this needs to be finalized and be reviewed so we can quote unquote start fixing it I move that we stop working on the house map and let it go in for analysis over the next two days so we can fix it next week.

>> VICE CHAIR ROTHHORN: Okay that was a motion and I just want to make sure that because I think the fixing there was a District 18 that I think needed to be quote unquote fixed.

>> MS. JULIANNE PASTULA: And 16.

>> VICE CHAIR ROTHHORN: And 16.

>> MS. JULIANNE PASTULA: Pardon me 6 and 18 specifically.

>> VICE CHAIR ROTHHORN: Yeah 6 and 18.

And then in District -- and I do think that Commissioner Eid pointed out there is a community of interest in Hamtramck in District 10 we might sort of try to pull into 2 just to comply and I don't think it's going to be a voting rights thing but that's meaning I think it's going to be okay but I just want to acknowledge that, that I think is where the spirit of fixing, it's in this map and it's District 18, District 16, and District 1.

No.

General Counsel please help.

>> MS. JULIANNE PASTULA: What I would recommend is that the Commissioner consider doing is for the active matrix to scroll starting with 1 and glance at the districts, anything that is higher than 40% for the Black voting age population and the population difference I mean just to glance at and just go down the list and then when we get to I anticipate number 6, number 18, and others that those quote unquote fixes can be dealt with and then this map can be ready for the partisan fairness analysis.

That would be my recommendation.

And if the Commission was desiring of having an alternate house map, then the map that is the product of this analysis could be used to start the clone for the new one.

But this would that changed.

Did you scroll John?

>> MR. MORGAN: Sorry I moved the two yesterday where we were comparing Commissioners Szetela's plan with the previously done plan and I was making this matrix show the combined so we could do what you described which is look at each individual District I can also bring it up in the active matrix.

>> VICE CHAIR ROTHHORN: Thank you for that helpful direction General Counsel? It's Commissioner Curry's turn and so I want to acknowledge Commissioner Orton first and turn it back to you Commissioner Curry and direct of fixing 6 and 18 so yeah it will be your turn after Commissioner Orton Commissioner Curry.

>> COMMISSIONER ORTON: So General Counsel I guess, I can't see you guys over there but I think we have been asking for specifics and the specific that I heard is that 6 and 18 need to be further unpacked? And you gave a number and 1 through all of them and if it's over a certain percent we need to look at that.
So can you tell me again what that number was.

>> MS. JULIANNE PASTULA: My suggestion was and Mr. Morgan was very helpful with it, however the data is best displayed but that the Commission start with the data chart and look at the list starting with one and I would recommend anything with a higher than 40% Black voting age population be looked at.
This will also give the Commission an opportunity to look at their population numbers at this time and that way by the time we get to District 110 we will know this map is okay for -- to have Dr. Handley run the partisan fairness measures.
So that would be my recommendation is just scrolling down the data and if there is anything, again, that looks percentages that look kind of high, the Commission can take a closer look.
But again with the modifications that the Commission has made, again, looking at the current data percentages would be what I would recommend and then when we see those districts, we can address them and make sure that all of them are addressed is my goal.
By going through the chart in this fashion.

>> VICE CHAIR ROTHHORN: Okay so our Chair has returned.
So I'm going to turn it over to Chair Szetela and.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Yep so, I will take over from here.
First, I'd like to remind everyone, take it off? Commissioner Woods were you going to ask me to remind everybody?

>> MR. EDWARD WOODS: Yes.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: That is what I was about to do remind everybody we are required to wear masks in the building so if everybody could get their masks on, I would appreciate that.
This map we have open right now just so I'm oriented this is a full map we have of the full state with the changes I had suggested yesterday.
Is that.

>> MR. MORGAN: Yes, that's correct.
I made the changes as directed.
We stipulated I would do that.

But it does bring our percentages down in most districts below 40% and we have a few like 53, 52, I think the highest is 53.

So I did send that over to John if you guys want to look at it.

I think it might be easier than having us do it individually.

Again I'm not vouching for these districts.

I just I tried.

I did what Mr. Adelson asked and tried to lower the numbers.

And we've got some crazy show string districts but if everybody wants to look at that, I think it might and have Mr. Adelson look at it and see if this is what you are thinking we might do to be compliant that might be helpful.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Is this draft distinct from the version submitted the day before yesterday?

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Yes.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Okay, per our process they must be submitted to the Secretary of State one day before so they can be publicly posted.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Okay

>>VICE CHAIR ROTHHORN: Commissioner Clark I saw your hand and want to make sure General Counsel gets in while we are waiting for mapping for Commissioner Eid because I think partisan fairness was something we wanted to address Commissioner Clark do you have something quick?

>> COMMISSIONER CLARK: Rebecca.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Yes.

>> COMMISSIONER CLARK: Changes you made you just referred to are they just in the Detroit area?

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Yes.

>> COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay thank you.

>> VICE CHAIR ROTHHORN: Okay while we are waiting for our mapping software to boot up Commissioner or General Counsel would you like to address partisan fairness?

>> MS. JULIANNE PASTULA: I would thank you so much Vice Chair Rothhorn.

So very briefly I wanted to highlight again for the benefit of the public that partisan fairness according to subsection 13 of the Constitution, which sets forth the ranked criteria that the Commission is legally required to follow, the language regarding partisan fairness is districts shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any political party.

A disproportionate advantage to a political party shall be determined using accepted measures of partisan fairness.

That language does not require and actually prohibits the Commission from considering the election results while they are mapping.

Accepted measures of pardon sand fairness and measures are run on statewide plan. Which the Commission run on statewide plans.

They cannot map in the manner in which the public is advocating.

They are legally prohibited from doing so.

The partisan fairness measures when run again the Commission's expert Dr. Lisa Handley will be here tomorrow to run those partisan fairness measures on the statewide plans.

And then the Commission will be able to make amendments, if necessary, based on those measures.

And again the language is shall not provide a disproportionate advantage.

This language is key.

This language is what must be followed and the Commission cannot vary this language or modify the Constitution or not follow the Constitution or else the entire map will be put in jeopardy.

In legal jeopardy.

So it really is critical I think for the public to understand and appreciate the position that the Commission is in.

And that they are required to follow the Constitution as adopted.

By the voters in Michigan.

Again, to the goal was to end partisan gerrymandering and not draw maps based on political considerations which is what this Commission has done to date and will continue to do, get the partisan fairness results and then their legal team can advise on appropriate next steps.

Thank you Mr. Vice Chair se Szetela thank you General Counsel so Anthony I think we will hand it over to you to direct the line drawers.

Looks like Mr. Morgan over there.

   >> MR. BRUCE ADELSON: Madam Chair can I interject.

   >> CHAIR SZETELA: Yes.

   >> MR. BRUCE ADELSON: Thank you for your ongoing efforts and there is something that occurred to me that I wanted to make clear.

One of the things that this Commission is doing, which is quite different than the typical approach to redistricting, you are essentially unpacking districts.

You are essentially leveling the playing field as the Voting Rights Act was intended when it was passed in 1965.

And the Supreme Court has said that is a more challenging process than just packing people of color together willy-nilly.

Frankly that is not difficult to do.

But you are doing the opposite.

And I think it's really important that everybody realize that.

And that, that is why the process is challenging and the process does involve many steps here and there, so I just wanted to make that clarification because I think it is a very salient one.

>> CHAIR SZETELA:
Thank you, good afternoon I apologize in the delay, on getting started.
As Chair of the Commission, we will bring the Michigan Independent
Citizens Redistricting Commission to order at 1:25 p.m.

This Zoom webinar is being live streamed on YouTube at the
www.Michigan.gov/MICRC Commission YouTube channel.

For anyone in the public watching who would prefer to watch via a different platform
than they are currently using, please visit our social media at Redistricting MI

Our live stream today includes closed captioning. Closed captioning, ASL
interpretation, and Spanish and Arabic and Bengali translation services will be provided
for effective participation in this meeting. Please E-mail us at
Redistricting@Michigan.Gov for additional viewing options or details on accessing
language translation services for this meeting.

People with disabilities or needing other specific accommodations should also
contact Redistricting at Michigan.gov.

This meeting is also being recorded and will be available at www.Michigan.gov/MICRC
for viewing at a later date and this meeting also is being transcribed and those
closed captioned transcriptions will be made available and posted on
Michigan.gov/MICRC along with the written public comment submissions.

There is also a public comment portal that may be accessed by visiting
Michigan.gov/MICRC, this portal can be utilized to post maps and comments which can
be viewed by both the Commission and the public.

Members of the media who may have questions before, during or after the meeting
should direct those questions to Edward Woods III, our Communications and
Outreach Director for the Commission at WoodsE3@Michigan.gov or
517-331-6309.

For the purposes of the public watching and for the public record I will now turn to
the Department of State staff to take note of the Commissioners present.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Good afternoon, Commissioners.
Please say present when I call your name. If you are attending the meeting remotely,
please announce you are attending remotely and disclose your physical location where
you are attending from.

I will call on Commissioners in alphabetical order starting with
Doug Clark.

>> COMMISSIONER CLARK: Present.

Dispensing them in less compact districts that radiate out for the City of Detroit to suburban parts of Macomb and Oakland County.

As a result the maps feature 0 Black majority districts.

I'm asking Detroiters to stay and if we cannot consist have a consistent on the map I would recommend that we should look.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Your allotted 90 seconds has ended could you please conclude your statement.

