




Multidrug Resistant Organisms in Michigan



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**Surveillance for Healthcare-Associated and
Resistant Pathogens Unit**
**Michigan Department of Health and Human
Services**



Multidrug-Resistant Organisms




Targeted Multidrug-Resistant Organisms




What do they have in common?

- Opportunistic pathogens that can **colonize** multiple mucosal and/or skin surfaces
- Cause a **variety of infections**, most commonly urinary tract, wound, and bloodstream infections, and pneumonia
- In **healthcare settings**, transmitted via **direct and indirect contact** with infected or colonized individuals or **contaminated healthcare environment**
- Are **emerging in prevalence** in the region


Colonization Drives Spread and Precedes Infection



Shedding of MDROs from colonized individuals leads to contamination of HCP hands and clothing and the surrounding healthcare environment




Colonization confers a 2-10 fold higher risk of infection with the colonizing organism than an individual without colonization





For every individual identified with an MDRO infection, there are some multiplier more who are colonized

COVID-19 Impact on Antimicrobial Resistance


- Resistant hospital-onset infections and deaths both increased at least 15% during the first year of the pandemic
- More than 29,400 people died from AR infections
 - Nearly 40% of the people got the infection while they were in the hospital
- Gaps in surveillance data and isolate submission






Data from 2018-2020 are preliminary.

Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales




Data from 2018-2020 are preliminary.

Carbapenem-resistant *Acinetobacter*





Candida auris



Data from 2018-2020 are preliminary.

Multidrug-resistant *Pseudomonas aeruginosa*

Candida auris is a Public Health Concern



Colonization amplifies the problem

5-10% develop invasive infections
~45% mortality within 30 days of invasive infection



Spreads in healthcare settings


Some facilities can develop >70%
colonization prevalence
Outbreaks can be difficult to
control



Only 3 classes of antifungals

>80% resistant to 1
>25% resistant to 2
>30 isolates pan-resistant

Candida auris Transmission is Increasing



Candida auris Transmission is Increasing


Reported clinical cases of *Candida auris*, 2013-2016





Reported clinical cases of *Candida auris*, 2017




Reported clinical cases of *Candida auris*, 2018



Reported clinical cases of *Candida auris*, 2019





Reported clinical cases of *Candida auris*, 2020



Reported clinical cases of *Candida auris*, 2021





Reported clinical cases of *Candida auris*, June 1, 2021-May 31, 2022



Territories AS GU PR VI MP

Candida auris Cases in Michigan




79 Cases Detected in 72 Patients:

- 16 patients by clinical cultures
- 7 patients initially identified on colonization screening subsequently had positive clinical cultures
- 56 patients by colonization screening only

- Screening
- ▨ Screening to Clinical
- Clinical


Preliminary data available 11-15-22

Specimen Source of MI *Candida auris* Isolates



Preliminary data available 11-15-22

Multiple Introductions of *C. auris* Followed by Local Transmission



Risk Factors for *Candida auris* in MI Cases



Older age

Median 59 yrs
(range 18->89)



Indwelling devices

Recent Mechanical Ventilation (73%)
Tracheostomy (64%)
PEG tube (64%)
CVC/PICC (44%)
Urinary Cath (41%)



Wounds

Chronic non-healing or surgical (67%)



Antifungals and antibiotics


Hx MDROs (48%)



Comorbid conditions

Chronic Lung Disease
Diabetes
Renal Disease
Cardiovascular Disease
Cancer

Multiple Healthcare Exposures are Common



**Acute Care
Hospital**



**Long-term Acute
Care Hospital**



**Skilled Nursing
Facility
w/Ventilator Care**



**Skilled Nursing
Facility**

**At Time of
Detection**

38%

58%

3%

-

**Exposures in
Last 90 Days**




99%

66%


20%

20%

Antifungal Resistance is Common in *C. auris*

Antifungal Class		US Isolates	MI Isolates N=21
	Azoles	88%	95%
	Polyenes	34%	0%
	Echinocandins (First Line)	3%	19%
	Resistant to 2	>25%	19%
	Pan-resistant	>30 isolates	0 isolates

Colonization Screening Conducted as Part of Public Health Follow-up



Candida auris Outbreaks Detected

Acute Care Hospitals



Medical ICU
3 patients



Med/Surg ICUs
4 patients
2 patients



Medical ICU
3 patients*
2 patients

Long-term Acute Care Hospitals



LTAC
12 patients



LTAC
33 patients

Skilled Nursing Facility w/Ventilator Care



Ventilator Unit
2 patients



New Admit/COVID-19 PUI Unit
2 patients

Skilled Nursing Facility



New Admit/COVID-19 PUI Unit
2 patients

Whole Genome Sequencing Detected At Least 2 Separate *C. auris* Introductions into HCF A

Genetic *C. auris* Clade

Clade I

Clade II

Clade III

Clade IV

★ = Michigan *C. auris* Isolate





First isolate detected at HCF A in urine culture
Azole-R, Echinocandin-S



3 isolates detected at HCF A on 1st PPS 3 weeks later
in axilla/groin swabs

Azole-R, Echinocandin-R

Carbapenemase-Producing Organisms are a Public Health Concern



Spreads in healthcare
settings




Highly
drug-resistant

Mechanisms of Carbapenem Resistance

- Altered targets
- Avoidance of targets
- Porin loss
- Efflux pumps
- Enzymes

Carbapenemases



Carbapenemases Vary by Organism



25-30% are CP



<5% are CP




>90% are CP

KPC, NDM, OXA-48-like, IMP, VIM


OXA-23, -24/40, 58, -235-like

Confirmed CP-CRE Cases Reported to MDSS 2018 - 2022Q3*




Preliminary – Data Subject to Change

Confirmed CP-CRE Cases Reported to MDSS 2018 - 2022Q3*




Preliminary – Data Subject to Change

Confirmed CP-CRE Cases Reported to MDSS 2018-2022Q3*



CRE Isolates Submitted to BOL 2018 – 2022Q3*



Preliminary – Data Subject to Change




CRE = Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales

Carbapenemase genes include KPC, NDM, OXA-48, IMP, VIM

**CP-CRE isolate submission required in 2022

■ Confirmed CP-CRE ■ All CRE Isolates

More Recent CP-CRE Outbreaks Detected





- Multiple outbreaks across settings
- Particularly in COVID-19 unit or during times of COVID-19 surges
- NDM *Klebsiella pneumoniae* ST 219 - >100 cases regionally (R2N, 2S)
- VIM *Enterobacter cloacae* ST 114 – 7 cases (R3)



- Contaminated Duodenoscopes
- NDM *Escherichia coli* ST648

NDM *Klebsiella pneumoniae* ST 219

- Sustained regional transmission detected since late 2019
 - Clonal outbreak from single introduction into the region
 - Outbreaks with multiple cases in ACH, vSNF, SNF as well as epi-linked single cases in facilities that share patients (intra and inter-facility transmission), and few non epi-linked cases




Summary of Targeted MDRO Trends

- Emergence of localized transmission of *Candida auris* in SE MI in 2022
 - Most cases are colonized, unrecognized status driving transmission
 - Outbreaks detected across healthcare settings, largest occurring in LTACHs
 - Multiple clades, some echinocandin-R strains detected
- Early analysis may indicate slightly lower rates of CP-CRE in 2022 vs 2020-2021
 - *very preliminary: data cleaning/case closeout in progress, isolate submissions(?)*
 - Continued detection and spread of NDM carbapenemases
 - Detection of targeted carbapenemases in non-Big 3 organisms
 - *Serratia & Citrobacter* spp. (KPC), *Proteus & Providencia* spp. (IMP)


What Can Healthcare Facilities Do?



Infection Prevention Practices



Identify Colonized and Infected Individuals



Communicate MDRO Status



Antibiotic & Antifungal Stewardship

Public Health

What Can ~~Healthcare Facilities~~ Do?


ICAR

PROJECT
FIRSTLINE



Infection Prevention
Practices


Facilitate
Screening
& Isolate
Submission



Identify Colonized
and Infected
Individuals

Assist w/Notifications

Promote Transfer Forms



Communicate MDRO
Status

NHSN
NATIONAL HEALTHCARE
SAFETY NETWORK

CHARM Project



BE
ANTIBIOTICS
AWARE
SMART USE, BEST CARE



Antibiotic &
Antifungal
Stewardship

New & Updated CDC Guidance & Tools for 2022

Interim Guidance for a Public Health Response to Contain Novel or Targeted Multidrug-resistant Organisms (MDROs)



Updates Coming Soon

National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases
Office of Infectious Diseases



Response Guidance
“Containment”

Interim Guidance for Public Health Measures to Prevent the Spread of Novel or Targeted Multidrug-resistant Organisms

NEW Coming Soon


Proactive Guidance
“Prevention”

Infection Control Response and Assessment (ICAR) Tools

Updates Coming Soon


ICAR Tools For All
Healthcare Settings

STOP ENHANCED BARRIER PRECAUTIONS **STOP**
EVERYONE MUST:



Clean their hands, including before entering and when leaving the room.

PROVIDERS AND STAFF MUST ALSO:




Wear gloves and a gown for the following High-Contact Resident Care Activities:

- Dressing
- Bathing/Showering
- Transferring
- Changing Linens
- Providing Hygiene
- Changing briefs or ass.
- Device care or use: central line, urinary tracheostomy
- Wound Care: any skin opening

Do not wear the same gown and gloves for the care of more than one person.

Updated July



U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Center for Disease Control and Prevention

Enhanced Barrier
Precautions Guidance
Nursing Homes

Thank You

Surveillance for Healthcare Associated and Resistant Pathogens (SHARP) Unit
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