Ma'am, out of respect for the fellow ma'am you are being disruptive we have a lot of people here who want to speak today so please honor the time limits.

Thank you.

Five, six, seven and eight.

>> Number five you can go ahead when you reach the podium.

>> Good afternoon, Commission and staff my name is Sharon Wilson.

I was born, raised and educated in the City of Detroit.

I now serve on the board of Delta manor which is a senior apartment complex located on the west side of the City.

I am vested.

Please note issues important to the African/American community have not been given sufficient attention.

Commissioners, now is the time to address these injustices via a correction of the proposed maps.

VRA districts must be created to allow Black voters to elect representatives of their choice.

Thus consideration of voting participation and election results must be taken into consideration.

Currently you have cracked multiple districts and have weakened our voice.

I support the promote the vote maps for Congress, map ID0615.

And the Michigan State University institute for social policy and public research recommendation that the MICRC reevaluate its approach towards compliance with the V RA.

No excuses.

We are demanding fair and equitable maps.

Thank you for listening.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number six.

>> Good afternoon my name is Christine Peck and I'm a resident of Birmingham I was also an active volunteer in the 2018 prop two ballot initiative.

I participated in the process and continue to be invested because I believe a basic requirement of a true democracy is the right for citizens to choose their elected officials by vote.

However, if the proposed map this Commission has published stands it's as if the democratic party and independents on this Commission had their voices completely silenced.

Primarily in the City of Detroit.

This proposed map spreads the African/American block into multiple districts where their voting influence is greatly diminished and probably violates what is left of the Federal Voting Rights Act.

By the Trump support Court it was supposed to protect a voting groups ability to elect candidates but this Commission proposed map will rob the African/American community of the biggest City the edge in the population of Detroit allowing carpet baggers from suburbs and Lansing to dictate policy where and how state and Federal funds are spent for so many necessary endeavors in our City.

For shame.

This is not what we sent you here to do.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 12.

>> My name is Marianne and live in hunting ton Woods Michigan.

I appreciate what you're doing Commissioners and as I delved into the maps, I cannot imagine the complexity of the work however today I want to focus on my State House District 21 on all of the maps.

The efficiency gap is between 5.7 and 7.4% this is definitely completely wrong.

If you keep in mind that many elections in our state are decided by less percentages than that, that needs to be reconsidered so first of all District 21 you drew part of 7 cities Detroit, Huntington Woods, Berkeley, Royal Oak, Oak Park, and Clawson, parts of all of these cities which amounts to an African/American population between 48-50% depending on the particular map. You have not drawn a majority minority District even though I believe that some of your work has been to do vertical as opposed to horizontal districts.

But this did not accomplish the goal of having any kind of minority majority districts so what I believe that you need to do is you need to create horizontal districts in the area between Woodward and green field north of 8 mile and the same thing, the same area south of 8 mile.

So this could give you a majority Black District.

Otherwise you will be totally disenfranchising the votes of Black Americans thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Commenters 13, 14, 15 and 16 may approach the microphone and number 13 when you reach the podium you are free to speak.

>> Good afternoon, Commission my name is Norman from Detroit.

I'm here today to ask you guys to make sure you are listening to the people out here in the community.

I understand that you guys have a tough job to do.

This is not my first time speaking to you guys.

And how you have done the districts using 35 percentage of how you are drawing is inaccurate based on the primary of what happened last year and Michigan has low primaries so I'm asking you to go back and redraw the maps not as fast as you can but as accurate as you can and increase it up to 50% and you get the accurate message you need out here.

Also think about the people you represent.

Hear what we are saying and not go by idly and hear what I say.

That is all I ask.

Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 14.

>> Hi can you hear? You got my thing on the screen.

Can you throw yours up Congressional up on the screen next to it before you start the clock.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: We are only able to share one map at a time.

>> Yeah, so this is the Congressional you know map I came up with.

It's not really the best option but at least it's something different this is Anthony in southwest Detroit and care about southwest and Down River.

Your Congressional maps have the same configuration throughout Apple, Birch, Cedar, Maple and V1RAS240 all use the same configuration for Congressional one and it's not the UP Commissioner Lange and Kellom when you were on the thing yesterday Congressional District one is right here in Detroit and they use the same for six out of your 7, 8 maps.

There was nothing methodical about it Commissioner Rothhorn and you said it was methodically drawn and we lean on the data and it drove us here.

I watched every meeting the data did not drive you to what you draw for Congressional District one for Detroit.

If I want to ride a bus from the bottom to the top, I have to make a transfer.

If I ride a bus from the bottom of mine where Down River is to the top, I can pick 3, 4, 5, 6 buses to take me all the way.

That is one basis by which I just came up with that.

And so you copied and pasted it.

Then Commissioner Eid you just switched out Warren for Romulus and that is different not really.

Commissioner Lange I appreciate you for at least trying to draw something different so please make wholesale change.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 15.

>> Nina from south Oakland.

In the State House and Senate maps two different communities of interest are being treated unfairly.

Specifically in District 110.

Every one of these maps divides.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Your 90 seconds is up.

Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 17, 18, 19 and 20 and number 17 when you reach the microphone you may begin speaking.

>> Hello Commissioners and thank you for your work.

I appreciate the effort to remove politics from the political process.

However, I also want to express my concerns of elimination of a District and possible of decreased representation of a minority community that needs it the most in Detroit.

My name is and my family and I live in the City of Rochester. I'm a member of the Sikh faith.

I'm here today to speak on behalf of my religious community in Oakland and Macomb Counties because we have not yet advocated for ourselves in this progress. As a smaller community we used to be together to amplify our voice and have our Congress person notice us as a constituency group.

Our concerns are not only for our own religious community, but the communities at large which we live in. That is why I'm supporting the Birch version of the draft map, which keeps the Sikh places of worship in Oakland, Macomb Counties together by keeping Troy, Rochester, Rochester Hills and Sterling Heights in one District.

We will see many comments from my community on the Birch map. I ask you to consider Michigan six of community of interest on the final Congressional map. Thank you for the opportunity to comment today.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 18.

>> This Commission was set up to prevent partisan fairness gerrymandering.

The members on this committee should be ashamed of the stacking cracking and packing these so called maps put forward and show.

People see through this.

How much influence has Alec had on Commissioners and the map, ALEC, how much influence have they had on you guys? Start over.

Those maps are garbage.

Go with the maps with the AFLCIO, promote the vote and the Showers, Schwartz maps.

Start with those and start over.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 19.

>> Good afternoon, Commission my name is Yvette Anderson.

We need you to draw maps that are 51% Black.

We know that you can draw better maps for Black Michiganders.

Honor the Voting Rights Act to ensure Black people are able to elect leaders that look like themselves.

Let's not return to the Jim crow politics of old.

Going from 17 majority Black districts to 0 is unacceptable.

It's important to me that Detroit be able to elect its own representatives and I'm not sure your maps will guaranty that.

Look at the AFLCIO fair maps project for ideas on how to get to partisan fairness while respecting real communities of interest.

Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 23.

>> I am Susan.

I live in northwest Detroit in north Rosedale Park and I'm a proud member of Congressional District 13.

I've lived in Detroit since 1975.

I know you have a very difficult job and I know you're doing it to the best of your ability.

However, the currently drawn map cracks my neighborhood and puts my neighborhood in a Congressional District combined with suburban Livonia which I think is 95 percentage white.

I and my neighbors in Detroit in this northwest Detroit are truly a community of interest and have different concerns and needs than suburban Livonia.

I know the intent of this map is not racist.

But it is functionally racist because it dilutes the Black vote.

And will decrease Black representation.

There are examples of maps that are fairer.

Check out the AFLCIO and one fair vote as possible guides.

I think it is incumbent upon you to draw maps that are fair for my neighbors or me and for all Detroiters.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 24.

>> My name is Rick blocker.

And excuse me.

I come today to ask again that you draw majority-minority maps and districts.

We have Black people in the State of Michigan representing 14% of the population.

We currently represent 12% of the people in the State Senate and the State House.

We represent six percent of people in the Congress of the United States.

Under your current proposal that number could be eliminated to no representatives in the Congressional and very few, if any, in the State House and State Senate.

You must do better.

We deserve fair representation.

The people in this area have fought hard.

We cannot go backwards.

We are sick and tired of being sick and tired.

We need fair maps now.

We need for you to stop, no excuses, draw fair maps.

Make sure we have Black representation.

If that current Congressional maps you have, neither one of them and I looked at all the maps on the portal goes to 50%.

If you have to go to other communities where Black people are to get 50%, you need to do so.

It is not acceptable for us to have the maps that does not reflect our community and does not protect Black people in this area.

Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Numbers 25, 26, 27, and 28 please approach the microphone and number 25 you can begin speaking. And just to orient people online watching proceedings, we are at 25 and at it for about 35 minutes.

We currently have 116 people signed up for in person public comment.

So it is likely that we will not get to online remote public comments before the 3:30 close and I think we are probably going to push a little past 3:30 to give people more time to speak so orient the people online we are 25 and have 116 in person.

Go ahead number 25.

>> Thank you, good afternoon, everyone my name is Michael and I'm here with my vice president Tonya Ray and Michelle Thomas and Pam Smith and other members of labor unions.

Michigan independent Redistricting Commission you are failing us.

Congress will not end the filibuster so John Lewis Voting Rights Act and freedom to vote act are laying in the waste land.

States right has been the excuse for not passing that legislation and it has been historically been the reason for the disenfranchise of Black Brown Jews and others and needs to focus on Michigan rights and do the right thing for the state and citizens.

Fair should be the benchmark your plan negates what fairness and voting democracy in the communities.

Your plan for the next ten years denies Black Brown in Michigan the opportunity to select representatives from their neighborhoods to send to Lansing, Washington or the school boards.

You can incorporate the AFLCIO maps project or the Michigan Black caucus or even come to the UAW or CBT and we will improve your product to present to the people that will provide racial justice and ensure nonpartisan fairness.

Do the right thing.

Do not put barriers on our boundaries and chains on our voting machines.

Please do not sell the citizens of Michigan by offering a youth that divides us and greatness and power of our democracy.

We all know the big lie.

We ask you today why.

We are asked to have maps on behalf of the politicians or the people in power.

We must protect the voice of people.

Do the right thing.

Listen, think and act.

Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 26.

>> Good afternoon my name is Carla Meijer and I'm from Troy and Oakland County.

New House District 32 which is all of Troy is perfect.

Thank you.

New Congressional District 6 not so much.

Troy and Oakland County share new districts with Macomb County.

I lived in Troy since the early 70s but I have always been employed in Oakland I'm sorry always been employed in Macomb County and I know we are not communities of common interest nor do we share common characteristics.

The new Congressional District 6 needs work.

It needs work.

As proposed currently proposed it weighs heavily republican.

Troy should be with Oakland County as proposed on the Juniper maps all other maps it's with Macomb and affiliates with Oakland County and school and library affiliations bus teams Commerce and our Oakland County water resource efforts and goes to Lake St. Clair and the City of St. Clair shores a Lake voting community with nothing similar to Troy.

My ask is that Troy and other Oakland cities that have been placed in CD6 be moved to neighboring CD3 it just makes sense.

Over all maps must be completely nonpartisan and must, must comply with the Voting Rights Act rules.

Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 27.

>> Good afternoon, Commissioners.

My name is Betty Edwards, I'm a lifelong Detroiter who has voted in every election since I was 18.

I'm a concerned citizen.

And also a member of Delta Sigma Theta sorority. It was created for Black people to elect representatives that look like them and of their choosing.

Your current maps crack Detroit and make this impossible by radically changing districts.

Today that means congresswoman Tali, Senator Stephanie Chang and Guise and rep Sarah Anthony's community should not be carved up into districts that do not keep their communities' interests together.

>> Good afternoon my name is Danielle Steven I'm a retired public servant, native Detroiter and member of multiple civic including Delta significant that and Detroit alumni chapter and Detroit Branch NAACP.

I thank you for this opportunity to provide comment again.

But after review of the maps you submitted, I do not believe they best represent the interests of African/American voters and they're about to select other African/Americans to represent them.

A report recently issued by the Michigan State University's institute for public policy and social research concludes that the methodology used by the Commission, quote, breaks apart the geographical compact Black majority in the City of Detroit dispensing them with less compact districts.

That radiate outward from the City of Detroit towards suburban parts Macomb County and Oakland County.

As a result this engineered partial dilution of concentrated Black vote the maps future 0 Black majority districts.

The purpose of the Voting Rights Act was to ensure equity and the ability for African/Americans to fully participate and a state with African/American population of 13.79 percentage there should be some consideration of our community.

We also point out the majority of this percentage resides in Southeast Michigan and in Detroit furthering our argument.

We strongly recommend that the Commission look to the promote the vote maps.

I have my full statement in the portal.

Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for doing that.

And to clarify we welcome people to also submit their statements into the portal particularly if you feel you don't have time to complete it or just in general because it gives us a written record and you can access that outside the room here there are people there who can assist you or go to the website at www.Michigan.gov/MICRC.

And you can submit your comments there as well.

Thank you, number 48.

>> Good afternoon Honorable Commissioner I'm Eddie McDonough and I think I'm your last speaker before we break.

I would just like to say I've been around for a little while.

70 years old.

I've had the opportunity of growing up in Pontiac.

But I have lived in Wayne County, I've lived in other parts of Oakland County and lived in Canton, I've lived in Farmington Hills, I've got a relatives all over Southeast Michigan.

The one thing that I know plain and simple is in all of my living whoever we chose to represent us were part of us from those various communities.

That needs to stay the same.

Speaking as respectfully and as candidly as possible we know the lawsuits are coming so why are we compromising on the integrity of this constitutional amendment.

I urge you not to compromise our chance at representation for the sake of numbers. As you know because of the lack of census representation there is no Federal protections, no Federal Voting Rights Act, no grant funding or research no recognition for Arab Americans and the battle for basic equity will be even harder because all the current maps will restrict the only opportunity to gain legislative representation.

The only avenue we have left for a voice.

I'm frustrated because we are making history at the local level with record numbers of Arabs voting and running for office and done what we are told to do on the table instead we are put at the menus.

   >> CHAIR SZETELA: Your allotted 90 seconds is up please conclude your statement.

   >> P6764 and P6762 which have been collectively drafted by our community thank you.

   >> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. .

Number 56.

   >> Okay looks like we don't have 56 so 57 if you want to go ahead.

   >> Hello, my name is Anthony Watkins.

And I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to share my important comments on the public hearing.

I would like to comment on how the Commission has gone from 17 majority Black districts primarily based in Detroit to 0.

That's a problem.

That is a serious problem.

The Detroit neighborhoods and communities should be drawn together.

Majority Black districts are important.

And we can draw them.

NAACP has drawn them.

Several community groups have drawn them.

Fellow Detroit citizens have drawn them.

But these maps need to be seriously looked at and seriously considered and not just request to be submitted.

So we are aware we can beat this and we are aware that we need to have this done.

Because districts do not have a majority of Blacks.

In large part having elected Black individuals.

Black issues are important.

And led by Black people.

And it's Black people continuously able to lead on these issues.

I thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Numbers 58, 59, 60 and 61.

>> What number are you sir?

>> 59.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: I don't see 58 so go ahead number 59.

>> I'm Percy Johnson, UAW cap chairman, Local 22.

I'm also a member of liberty temple Baptist church.

We were involved with getting the petitions for you guys to be able to have the position that you have today.

And I need you to get me out of the hot seat because right now the encouragement that I gave our voters in Detroit and people who signed the petition and were willing to participate and be in one of your you know we took names of people to also be a Commission in our church and union halls.

And they were encouraged this will give them a chance to have a fair vote to represent their communities.

And we, seriously I got over 8, 900 signatures on our petitions for this to be on the ballot.

And 90% of them were Detroiters.

So please I'm asking you to please give Detroiters a 50% or plus better to represent their vote when they vote.

So to weaken them and give them a weak vote would hurt them.

I'm from Troy but yet I know if I see -- when I see something that is not justly done or unfair, I'm going to speak up for them and represent them.

My heart and soul is in Detroit and Detroit deserves to have fair, good representation and they can't get it if you take away their strength of their vote.

Give them a 51 plus vote.

Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 60.

>> All right we will move on to 61, 62, 63, 64 and just in case there is in I confusion it's my understanding when people were first arriving that people who were higher than 50 were told we might not get to them.

So I'm keeping track of everyone who is not here so if those people happen to show up at 5:00 you will be given a chance to speak.

So I don't want people to think because they are not here, we won't give you a chance to speed because I know some people were given that guidance what number are you ma'am.

>> 64.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: 54.

>> No 64.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: 61, 62 or 63.

It has the second largest Asian community of any City and Township behind Troy which you basically kept whole in the State House and it's 28 percentage Asian and the number has risen significantly over the decade and projected to grow.

African/American voters which I agree with the folks in the room we need more of and better off there are few communities in Michigan that have large populations of color from different racial backgrounds like Hispanic and Asian community.

I want the Commissioner to consider Novi and Troy has significant Asian population and this community should be kept whole to keep it intact and elect districts that we can select a candidate of choice.

I think the map that has gone the most right direction is the one that is proposed by Commissioner Szetela for the State House.

But it's missing several Novi and precincts out to livings ton county and for Ann for partisan fairness and do not include it with Livingston County and I would take Commissioner Szetela and swap precincts in lion Township for remaining in Novi it does not deserve to be split three ways and have much with Livingston County border and increases the Asian share of population and fits within the population deviation I did double check.

Thank you for your time and being here to take comments.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. At this time I'll call up 66, 67, 68 and 69 and 66 as soon as you reach the microphone you can start speaking.

>> Good afternoon my name is Reno, 892 out of Saline Michigan and asking the Commission to withdraw the maps so it's fair for democrats and republicans the entire purpose of the independent redistrict Commission is making things fair.

And their work is not complete until they have maps that are fair across the board. I'm also asking for the Ypsilanti centric districts Ypsilanti voters should not have their voices silenced by getting packed into the shadow of Ann Arbor. It's okay if they have Ypsilanti and only a portion of Ann Arbor share districts. But they should not have Ypsilanti and all of Ann Arbor packed together.

This is because Ypsilanti is a major population centered with different demographics than Ann Arbor.

Some newer maps made the split and hope they will follow through. Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 67.

>> Hello, my name is Yancey and representing 892 and concerned how you sliced Detroit into thin strips and put with heavy white areas in the suburban.

The democratic Commissioners and in particular need to stay strong and veto any unfair maps until we get fairness.

And under 13 Commissioners should approve any maps that has a boundless advantage to a particular party.

All of the maps so far have been approved by democrats of the Commission and all of them favor the republic party.

Where is the fairness in that? The fairness is a priority above all local boundaries and compactness.

Do not be afraid to unpack the City.

And by doing so it may make a weird shape in the map but that is okay.

What is not okay if the map does not represent Michigan, it's important Detroit be able to elect its own representative and I'm not sure your maps warrant that.

I believe Detroiters should be represented by Detroiters who understand their concerns. Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Number 68 or 69. Do we have number 70, 71, 72 or 73? If you could just let me know your number, ma'am.

73 thank you.

>> Hi, I'm Sherri from Livingston County and while as I listen to the people speaking here today, I realize I don't have as much on the line as many of them.

So I'm hoping that you all take it to heart and listen to what these people are saying.

As a member of the League of Women Voters, I was very strong support of the independent redistricting committee.

And my -- I do live in a currently horribly gerrymandered District that has taken away my voice and my community.

And although the maps are significantly better than they were, they are still skewed in the U.S. Congress and the Senate to favor the GOP by 5-8%.

That's not good enough.

We want fair maps.

The partisan fairness is one of the criteria in the Michigan Constitution.

And I hope you all take that to heart.

Basic principle is that the party that receives the most votes statewide should receive the most seats in the Michigan legislature.

I would urge you to look again at the AFLCIO and the one fair vote maps.

And I'm requesting that you please make partisan fairness a priority in your map. Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. A call for 70, 71 and 72 what number are you ma'am?

>> 74.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Go ahead.

>> My name is Ethyl.

I'm a resident of White Lake Michigan in northern Oakland County.

I want to mention that I appreciate the work you're doing.

>> I'm number 95 and I'm a republican and did not vote for proposal two but people of the state did and it's the law of the land and a process that has to go forward and so I commend you for doing work but your work needs work and the one thing you failed to do or at least not at the start but as you got going and sort of listened to your experts first of all Voting Rights Act expert I think I would fire your first order of business after these hearings should be to fire the voting rights expert because he has it dead wrong that is why this community here is dissected as bad as. It has been smashed like a toothpaste tube all over southeast Michigan and I think that is wrong.

But you stopped looking at people and stopped looking at communities and started looked at numbers on a spreadsheet. And all you wanted to do is come up with numbers on the spreadsheet. From the partisan fairness you are. And you couldn't have over 40% African/American in any District, so on and so forth. And then you started dividing things up. And I just want to point out District 15 on the State House map, which begins Schoolcraft and Greenfield in Detroit, an area I grew up very close to. And goes through Oak Park, Berkley, Southfield Township, Bloomfield Township and Birmingham and ends at Long Pine and Loser.

Schoolcraft and Greenfield have very little, if nothing in common with Long Pine and Loser, so get back to work and understand politics.

I know you were not supposed to be involved, and it's clear you weren't. So get back to work and draw fair districts and draw African/American districts. It needs to be done.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Sir. If you would like to go ahead and speak and let me know what number you are as well, that will be helpful.

>> Hi. Excuse me. My name is Bruce.
My number is 101.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: We can't hear you it's okay to take your mask off while speaking in the microphone.

>> With the mask.
How you doing my name is Bruce I want to thank the Commission for letting me speak today and I'm blind and I see clearly what is going on with redistrict.
And y'all can see but y'all are blind.
My parents came here from Georgia and Tennessee.
I represent Detroit and northwest area.
And I'm going to speak for the kids that don't have a vote that we are supposed to represent they are our future and for y'all to have districts where I'm not represented by my color and my community, I hope y'all do the right thing and represent the minorities and people of Detroit and the people of my District to represent me and the kids who can't speak for themselves.
I am grateful to see everybody coming out to let you all know how we feel about Districting stuff here.

Exhibit 9

Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC)

From:	Pastula, Julianne (MICRC)
Sent:	Wednesday, October 20, 2021 10:12 PM
To:	Pastula, Julianne (MICRC)
Subject:	Privileged & Confidential: VRA/Partisan Fairness

Follow Up Flag:	Follow up
Flag Status:	Flagged

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Dear Commissioners and Staff,

Congratulations on a very successful first public hearing! As expected, many of the comments centered around the VRA and partisan fairness. Many speakers advocated for strong consideration of the MDP backed AFL-CIO and Promote the Vote maps which are based on criteria and methodologies that are simply not in the MI Constitution (resulting in partisan fairness numbers so different from the MICRC maps which adhered to the MI Constitution and still score very well).

I circulated a privileged and confidential summary prepared by Bruce Adelson in regard to the Voting Rights Act on October 14th. Under MI law, this memorandum (which is an attorney-client communication) can serve as a basis to convene a closed session. This would enable the MICRC to have a frank and direct discussion with their legal counsel in regard to the memo and address the issues surrounding VRA compliance in more detail. This would benefit the MICRC by having one conversation where all members present hear the same information at the same time, benefit from hearing questions of your colleagues and, more importantly, receiving the answers and legal advice from your team. This is a far more effective communication option than one-on-one conversations which lack the depth or breadth of a collective conversation.

If the Commission would like to pursue this option, coordination of this conversation would be needed to facilitate participation of remote members and preparation of the appropriate script to satisfy the legal requirements of holding closed session in MI. This could be arranged in very short order.

Please do not hesitate to reach out with any questions or concerns.

Sincerely,

Julianne Pastula
General Counsel
State of Michigan
Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission
517.331.6318
PastulaJ1@Michigan.gov

Exhibit 10

Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC)

From:	Pastula, Julianne (MICRC)
Sent:	Monday, October 18, 2021 10:07 AM
To:	Pastula, Julianne (MICRC)
Subject:	Privileged & Confidential Information and Update

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Good morning Commissioners and Staff!

Congratulations on all of your hard work to date. As we move into the second round of public hearings and the final deliberation/adjustment period I wanted to provide the following information and reminders:

- Please do not respond to comments in the portal. Similar to the presentations, this creates a record that will give your opponents the ammunition for your sworn deposition and trial testimony on your intent and rationale for your mapping selections and on whom you chose to engage.
- Some individual Commissioner maps were submitted after 10 am deadline on Thursday due to ongoing software and data issues. Given each of your individual constitutional rights to submit maps and the difficulty in resolving technical issues for some Commissioners, I strongly recommend any maps received after the deadline be welcomed by the Commission. In addition, the Constitution does not empower the Commission to reject these individual commissioner maps. All published collaborative and individual maps will receive feedback from the public and vetting by the Commission itself.
- Another language reminder:
  - The rationale provided during the deliberations and adjustment period must be very specific and provide the legal justifications your mapping decisions. The privileged and confidential document titled *Legal Considerations and Discussion of Justifications Re: Criteria* circulated on October 7th provides appropriate legal guidance. The compliance tracking form can also assist in capturing rationale and must be completed for each final map. This rationale is the basis for your decisions that will be highlighted in court (used to challenge or support your work), as has happened with other state commissions, such as in Arizona. Remember, Arizona's transparent, thorough compliance justifications enabled the Arizona Commission to successfully defend all its maps, achieve DOJ preclearance for the first time in state history, and win 9-0 before the US Supreme Court. Let's follow their lead and match their track record.
  - During the post public hearing deliberation and adjustment period (only 8 days) it is appropriate to highlight that you are responding to public comments, looking to unite/reunite communities of interest and/or increasing diversity. Statements about eliminating blacks or adding whites cannot be made at the table or placed on the public record. There is already too much on the record that can be used against the Commission's work taken out of context and without full appreciation of the MICRC's process.

- It is critical for compliance with the 5th criteria (districts shall not favor/disfavor incumbents or candidates) that Commissioners not consider, know, discuss, analyze, look at, listen to or otherwise allow incumbent information to infiltrate your process, deliberations or work product.
- I would urge the Commission to avoid hyperbole and personal attacks during deliberation and adjustment period. As expected, criticism and attempts to split the Commission into factions will be increasing, particularly during the public hearings.
- If you choose to speak to the media, please remember Friday's great PR training sessions by Edward and Mike (which also reinforced the Subsection 11 messaging that started in January). In addition to "I don't know" or "playing it by ear" and giving an answer that could potentially damage the ongoing work of the MICRC, an appropriate answer can reference legal advice given or redirect to your lawyers (Edward always reaches out to me and I anticipate Mike would not hesitate to as well). By design, the Commission is comprised of 13 regular citizens that should not be expected to have a command of a body of law dating back to the 1960s.
- If you would like to discuss the contents of the Privileged & Confidential VRA memo circulated on October 14th Bruce and I are available to you. We are concerned that the misinformed media narrative will result in additional complications in the Commission's compliance with the VRA. Remember the MICRC has been consistent in its data driven process. The draft proposed maps are based on RBV analysis and the law. Creating districts with overwhelmingly minority or "safe" districts is not supported by either the data or the law. This media narrative is being advanced by lobbyists and politicians driving emotion in a very sensitive and critical area.

PLEASE consult with your lawyers if you have any questions, concerns, or uncertainties. Our job and ethical obligation is to advise and guide you through this final, more difficult mapping phase.

Sincerely,

Julianne Pastula
General Counsel
State of Michigan
Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission
517.331.6318
PastulaJ1@Michigan.gov

Exhibit 11

From:	Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC)
Sent:	Wednesday, December 15, 2021 10:10 PM
To:	Pastula, Julianne (MICRC); Lett, Steven (MICRC); Rothhorn, MC (MICRC); Woods, Edward (MICRC); Hammersmith, Suann (MICRC); Clark, Douglas (MICRC); Kellom, Brittni (MICRC); Orton, Cynthia (MICRC)
Subject:	Re: P&C: Update on Proposed Legislation

Julianne:

I do not appreciate you attempting to put words in my mouth. I did not say I no longer have concerns. In fact, I have grave concerns regarding your conduct.

Specifically, I am deeply concerned to have learned that you personally became aware of critical issues with Dr. Handley's VRA analysis earlier this week and, in addition to not notifying the Commission about this alarming development, have also directed staff members, vendors, and the SOS not to alert Commissioners as to the issue until the week of December 28th - almost two weeks away. It's my understanding that Dr. Handley has informed you, staff, vendors, and members of the SOS that her analysis was deeply flawed and that, as a result of her flawed analysis, not a single one of our Senate maps are VRA compliant. Accordingly, the Commission will likely need to redraw and republish, at a minimum, our Senate maps with BVAP numbers closer to 45-48%, which will require significant map revisions. The alternative is for us to approve non-VRA compliant maps and let our lawyers attempt to defend them, which would be an affront to this entire process.

This information should have immediately been communicated to the Commission and certainly should have been placed on the agenda for tomorrow. The fact that you have instructed other staff members and the SOS to not disclose this information to the Commission for a further two weeks is outrageous and is a perfect example of you exceeding the scope of your duties and making decisions that should be made by the Commission. As an attorney, you have an ethical obligation to keep your client informed. Squirreling away critical information for weeks and hiding it from the client does not satisfy this obligation.

In addition, it's my understanding that you were hoping to conceal this information from the public by having yet another closed session the week of the 28th, which contradicts our mission, vision, and values.

I was planning on discussing this situation with you in person in the morning to encourage you to share this information immediately with Commissioners. Unfortunately, your email made me reconsider that path.

See you in the morning.

Rebecca

From: Pastula, Julianne (MICRC) <PastulaJ1@michigan.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, December 15, 2021 8:59 PM
To: Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC); Lett, Steven (MICRC); Rothhorn, MC (MICRC); Woods, Edward (MICRC); Hammersmith, Suann (MICRC)
Cc: Clark, Douglas (MICRC)
Subject: RE: P&C: Update on Proposed Legislation

Dear Rebecca,

My offer to connect was in response to your statement during the Dec 2nd meeting that I had stepped outside of my role as General Counsel. I was confused by those allegations. I'm glad to hear it's no longer a concern and I look forward to seeing you in the morning.

Sincerely,

Julianne Pastula
General Counsel
State of Michigan
Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission
517.331.6318
PastulaJ1@Michigan.gov

From: Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC) <SzetelaR@michigan.gov>
Sent: Monday, December 13, 2021 11:57 AM
To: Pastula, Julianne (MICRC) <PastulaJ1@michigan.gov>; Lett, Steven (MICRC) <LettS@michigan.gov>; Rothhorn, MC (MICRC) <RothhornM@michigan.gov>; Woods, Edward (MICRC) <WoodsE3@michigan.gov>; Hammersmith, Suann (MICRC) <HammersmithS@michigan.gov>
Cc: Clark, Douglas (MICRC) <ClarkD32@michigan.gov>
Subject: RE: P&C: Update on Proposed Legislation

Julianne:

Thank you for your note. While I appreciate your offer to connect, I don't believe there are any issues we need to discuss at this time? If there is something in particular you are concerned about that I am unaware of, you are certainly free to reach out to me at my number below. Keep in mind I am back to working full time and may be tied up in meetings, so please leave a message if you call and I don't answer.

Rebecca Szetela
Commissioner
Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission
szetelar@michigan.gov
(517) 898-9366

>> CHAIR SZETELA: As Chair of the Commission, we will bring the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission to order at 5:00 p.m.

This Zoom webinar is being live streamed on YouTube at the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission on the YouTube channel.

For anyone in the public watching who would prefer to watch via a different platform than they are currently using, please visit our social media at Redistricting MI to find the link for viewing on YouTube.

Our live stream today includes closed captioning. Closed captioning, ASL interpretation, and Spanish and Arabic and Bengali translation services will be provided for effective participation in this meeting. Please E-mail us at Redistricting@Michigan.Gov for additional viewing options or details on accessing language translation services for this meeting.

People with disabilities or needing other specific accommodations should also contact Redistricting at Michigan.gov.

This meeting is also being recorded and will be available at www.Michigan.gov/MICRC for viewing at a later date and this meeting also is being transcribed and those closed captioned transcriptions will be made available and posted on Michigan.gov/MICRC along with the written public comment submissions.

There is also a public comment portal that may be accessed by visiting Michigan.gov/MICRC, this portal can be utilized to post maps and comments which can be viewed by both the Commission and the public.

Members of the media who may have questions before, during or after the meeting should direct those questions to Edward Woods III, our Communications and Outreach Director for the Commission at WoodsE3@Michigan.gov or 517-331-6309.

For the purposes of the public watching and for the public record I will now turn to the Department of State staff to take note of the Commissioners present.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Good Evening, Commissioners.

Please say present when I call your name. If you are attending the meeting remotely, please disclose you are present and you are attending remotely.

I will call on Commissioners in alphabetical order starting with Doug Clark.

>> COMMISSIONER CLARK: Present.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Juanita Curry.

>> COMMISSIONER CURRY: Attending from Detroit Michigan.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Anthony Eid?

People are represented in our legislatures, not geography.

My second concern is about partisan fairness.

As was discussed before too.

We need you to reconsider the maps that are currently drawn to ensure that this principle is applied.

I understand that the current drafts are pretty much all leaning towards one party.

And that's the republicans.

This is contrary to the criteria established for the Commission and cannot stand.

Those elected from such districts whether they are one party or the other dominant will not feel as compelled to take into consideration conflicting sets of opinions and to be willing to compromise on legislation.

And that's what we have going on now.

Now, this is a major reason why many of us voted for the proposition, so we are asking you to please work harder on this point. Thank you.

   >> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission.

Number five.

   >> Hi, can you hear me all right? Is this good? Hey, everyone, my name is Max and live in Wayne County and thank you to the Commission I know this task is complicated and difficult and thank you for your time and dedication on it.

I was here this afternoon and compelled to respond to something.

The Commission was told they cannot use partisan data while making the maps.

But I just want to say that is nowhere in our state Constitution.

That prohibits saying that you cannot use partisan data while making your maps.

I do understand there are some partisan fairness measures such as the efficiency gap that you need a full complete statewide map of districts to use.

But let's not kid ourselves.

The current draft maps as they stand are heavily favored towards one party over the other and tomorrow's analysis is going to show that.

So the question I have for the Commission is: How are we supposed to un-gerrymander the current draft maps if we are not able to use partisan data while you are actually making the maps themselves? I know there was a lot of fun metaphors earlier this afternoon I want to try one for myself.

This is like saying that the Constitution is requiring you to bake a cake and yet you are also being told the Constitution prohibits you from measuring ingredients or taste testing the batter that you simply are supposed to put it in the oven and hope it turns out great.

Which it begs the question then what? Like what are you supposed to do for the next cake do you want to guess and check and do trial and error? To me it sound like a waste of cake baking and map drawing time.

Just like everyone else I want a delicious slice of fair constitutional cake.

Exhibit 13

From:	Pastula, Julianne (MICRC)
Sent:	Wednesday, October 6, 2021 7:12 PM
To:	kbrace@aol.com
Cc:	Hammersmith, Suann (MICRC); Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC); Rothhorn, MC (MICRC); Reinhardt, Sarah (MDOS); Badelson1
Subject:	Partisan Data/Partisan Fairness Measures
Importance:	High

Dear Kim,

We urgently need to have a telephone conference this evening to address this issue. The manner in which the partisan data is being presented does not assist the Commission in determining how and where to make focused adjustments to districts. The "trial and error" approach being employed today is far too time consuming and does not have any cognizable methodology. Even worse the time spent is not resulting in productive improvements. Given that the Commission only has 3 days left to finalize its draft proposed maps this must be addressed immediately.

On or about August 6th, I expressed concern with the display of partisan data as the Commissioners were focusing on the displayed political data and because we don't have competitiveness as a criteria, drawing with partisan data was inappropriate. At the time, you indicated it could be "hidden" leading me to believe it is in the active matrix. We need to discuss a more productive way forward so the Commission can interact with partisan data in a more meaningful and time efficient way.

I have taken the liberty of sending an invite for 8:30 pm. I acknowledge you are traveling to the East coast, please advise an alternate time this evening is needed.

Sincerely,

Julianne Pastula
General Counsel
State of Michigan
Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission
517.331.6318
PastulaJ1@Michigan.gov

Exhibit 14

From:	Pastula, Julianne (MICRC)
Sent:	Sunday, October 3, 2021 9:49 PM
To:	Kim Brace
Cc:	Hammersmith, Suann (MICRC); Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC); jmorgan4@cox.net; wkstigall@gmail.com
Subject:	RE: Plan to Score

Dear Kim,

I am available to discuss tomorrow. I will be remote in the morning/early afternoon so it may be best to connect when I arrive in person or after the meeting - depending on Sue's availability of course!

Also, can you please confirm Polsby-Popper in in the software. If so, does the report display individual district scores as well as the plan min/max/median/standard deviation?

Thanks,

Julianne Pastula
General Counsel
State of Michigan
Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission
517.331.6318
PastulaJ1@Michigan.gov

From: Kim Brace <kbrace@aol.com>
Sent: Sunday, October 3, 2021 9:22 PM
To: Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC) <SzetelaR@michigan.gov>; jmorgan4@cox.net; wkstigall@gmail.com
Cc: Kim Brace <kbrace@aol.com>; Hammersmith, Suann (MICRC) <HammersmithS@michigan.gov>; Pastula, Julianne (MICRC) <PastulaJ1@michigan.gov>
Subject: Re: Plan to Score

Rebecca -- OK, your plan is uploaded and viewable by the public on the MyDistricting site..

Attached is also the report on political fairness that I ran on your plan.

Sue & Julianne -- One of the things that staff and I need to discuss on Monday is how much of some of the additional reports do you want to unveil. Like this political fairness report there are a bunch of other data, tables and reports that are possible in EDGE, but we should talk about what do we want to release.

Thanks

Kimball Brace
Election Data Services, Inc.
6171 Emerywood Ct
Manassas, VA 20112-3078
(202) 789-2004 or (703) 580-7267 <-- landline
Fax: 703-580-6258
Cell: 202-607-5857
KBrace@aol.com or KBrace@electiondataservices.com
www.electiondataservices.com

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-----Original Message-----
From: Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC) <SzetelaR@michigan.gov>
To: Kim Brace <kbrace@aol.com>; jmorgan4@cox.net <jmorgan4@cox.net>; wkstigall@gmail.com
<wkstigall@gmail.com>
Cc: Kim Brace <kbrace@aol.com>
Sent: Sun, Oct 3, 2021 7:20 pm
Subject: Re: Plan to Score

Yes, unveil it

From: Kim Brace <kbrace@aol.com>
Sent: Sunday, October 3, 2021 7:13:01 PM
To: Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC) <SzetelaR@michigan.gov>; jmorgan4@cox.net <jmorgan4@cox.net>;
wkstigall@gmail.com <wkstigall@gmail.com>
Cc: Kim Brace <kbrace@aol.com>
Subject: Re: Plan to Score

Hey Rebecca --

    Will do, now that I'm in our Lansing hotel.

    Dustin sent me a CD plan he worked on yesterday, and Sue wanted me to upload it to our
MyDistrictinng site for the public. Are you ok with unveiling your plan?

Let me know.

Thanks

Kimball Brace
Election Data Services, Inc.
6171 Emerywood Ct
Manassas, VA 20112-3078
(202) 789-2004 or (703) 580-7267 <-- landline
Fax: 703-580-6258
Cell: 202-607-5857
KBrace@aol.com or KBrace@electiondataservices.com
www.electiondataservices.com

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-----Original Message-----
From: Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC) <SzetelaR@michigan.gov>
To: Kim Brace <kbrace@aol.com>; John Morgan <jmorgan4@cox.net>; Kent Stigall <wkstigall@gmail.com>
Sent: Sun, Oct 3, 2021 6:38 pm
Subject: Plan to Score

Can you run this through the software and send back the spreadsheet reflecting the Partisan Balance scores? Thanks!

Rebecca Szetela
Commissioner
Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission
szetelar@michigan.gov
(517) 898-9366

Exhibit 15

From:	Pastula, Julianne (MICRC)
Sent:	Monday, October 4, 2021 7:23 PM
To:	Rothhorn, MC (MICRC); Szetela, Rebecca (MICRC)
Cc:	Badelson1
Subject:	P&C: Congressional Map Considerations

Importance:	High

Dear Rebecca and MC,

Bruce and I have reached back out to ███████ in an effort to get context on his map submissions. Given that his initial map analyzed by Dr. Handley received near perfect scores, why should he try to better what is arguably incomparable, particularly if subsequent maps do not score as well as the initial analyzed map. Our concern is that the map was influenced by partisan data or considerations that are not allowed under MI criteria. While it is clear the AFL/CIO maps were drawn focused on partisan data (both competitiveness and proportionality by districts) to better their overall partisan fairness scores (also near perfect) – this cannot taint the Commission's collaborative work. A map that does not follow the criteria can never be "better" than those that do.

Bruce and I remain steadfast in our recommendation to ████████ that he not advance his map we discussed with him last week and strongly encouraged him to submit any desired drafts as an individual Commissioner map, not insert it into the collaborative pool.

Please do not hesitate to reach out with any questions or concerns.

Sincerely,

Julianne Pastula
General Counsel
State of Michigan
Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission
517.331.6318
PastulaJ1@Michigan.gov

>> CHAIR SZETELA: As Chair of the Commission, I call the meeting of the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission to order at 10:06 a.m.

This Zoom webinar is being live streamed on YouTube at Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission YouTube channel.

For anyone in the public watching who would prefer to watch via a different platform than they are currently using, please visit our social media at Redistricting MI.

Our live stream today includes closed captioning. Closed captioning, ASL interpretation, and Spanish and Arabic and Bengali translation services will be provided for effective participation in this meeting. Please E-mail us at Redistricting.gov or details for language translation services for this meeting.

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Members of the media who may have questions before, during or after the meeting should direct those questions to Edward Woods III, our Communications and Outreach Director for the Commission at WoodsE3@Michigan.gov or 517-331-6309.

For the purposes of the public watching and for the public record I will now turn to the Department of State staff to take note of the Commissioners present.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Good morning, Commissioners. please say present when I call your name. If you are attending the meeting remotely, please disclose you are attending remotely and as well as your physical location you are attending from.
I will call on Commissioners in alphabetical order starting with Doug Clark.

>> COMMISSIONER CLARK: Present.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Juanita Curry.

>> COMMISSIONER CURRY: I'm present, attending remotely from Detroit Michigan.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Anthony Eid?
Brittini Kellom?

>> COMMISSIONER KELLOM: Present, attending remotely from Detroit, Michigan.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Rhonda Lange?

My name is mark Payne a resident of Detroit, I ask that the vote process you have established be adhered to on the actual vote so the public can witness a transparent conclusion to your work.

In addition these lines will last ten years and have a lasting impact.

You can still do better especially on the State House maps Hickory is least bad but you can do better for Michigan taking a little bit more time drafting.

Please take more time to additionally address our ability to elect candidates of choice and assure compliance with the voter rights act z, as a voting rights expert Handley says in 2C we compile election results where all draft districts can be used whether your proposed will provide minority voters with the opportunity to elect.

No mention of this however no mention of this being done is made.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Next in line is number 28, Nicole Bedi.

>> Hi everyone.

My name is Nicole Bedi from Birmingham I'm in support of the Birch Congressional map.

We are part of the congregation of a Sikh technical of Rochester Hills.

You heard a lot from my community earlier in the process we support the Birch map because it keeps together the neighborhoods of Sterling Heights Troy and Rochester Hills so that our religious community as well as the south Asian cultural community can be a constituency with member of Congress.

I've been following this process really closely and I've actually taken the time to tally the pins on the portal.

And I want you to pay attention to the fact that there are actually 1500 comments between the Birch and Chestnut maps where 67% of comments are positive on the Birch map where only 55% are positive on or green on the Chestnut map.

There has been a lot of T attention on these verbal comments like mine organized by groups but a ton of individuals do not have the luxury to take time away.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for addressing the Commission. Next in line is number 29, Claudia Warren.

>> Good morning.

Good morning, Commissioners and thank you for your service in this extremely important process.

I am one of the many Voters Not Politicians volunteers residing in Midland County.

We collected 21,000 signatures to get proposal two on the ballot.

50-60% of Midland County voters approved proposal two.

50-60% of Midland County voters understood that Michigan's redistricting process was rigging the election in favor of one party.

In Midland County and in the rest of the state we all witnessed what happens when one party dominates with a closed mindset.

Comments, thoughts? Views? Cheerleading for your plan? Commissioner Eid?

>> COMMISSIONER EID: Well, in my opinion I think the Chestnut plan is the one we should adopt.

I see it as kind of a compromise between all of the plans that we have.

For example, you know we have Ottawa County and Apple it's not split at all.

And Birch it's split twice.

Chestnut there is a compromise and only split once with part of it going in the lower District and the other half going in the Grand Rapids-Muskegon District.

Likewise I see a compromise in Midland County.

And this map almost all of Midland is kept whole except for a few sparsely populated Townships that only have about 9500 people in them total.

Which is less than some single precincts in the more populated areas of the state.

And I see that as a compromise because most of that County is kept whole.

And finally I think the next biggest difference is the BVAP is a little bit higher on districts 12 and 13 in Metro Detroit.

They are at about I believe they are, I will find it out now, they are about 45 and 43.8%.

Which are just a couple of percentage points higher on Birch and Apple configuration.

And finally I think while it wasn't made to be this way, I would ends up shaking out is it also has more competitive districts than Apple or Birch.

So I think it's the best one.

I think that is what we should adopt.

And I also like Commissioner Szetela's individual map.

And I also like Birch.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Any additional discussion? Rhonda, I can't see you Commissioner Wagner I can't see you, miss Reinhardt?

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Thank you.

Per the Commission's adopted final vote procedure, if you're entering into step two for U.S. Congressional, the first step or step 2A states a motion will be made that each Commission shall state the top plans under consideration and then proceed into discussion after disclosure of your top two favorite plans.

Did you hear me okay? Do you want to repeat it.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for the reminder I would entertain a motion for Commissioners to state their top two favorites among the Congressional plans.

Motion made by Commissioner Eid and seconded by Commissioner Witjes is there any discussion or debate on the motion? Hearing none let's vote we have a motion by Eid and seconded by Commissioner Witjes to request that Commissioners identify their top two favorite Congressional plans all in favor please raise your hands and say aye.

Opposed raise your hands and say nay.

>> COMMISSIONER LANGE: Nay.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Commissioner Lange.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: No, we are not voting at this point, identifying the top two favorite maps and move into a discussion.

And per our planned document we are supposed to do it in alphabetical order so starting with collaboratives that would be in Apple.

Is there any discussion or debate on the Apple?

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Commissioner Wagner for your reference, in the voting procedure document, the final vote procedure we are moving into 2B which the Commission will discuss each published plan for the District type under consideration in alphabetical order.

>> COMMISSIONER WAGNER: Thank you.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: I'm not seeing any hands on the Apple.

Okay, do you want to talk about the Birch, any comments about the Birch? Commissioner Rothhorn?

>> VICE CHAIR ROTHHORN: So I think the reason I'm choosing Birch is because there has been in the southeast Michigan area it's the most populated area.

And I guess concerned about the way that and recognizing that Grand Rapids is our second most populated City.

But with I believe Detroit and then I think Warren and Sterling Heights it has the top four cities are the most populated area and I think Birch treats that area that the communities of interest that are preserved or the community of interest that we heard from during our process are most reflected in that Birch map.

I recognize that it's not perfect as many have said.

But that is why because it's the most populated area that has the most communities of interest, the most diverse communities of interest preserved that is why I'm leaning towards Birch.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Commissioner Witjes then Commissioner Clark then Commissioner Lett.

>> COMMISSIONER WITJES: I'm basing my decision I know we are talking about Birch here for a good second but going to hit two birds with one stone.

1 I'm taking my own personal beliefs here out of almost everything we are doing when coming to voting. There has been an overwhelmingly positive response to Chestnut. More so than Birch.

So that would be the reason why I put Chestnut above Birch however both maps are decent.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Commissioner Clark?

>> COMMISSIONER CLARK: Yeah, and I'd like to talk about Birch and Chestnut together.

2 The reason I selected Chestnut was I felt it had more swing districts that depending who the candidates are I could go republican or democrat and that is one of the things we

heard from the public a lot, they used the word competitiveness and I just associated that word with the way Anthony configured this.

So I think that's a very positive thing and something the public talked about quite a bit.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Commissioner Lett?

>> COMMISSIONER LETT: Yeah, I agree with Commissioner Clark and Commissioner Witjes.

3 Clearly the sentiment from the public was for Chestnut.

Really without many reservations at all as I recall.

And it seems I recall that people would say you know Birch looks good but Chestnut looks better.

And number two I think our deliberations as we develop Birch and develop Chestnut, I think we made the corrections to the Birch that provided us with Chestnut and therefore I believe that is the one that should be voted in.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Okay, so I have some comments on this.

I think in terms of the public comment it's been frankly equal and actually favors the Birch and that was something I believe Chris Andrews mentioned today that when you tally that 67% of the comments related to the Birch are positive 55% of the comments related to Chestnut are so I think the Birch actually has more favorable comments.

I think the Chestnut in particular it wasn't something that we drew as a collaborative map.

It was something this Commissioner Eid did on his own and adopting it and making it a collaborative map.

Unlike the Birch where we did draw it in live meetings and discussed at length what we were doing and why we were doing it we never had that sort of background with the Chestnut and I think you see that reflected the in the communities of interest on the two maps because for the Birch we have particular configurations particularly Detroit and Oakland County where we have you know little jut outs here and there and done with a deliberate purple and we went through the communities of interest.

We were specifically discussing the Bengali and Asian and Chaldean, the Hispanic communities, the Arab and Muslim in Dearborn in particular and really trying to preserve those communities of interest and we ended up with the lines we drew.

Where I feel the Chestnut disease not preserve those communities of interest in the same way and I think from a defensibility perspective that makes it difficult to go in and say Yeah, we considered the Bengali in Birch we carved out its own District for it yet we completely threw that in the dumpster when it came to Chestnut.

If it was important for us to incorporate in the Birch it should have been incorporated in the Chestnut as well and a big weakness with the plan.

I feel that is a big weakness that a lot of people have identified with the Chestnut in particular including outside entities that have looked at both maps.

Have consistently rated the Chestnut as being the lowest on communities of interest in terms of taking those into account.

And I think that is concerning because we have the Birch which does well with communities of interest.

We have the Apple which does well with the communities of interest then we have the third ranked which is the Chestnut.

So I think if you are looking at all things being equal which they mostly are because the public impression of it is equal if slightly favoring Birch and we have different metrics we are looking at.

Whether it be population, whether it be efficiency gap, whether it be mean median. They are pretty equal.

And so the big differentiating factor for me is the COIs and we have one map that I think does a really good job of respecting the COIs and in addition to that was well documented as to why we were doing that.

And very open to the public then we have another map that frankly I think compromises COIs.

In favor of competitiveness which is not even one of our constitutional criteria.

Nowhere in our constitutional criteria is competitiveness and I'm sure our General Counsel will jump in on that point so that is not something we should be considering as a factor.

And when people are asking us to consider that they are asking us to deviate from the 7 ranked criteria we are supposed to be following.

So I think they are both good maps.

It's not going to kill me either way if we adopt one or the other but I definitely think in terms of complying with our constitutional mandate I think the Birch is superior.

And I would encourage everybody to think about that and consider whether we want to make sure that we are going with the map with better COIs versus the map that is more competitive.

Commissioner Witjes I think you had your hand up first then Commissioner Eid.

I'm sorry can we let Commissioner Curry go first thank you.

>> COMMISSIONER CURRY: I just want to reply that I agree with Madam Chair in her response to the Birch map.

I agree wholeheartedly with that.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you Commissioner Curry.

Commissioner Witjes then Commissioner Eid.

>> COMMISSIONER WITJES: Between the two I think communities of interest are represented both quite well in the Birch and the Chestnut map.

That being said when it came to percentages that were brought up today in public comment by the individual from Haslett I'm wondering if he went on to the actual public

comment not the portal but the website with the proposed maps where you can place the pins.

I'm taking it in account when we actually had our first maps to that we published and all of our public comments hearings we went on the next five plus everything that we've heard in our public meetings that we had every two weeks Chestnut is indeed superior out of the two in regards to what the public has said.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Commissioner Eid?

>> COMMISSIONER EID: A couple things.

One I just want to point out that the Detroit configuration that is in Chestnut was also in map Juniper that went on the second round of public comments which was a collaborative map and we came back and selected this map and made it a collaborative map on Chestnut based on what Commissioners said was the preferred Detroit configuration.

So that is the first thing.

Second, just looking at how people said their preferences, there were 7 preferences, 7 first place preferences for Chestnut.

And four for Birch.

And out of those for Chestnut there were more than -- there were two independents two republicans and one democrat and just wanted to point that out.

Finally I think the independent analysis actually shows the opposite.

I think independent analysis are good tools we should use but most of the ones I read specifically IPPSR report from MSU preferred the Chestnut map.

I looked at other things, the Princeton gerrymander project, which has the maps as A's, which are good.

And 538 also has them all being the same.

So I think from an independent analysis standpoint they are all pretty good all three of them.

As far as community of interest goes, I think the Chestnut map is better in supporting communities of interest because the biggest community of interest here is the you know the minority community in Detroit.

And the BVAP being higher I think it does a better job of having that community of interest being represented.

While we have the Bengali community of interest represented very well in other versions of maps.

You know we said all along that not everybody is going to get every single thing they want in every map but I think it's a good compromise.

There are other pluses to as far as Oakland and Troy is included with the Oakland County District which is something that at Oakland University the community made very clear to us, they want to be in with most of Oakland County.

There are negatives though, you know.

It's not a perfect map.

I don't like how Chestnut has upper Oakland County.

I think the Birch map is superior to Chestnut in that regard.

But overall looking at all things in totality, I prefer Chestnut and going by what most people said 7 people said Chestnut was their preference.

So I'm wondering if we can get any wiggle room, maybe have somebody change their mind so we can come to consensus something like that.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Commissioner Lange?

>> COMMISSIONER LANGE: This is why I have a problem of listing the top two it's like a round Robin and I don't think that this is how we should do it.

I don't think we should be forced to say which ones we are.

And put somebody on the spot saying oh, well, 7 Commissioners think this one is the way to go so we just need to swing the last one.

That is round Robin in my opinion and I don't like it.

I just want to put that out there.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Thank you for your comment, Commissioner Lange.

So I do want to address the MSU report because I did read that in full like I read everything.

And the primary reason why MSU tipped in favor of Chestnut is because number one they are of the opinion that we are required to have 50% BVAP in order to have voting rights compliance and they favored Chestnut because it has a slightly higher BVAP in District 12 and 13 so to me I disregard that entirely because I trust the expert opinion of Mr. Adelson and he what's said we do not have to have 50% so the fact they are favoring one map over another because it has a slightly higher BVAP when that is not what we are supposed to be -- that is not a goal we are trying to achieve, I disregarded that analysis entirely.

Otherwise their analysis was there was no difference between the Birch and Chestnut they were functionally the same in terms of every factor they looked at.

All right, I feel like we talked about Birch and Chestnut so do we want to talk about I think Lange would be next on the list.

Any discussion, comments about Lange? And anything about Szetela? Did you have a comment Commissioner Eid?

>> COMMISSIONER EID: I was going to say I like the Szetela version.

It would rank after Chestnut and Birch because I think the collaborative maps should be ranked first but just generally speaking, I think I saw what you are trying to do.

I saw you did a good job of trying to put together the best parts of both maps.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: All right so let's go back to our.

>> MS. JULIANNE PASTULA: Madam Chair.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Let's go to Clark.

>> COMMISSIONER CLARK: I liked the Lange map and represented some of the areas that I think needed more representation than they have had.
I think she did a decent job on that.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Commissioner Witjes?

>> COMMISSIONER WITJES: Okay this is okay so we just discussed the Congressional maps now we are going to move on to Senate then the house basically do the same thing.
Does that make sense? Now we actually discussed the Congressional map, wouldn't it make more sense to go through the voting process now?

>> CHAIR SZETELA: I think Ms. Reinhardt wants to chime in and General Counsel probably wanted to chime in too.

>> MS. SARAH REINHARDT: Yes, Commissioner Witjes that is how what the voting plan contemplates is that we will go through all of the steps for each plan sequentially and then move on to the next District type.
So first we would go through all the steps for U.S. Congressional and then move on to the next set, which I believe is State Senate.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Just to clarify going through all the steps you are saying voting at this point.
Okay that is what I understood.
Commissioner Lange?

>> COMMISSIONER LANGE: There was the topic of potentially making changes to the maps.
At the beginning that said we would be coming back to after discussion.
So when do we come back to that?

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Commissioner Witjes?

>> COMMISSIONER WITJES: I'm going to make a motion right now that we do not make any changes to the maps.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Is that all maps or just these Congressional maps?

>> COMMISSIONER WITJES: All maps.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: Okay so we have a motion by Commissioner Witjes seconded by Commissioner Vallette to oh, gosh, how do I want to say this not make any changes to the map I guess, any maps, just any District type maps any discussion or debate on the motion?

>> COMMISSIONER WAGNER: My hand has been up a while this is Commissioner Wagner.

>> CHAIR SZETELA: I can't see you.
Please go ahead.

>> COMMISSIONER WAGNER: Thank you I also wanted to get back to actually amending the maps because as everyone on the Commission is aware I've got a letter of demand out there.

Exhibit 17

THIS EMAIL IS A PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION THAT CONTAINS LEGAL ADVICE.

OPEN MEETINGS ACT REMINDER: DO NOT "REPLY ALL" OR CREATE "CONSTRUCTIVE QUORUMS" AMONG A QUORUM OF THE PUBLIC BODY THROUGH CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHER COMMISSIONERS OR THROUGH SHARED ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS. DELIBERATIONS BETWEEN A QUORUM OF COMMISSIONERS OR MEMBERS OF A COMMITTEE CAN ONLY OCCUR AT AN OPEN MEETING. PLEASE CONTACT JULIANNE AT 517.331.6318 WITH QUESTIONS.

Dear Commissioners and Staff,

I wanted to provide updates on the following issues:

Competitiveness. I have consistently stated that competitiveness is not a constitutional criteria in Michigan. Attempting to add this consideration as a criteria creates a significant legal problem and leaves the MICRC wide open to a court challenge. First, there is no legal basis for including competitiveness in the criteria that the MICRC is constitutionally mandated to follow. This would likely be viewed as arbitrary and capricious by a court, particularly after receiving legal advice against inserting competitiveness. To date, it has been included in the not only the drawing of districts but establishing it as part of the MICRC record as well as the rationale by which districts were evaluated. Second, as I indicated again during the second meeting last Thursday, the data in the active matrix is disaggregated election results utilized for VRA compliance analysis and is not an approved method to evaluate political advantage (competitiveness). The full election dataset is not currently included in the data cube. I acknowledge that the MICRC has received public comment advocating for competitiveness to be considered. Again, there is no legal basis for this and inserting it as a consideration undermines our legal risk management strategy. Political considerations are expressly excluded from diverse population/COI criteria so that argument would also fail and put the MICRC's work at risk. Political boundaries (county, city, townships) are a discrete criterion so attempting to align under diverse population/COI criteria absent demonstration of shared characteristics is also highly inadvisable as the MICRC will have to defend its' decision to identify entire counties or other political units as a COI when it is defending its maps. Other examples of redistricting principles that are not included in Michigan's criteria and therefore cannot be considered are nesting, establishing multi-member districts, and maintaining cores of districts.

In his prior work, Mr. Adelson evaluated political competitiveness in a state that has competitiveness as a specific constitutional redistricting criterion, He well understands the difference between complying with that state's requirements and Michigan's and will share those distinctions with the MICRC. Again, competitiveness is NOT in Michigan's constitution and cannot be included now by the MICRC in its drafting. Looking at VRA selected election results is NOT an approved method for evaluating "disproportionate advantage" and "fairness" and must be avoided.

Partisan Fairness. This is one of the constitutional criteria in Michigan but it cannot and should not be intertwined with competitiveness. The mathematical models accepted by the courts are employed on statewide plans to determine symmetry and measure partisan fairness by establishing whether a statewide seats to vote comparison and relevant statistical analysis demonstrate disproportionate advantage. As I indicated during the second meeting on Thursday, the

data in the active matrix is disaggregated election results utilized for VRA compliance analysis. Courts have held that election results cannot be used to demonstrate disproportionate advantage or competitiveness. The partisan fairness measures will require another update by EDS.

Additional Analysis by Dr. Handley. Dr. Handley is available to perform the partisan fairness analysis as well as additional evaluation of voting patterns by race and ethnicity to identify whether homogeneous populations that are too small for RBV analysis or are not a separate racial category in the census (i.e., concentration of Hispanic voters or MENA population being categorized as White in the census form). A draft Appendix to amend the EDS contract is being finalized for the Commission to discuss and consider.

Incumbents. The language of the 5th constitutional criteria "[d]istricts shall not favor or disfavor an incumbent elected official or a candidate" also demonstrates the intent of the constitutional amendment to remove partisan considerations from the MICRC's work. The most effective way to accomplish this and shield the MICRC from individual requests of individuals stating where they intend to run is to not take into consideration any incumbent data and rely upon the partisan fairness measures in the 4th criteria. Any intentional actions taken by the MICRC relative to incumbents will need to be explained and rationale provided for the record. This will be almost impossible in heavily gerrymandered areas of Michigan allowing for a challenge of favoring out state candidates. Additionally, there is no meaningful way to gauge compliance with this criteria once that information is taken into consideration intentionally. Your legal team advises against incumbent considerations and has asked the Communications and Outreach Director to stop including articles outlining the impact of the MICRC's work on current or prospective elected officials.

Compactness. The Polsby-Popper test is currently in the EDS software. This test is essential to evaluate legal compliance with the final constitutional criteria. Mr. Adelson has indicated it is a best practice method used across the country and compactness cannot be legally evaluated without it.

Reconciliation of Legacy Data. EDS has indicated that the reconciliation between the legacy data released August 12th and the PL 94-171 data released September 16th is complete and the data sets have been verified. As you recall, this was an important part of mitigating legal risk and demonstrating that the data set is accurate, particularly earlier this year when there was uncertainty about the releases.

Another Michigan Supreme Court Order. On Saturday, I received an Administrative Order from the MSC stating that until emergency rules are adopted, the MSC will be issuing case management orders for any lawsuits brought by or against the MICRC. A copy of the Order is attached for your convenience. These case management orders will set forth dates/deadlines and procedural requirements and will be extremely helpful. However, it does note the likelihood of shorter timeframes and "nonuniform" periods which underscores the need to secure local counsel as soon as practicable. The Baker Hostetler contract has been signed but the engagement letter has not been finalized. The proposed engagement letter was not consistent with the contract terms or the terms set forth in the RFP. I forwarded recommended edits so that process is ongoing and I am hopeful it will be concluded this week.

Analysis of VRA Compliance. Barring any travel delays, Mr. Adelson will arrive at tomorrow's meeting about 1 pm which coincides with the end of the recess period for lunch. He has reviewed the Senate and Congressional plans drafted last week, is happy to address questions the Commissioners may have and he also has questions for the Commission. He will share his thoughts in regard to the draft districts drawn last week and discuss overall VRA compliance at the beginning of the afternoon session.

Lastly, another reminder to be thoughtful in your terminology to ensure it is not freighted as each of you are creating a record that you will need to defend not only collectively as a public body but also as individual Commissioners. Again, I urge that public engagement consist of active listening as opposed to talking. The MCIRC has shifted into the mapping phase of its work, advocacy efforts have significantly increased, and the increased risk of creating a record that will undermine the MICRC's work is too great.

As always, I remain committed to the work of the MICRC and each of you individually. Please do not hesitate to reach out to me.

Sincerely,

Julianne Pastula
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State of Michigan
Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission
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